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STATMENT OF THE PROBLEM
James Bryce, in his ch^ter on "Liberty,"^ observes that an analysis
of the concept of liberty together with the various meanings which the term
has borne is a subject vast enough to need a treatise and "no one seems to
have undertaken the task." This dissertation is an attempt to provide for
a certain portion of that analysis. It is not, however, the purpose of this
dissertation to give an account of all the meanings vhich have been attached
to the term liberty in the course of huraan affairs. This treatise does not
deal with tlie historical problem of liberty. Neither is its purpose to in-
terpret the meaning and implications of the notion of liberty in relation
i
to the problems of any specific state at any given time. The political
problem of liberty is not the problem. The province of this present inves-
tigation is philosophical rather than historical or political, though, as a
matter of fact, the three approaches cannot be finally held apart.
The philosophical problem of liberty is the problem of determining the!
general features or predicates of the concept of liberty wiiich are permanently
valid, together with the proofs to vdiich these predicates are amenable ^d
the assumptions upon vhich they rest. The philosophical problem of liberty,
I
as cctitrusted with the historical, is normative rather them descriptive; it
|
is not so much the investigation into what men have meant by liberty as the
[
!
delineation of what liberty ought to mean if men are to be consistent in the
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use of the concept. As contrasted with the political problem of liberty, the
philosophical inquiry is the search for first principles rather than the
application of these principles to cases. The political problem of liberty
bears the same relation to the philosophical problem of liberty which the
science of casuistry bears to theoretical ethics.
The concept of political liberty implies liberty in the context of a
social group, and it is mthin this frame of reference that the present inves-j
tigation will proceed. The problem of political liberty is thus the problem
of the relation of the individual to the group. It is doubtless true that
every social philosophy deals with this problem,^ but a complete social phi-
losophy deals also with aspects of the problem which lie outside the scope of
tlTe more limited topic of liberty. The concept of equality, the notion of
rights. Idle place and function of institutions, etc. all find place in a
complete social philosophy. The point is that although the problem of liber-
ty is a problem of the relation of the individual to the group, one may not,
therefore, expect a complete social philosophy to be presented in an analysis
of the concept of liberty.
In the light of these remarks the problem may be rephrased to state
that the purpose of this investigation is to determine whether in social
organization there are to be found any general principles governing the rela-
tion of the individual to the group of such a character that tliese principles
can be regarded as valid for a consistent definition of liberty, and to
2.
inquire into the nature and limits of this validity.
1. "A complete theory of individual liberty and the function of the
State is a conplete political philosophy; and a philosophy of politics in-
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PRELIIIINMY DEFICIT lOM OF POLITICAL LIBERTY
The term "political liberty” is used to distin.^ish the kind of liber-
ty under discussion from metaphysical or moral liberty, \vhich is the liberty
involved in the free choices of persons. Political liberty is to be distin-
guished also from -v^at might be called "psychological liberty," bjr vdiich is I
i
I
meant the freedom of an integrated personality^, Neither of these is our !
i
problem.
The ad.jective "political" in the term "political liberty’ is to be
understood in a broad sense similar to that in ^«jhich Aristotle used the word
|
vdien he described man as a "political animal." The terra "political liberty/"
|
in the context of this discussion is not to be confined to the teclinical
|
meaning viiich this same term bears in the science of government, namely, the
j
n !
right of the individuals of a state to daare in the government of the state.
n
' This is only one part of -phat is here meant by political liberty.
The extension -v^iich this term is to enjoy may best be set forth by
noting the various kinds of liberty wMch have been described. Janes 3ry/ce,
2 'in the chapter noted, describes foiir kinds of libertv as follo^TS: i
II
Civil Liberty, the exemption frcn control of the citizen in respect l|
of his person and property. '
Religious Liberty, exemption from control in the expression of
j
religious opinions and the practice of worship. 1
Political Liberty, the participation of the citizen in the government
j
of the community.
Individual Liberty, exemption from control in matters which do not so
pl^iinly affect the welfare of the iiiiole community as to render control
necessary.
In this dissertation the term "political liberty" is not to be understood
1. Cf. Br^/ce’s usage below.
• 2. Bryce, ID, I, 53-54.

in tlie restricted (and more usual) sense described above but is to be under-
stood as including all the above classifications. In the present vrriting
the term "political liberty" means the same thing as the term "civil or socia|!L
liberty" used by Mill. ^ The adjective "political" is thus used to indicate
any or all of those 8.ctions on the part of the individual vjhich have a sig-
nificance for the life of the group and conversely any or all of those action's
on the part of the group which are significant for the life of the individual',
These reiuarks are, of course, only a preliminary definition of the
I
term; they merely describe an area from vhich a critical definition is to be
derived. A final definition at this stage of the investigation would be i[
inappropriate since the task of arriving at a definition is the object of the"
*i
investigation and its natural conclusion. I
IS THERE A HIILOSOHilCAL PROBLEM OF POLITICi\L LIBERTY?
The implication of much contemporary vjri ting about liberty is to the
effect that every instance of liberty is one in uMch the term means some-
thing particular and the particular things vhich it means are various, and
often contradictory. Mr. 'vValton H. Hamilton asserts, for example, that
"there are, in fact, as many freedoms as there are persons to declaim its
p
greatness or to invoke it in the name of hvunanity."^ He points out that
freedom means different things to the negro, the industrial v.-orker, the
farmer, and the btAsiness man; the liberties they fight for are different, if
not contradictory. This writer’s opinion is that ". . .we can no more
define freedom than vre can realize it • • • Virhat it is, viiat it means, v.hat
I
1. Mill, LIB, 65.
2. Hamilton, Art. 1, p. 25.
‘C9L\. ^cf 3/ :fycr g/,; ft*
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it promises vary with the circumstances of society, the institTitions under
vhich we live, and the thoughts which variously lie within our several heads.
Mr. Horace M. Kallen points out the sai-ne kind of relativity,^ and Everett
D. Martin adds that "in the abstract the term liberty has no generally recog-
nized content, for liberty is alv/a;?e the ought to enjoy some specific condi-
tion, or to do, say, or think something to Vihich it is presujned somebody else
objects." These statements are correct in so far as they point to an actual
state of affairs; liberty has meant a great many things and these tilings are
often in conflict. To the classical liberals it meant freedom of economic
enterprise; to modern liberals it often means a denial of such freedom. T,^at
this fact establishes, hovrever, is not that a philosophical interpretation of
liberty is impossible, but that above all things it is most necessary. And
why a philosophical interpretation? Because in the nature of the case we are
seeking a normative rather than a descriptive interpretation and a normative
interpretation is philosophical rather than scientific, nothing could be
more impossible than to try to arrive at a definition of liberty by simply
describing all the different meanings -vdiich the term has borne in history.
I
As Kant might well say, such a method is merely "blind empirical groping,"
II and a student, after making his way through such a list of meanings, would
at the end inevitably ask, "Y/ell, #iat does liberty really mean?" The demand
wu-ch such a question embodies is the demand for some standard by wiiich
I particular or private liberties, ofben defended in the name of "Liberty,"
j
can be evaluated. Persons v/ho have argued for specific liberties and persons'
1. Hamilton, Art. 1, p. 25.
2. Kallen, Art. 1, p. 4.
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who have witten on the notion of liberty in e;eneral have inevitably assumed
such standeirds although the assumption is not often made explicit nor is the
task of rendering it clear and consistent often tindertaken. This, howver,
is the basic issue and until this issue is met it will be true that "we can
no more define freedom than w can realize it." There is, therefore, a
philosophical problem of political liberty.
REASONS FOR CHOOSING ROUSSEAU
The reasons for choosing Rousseau as the thinker in whose writings the
problem of liberty is to be studied are readily defensible. His importance
in the history of political philosophy vxould partially justify the choice.
It has been said that Rousseau was the "first, in modern times, to state the
problem of civilization effectively."^ A more significant reason, however,
is that the problem with which he wrestled visls the problem of liberty.
Hegel^ s judgment vfas that Rousseau, in answering the question of the founda-
2tion of the state, shifted the emphasis from force to freedom. It is prob-
ably correct to say that almost no one in the history of political philosophy
v/as a more passionate defender of freedom or searched more diligently for the
lasting foundations upon which to erect the edifice of liberty than Jean
I
Jacques Rousseau.
^ 1. Hbffding, JJR, vii. The author of the statement is Leo E. Saidla,
translator of Hbff^ding’ s book and author of the Introduction. Bergson’s es-
Itimate is that Rousseau is "la plus puissante des influences qui se sont exer-i
c^es sur 1’ esprit humain depuis Descartes" ( cpAoted by Schinz,LPR,1 ,2).
jB.A.G. Fuller (HL'EP,240) delcares that Rousseau is "by far the most important"
of the political and sociological thinkers of the eighteenth cent\iry. C.E.
Vaughan (PV-'R,! ,92-93) finds Rousseau "richer in speculative ideas than any
other man of his century* excepting only Kant, and Kant himself felt in
Rousseau a "rare penetration of mnd" (quoted by VIright ,HR,3)
.
2. Hegel, GdP, III, 527. Cf. also pp. 552, 639.
’J
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still another reason for choosin^^ Rousseau is the fact that although
he made gigantic strides in the direction of his goal he did not finally
arrive. "The great problem—which Rousseau raised mth more sense than the
j
critics have usually recognized ... he did not solve.
A
most rev^arding
approach, therefore, to the problem of liberty is an anal^rsis of the cause of
Rousseau’s failure, and tMs is especially reir^arding in view of the fact that
Rousseau by Ms failxjre opened a vjay to success. His ms a seminal mind,
quick to formulate and generalize the manifold feelings of his sensitive
nature. His failure to achieve a nicely-balanced s^^tem is less serious '
than it might be in view of the fact that he created the basic elements out
j!
of which such a system can be constructed. To discover these elements and
set Hiem free for a new combination is to go a great distance tomrd the
solution of the problem at hand.
A final reason for concentrating on Rousseau is the fact that the con-j
tradictory character of even the most recent interpretations of Rousseau’s i
political tiought is prima facie evidence that the interpretation of Rousseau
is nob a closed issue and that tlaere may still be opportunity for fresh in-
sights. These considerations doubtless vra.rrant the devotion of the greater
portion of the space of this dissertation, to the thought of Rousseau.
ITETHOD OP IF/ESTIG.'^J?I01T
The first objective in tMs study is a review of the work of previous
investigators. The writing on liberty is almost inexhaustible, but a review
of all this writing is not relevant to the problem since the literature deal^
almost without exception, not with the philosophical problem but vdth some
special phase of tlie problem of liberty, e.g., the historical, the economic.
1. Hfiffdihfi, J^,__prefac^, 3^iv.
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or it deals mth a particular liberty li^ie religious liberty, individual liberi
tj'-, the liberty of thour^ht and expression or of free association and assem-
I
1
blap;e. Occasionally it happens that a v^itinj^ vjhich purports to be a philo-
|
sophical treatment of the problem turns out to be a treatment Tfhiich merely
combines several of these aspects and notices onljr incidentally, if at all,
the basic principles iwhich any one of these aspects must presuppose.^ The
literature dealing mth the particular problem of this investigation is,
therefore, com.paratively limited.
Studies of the problem of liberty in the political philosophy of
Rousseau are even fevrer. Nearly every biography or criticism witten on this
author has, to be sure, some reference to liberty, but discursive analyses
of this phase of his thought are rare. The first aim, therefore, will be to
give an acco\mt of the vrorlc which has been done on this phase of Rousseau* s
thon'^ht and on the philosophical problem of liberty in r^eneral. This a'.dll
constitute the final portion of the present chapter.
The second objective is an expository and critical review of the
mitings of Rousseau vhich bear on the problem at hand. The vjritings to bd
reviev/ed are the folloi-dng: Discours sur les art s ejt 1^ sciences; Discours
sur 1’ origin de I’in^galit^; Emi le; I^oononie politique; Centrat social.
This list includes some vjritings -vihich are not strictly political and it
omits others, the occasional pieces like the v/ritings on Corsica and Poland,
i
and the writings on \mr and peace, ivhich are political. The reason for
j
omitting these is that they contajjn no s^’^tematic principles relev?jfit to the !
I
problem other than those presented in the Contrat social, and the reason for
1. F. C. Montague’s book, Limits of Individual Liberty, is an essay
of this kind. The point reached byirid*^ ^ar/eiV’Ts ,'~as~tlTe'"autho himself
admits, only "one or two stages beyond the point reached by those vdiose sole
interest is in party politics" (prefatory note, vii).

including the otliers is the fact that they do contain such principles. The
chronological order of the vnritings is not observed because the logical order
is more important. The first three belong together logically, as do the
last tir/o. The critical review of these vrritings mil be the content of chap-
ters tvjD and three
.
Chapters four and five mil be devoted to the interpretation of
Rousseau and the object of this interpretation Vvdll be to present the various
I
approaches vhich the author makes to the problem of liberty and to arrive at
some conclusion about the final status of liberty in his system. This probleiii
will be studied from the standpoint of the relations existing betw'een indi-
vidualism and collectivism, in Rousseau’s system and from the standpoint of th i
reactions of various critics to these two phases of Rousseau's thought.
Chapter six mil embody an attempt to reconstruct a valid definition
of liberty using
,
in so far as possible, the insights of Rousseau.
i




A stixdy of Idiis nature oijght properly to include some reference to the^
I
classics on liberty, especially Mill ' s essay. On Liberty. A review of this
j
I
writin.g and the other classics vail, therefore, be included in the appendix. !
I
t
These are not treated in the main body of the dissertation because of limita-j
tions of space and because of the logical necessity of preserving the unity
of the study. The conclusion, hov;ever, of Mill's essay, the only one of the
classics dealing vath the philosophical problem explicitly, is considered in




WORK OF PREVIOUS INVESTIGATORS
To review all of the writing on Rousseau -would he attempting to travel
through -what Professor Wright has called "the Serbonian bog of Rousseau criti-'
present investigation and needs not, therefore, to be revie-sred. Specific in-
•vestigations of the problem of liberty in Rousseau are rare, but the
jings bear upon -the problem of liberty# They are, as a matter of fact, the
jorux of the problem, because final judgment about the status of liberty in
Rousseau* s system cannot be made until a conclusion about the relation betiveem
the indi-vidual and the grovqp is reached* Rousseau* s critics comprise t-so
general classest (1) Those -who find some -way of synthesizing indi-vidualism
and collectivism in his -writings and thus proclaim the unity of his thought,
(2) those -who find a synthesis impossible and thus proclaim the disunity of
his thought# The argraments on both sides of this problem -will be revie-wed in
the chapters on the interpretation of Rousseau and in that connection the
contributions of the critics -will be noted in fuller detail# The general
atti-tude of the -works -which are related to this problem, ho-wover, may be
noted here#
Among the papers read in 1878 at the centennial commemoration of
Rousseau* 8 death, one is significant for our problem, that of Joseph Hornxmg
on "Les Iddes politiques de Rousseau*" This paper traces the disunity of
Rousseau* s -writing to a contradic-bi on in Rousseau between the man and the
citizen, the former being a capricious indi-vidual of absolute liberty, the
latter being a rigid disciplinarian like Calvin#
1* Wright, MR, 31.
cism#"^ Much of this criticism revolves around issues irrelevant to the
-tdiich the critics pass upon individusdism and collectivism in Rousseau* s -nri-t«
•.
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Simile Fagudt^ one of the guiding lights in Rousseau criticism, reiter*>
ates Homung’s thesis in his Dix»huitifeme si^cle, Etudes littdraires (1890)*
t(« Faguet holds -ttiat the political ideas of Rousseau embodied in the Conti»at
I
I
social contradict the ideas of Rousseau* s other writings and that the final
I
I ' "
outcome of his political philosophy is "the most precise and the most exact
j
organization of tyranny that can be*"* This same conclusion is repeated and
expanded in Faguet* s later book. La Politique congar^e de Montesquieu
,
i Rousseau et Voltaire (1902), a study -wfoich charges Rousseau with beii^ the
I
[
defaider of "popular despotism" and Voltaire with being the defender of "roy-
al despotism," -viiile Montesquieu is credited with being the upholder of the
!
liberal -view in the eighteenth century*
I
Monsieur A* Espinas, a less friendly critic, gives a biting analysis
of Rousseau’s inconsistencies in "Le *syst^me* de J* J* Rousseau" (1895)* In**
I
I
stead of a system, he finds in Rousseau a collection of fragmentary pieces
I
ajrtfully placed together end to end, the tnhole being "incoherent to the point
I
:
of impertinence*"^ This attack -was answered by M* Edmond Dreyfus-Brisac in
i
the same year -yiith an eurbicle under the same title*
I
M* Gustave Lanson, tho stands along -with ^ile Faguet and Edmond
Dreyfus-Brisac as one of the fountainheads of Rousseau criticism, tends to
minimize the contradictions of Rousseau and to imify his work by showing its
internal consistency and its close relation to his life. In his Histoire
de la Litterature fran^ise (1896) ho finds that the following theme unifies
the iriiole work of Rousseavs Na'ture makes men good and society makes men e^Tll;
society, therefore, should be and can be reformed, as can the e'vll indi-^ridual
idiom it has produced* The individual can be free in society because to be
1* Faguet, DBS, S91.
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J free means to submit to one’s proper will, *wfcich, for the civil msin, is the
general will.
Harald HBffding’s Jean Jacques Rousseau and Hie Philosophy (1896)
^ throws some light cn the politics of Rousseau in the summary given of his
thought. The main interest of this volume, however, is biographical and
expository with sane analysis and interpretation.
M* Henri Rodet follows Faguet rather than Lanson in his Le Contrat
social et les Id^es politiques de J» J. Rousseau (1909) and holds that in the
end Rousseau effaced the last vestiges of individual liberty.
The bicentennial celebration of Rousseau’s birth (1912) brought forth
many articles on the various aspects of Rousseau’s thought. Lanson*
s
article, ”L’unit^ de la pens4e de ^ean-Jacques Rousseau" (1912) repeats the
conclusions of his earlier study and contends that the ccaatradictions of
Rousseau sure merely the clash of critical formulas vhich are substituted for
the works of the author. His works are one with his life, Lanson contends.
Monsieur G. Beaulavon, in "La doctrine politique de Contrat social" (1912),
agrees ydiii Lanson, assorting, but without giving the detail of the proof,
that the contradictions of Rousseau are "purely apparent and verbal."^ The
unity of Rousseau’s doctrine is found in the central preoccupation of the
author, which is above all a morsd preoccupation. ]^nile Boutroux, in his
"Renarques sur la philosophic de Rousseau" (1912), follows Lanson in contend-
ing that Rousseau’s criticisms of society are directed against the abuse of
the social condition and not against society as such. The regenerated
^
1. These are published in the Revue de m^taphysique et de morale
,
20
(1912), or same may be found in Baldensperger, JJfe. Saclonaxin, Art. 1, is a
review of these anniversary articles with some added material.
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political state will restore the benefits of the natural order* But Boutroux
i




between the individual and the universal* He corrects Rousseau* s theory at
one point by holding Uiat the bsirrier between the individual and the group is
not as impenetrable as Rousseau supposes* The airticle of Jeem. Jaur&s, **Les
Id^es politiques et sooiales de J* J* Rousseau” (1912), gives the general
lines of Rousseau* s thought and is 63q>ository rather than critical*
Of all the bicentennial writers it remained for Monsieur M* Bourguin
to call strict attention to the discontinuity of Rousseau’s thought world in
his article **Les deux tendances de Rousseau” (1912)* The individualistic
spirit of Rousseau's literary works is opposed to the collectivism of the
political writings* Following Faguet, Bourguin says that the conciliation
j
I
of these contradictory tendencies is merely verbal in Rousseau* Other aspectij
I
of Rousseau’s thou^t exhibit the same double tendency, e*g*, the abstract
and the emcrete tendencies*
Albert Schins, who is perhaps the leading Americsm critic of Rousseau,
introduced a new element in the intei*pretation of Rousseau with his book,
Jean«»Jaeques Rousseaus A Forerxumer of Pragmatism (1909)* In this wark Schiiuj
traces parallel developments in the thought of William James and Rousseau,
contending that Rousseau's last great effort to imify his thought is to be
found in the ^ile and that the Anile is pragmatic*
I
gaspard Yallette’s Jean Jacytes Rousseau Genevois (1911) calls atten-
j
tion, not to the pragmatic attributes of Rousseau’s thought, but to its
Genevan characteristics, and concludes that the main influences shaping the
philosophy of Rousseau came, not from Paris, but from the city of John Calvin*
C* E* Vaughan did the students of Rousseau a great service by publish*
ing his two-volume edition of The Political Writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau
13 *
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(1915)« His interpretation of Rousseau as a strong collectivist is an im-
portant contribution to Rousseau criticism*
^mile Durkheim, in his lengthy article, ”Le Contrat social de Rousseau"
(1918), gives a history and an interpretation of the Contrat social * He joins
the group of Lanson and Beaulavon by contending that collective life, accord-
I
ing to Rousseau, is not contrary to the natural order and that one can find
I
j continuity in the tiiought of Rousseau*
I M* Daniel Momet, noted oritie of the Nouvelle Helofse, presents a
j
brilliant birief analysis of the -writings, the intellectual development, the
system, and the influence of Rousseau in his Histoire de la Litt^rature et
de la Pens4e Prancaise (1924)« Another general exposition, important for
i'





providing the background of the problem before us, is P* H* Wright’s The
Meaning of Rousseau (1929). The essentials of Rousseau’s system are clearly
eapounded in tliis work, but emphasis is allo-wed to rest upon ideas -which, in
the opinion of -liie present -wiriter, are marginal rather than central in
I Rousseau; but it happens that these marginal ideas are more consistent than
the ones which Rousseau makes central so that Professor Vkiright’s exposition
carries caavietion* He finds imity in Rousseau’s system by stressing, for
example, that -type of indi-vidualiem in which reason is central, leaving to one
side the type of indi-vidualism in which nature is central* The crucial ques-
tion in the interpretation of Rousseau’s political philosophy is the question
of -which -type of individualism \mderlies -ttie theory* We shall attempt to show
that Rousseau’s most constant appeal is to the -type of individualism in -which
nature rather than reason is basic*
Probably the best general interpretation of Rousseau is Albert Sohins’s
«
La Pens^e de Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1929)* The second volume particularly
presents a philosophical criticism of Rousseau’s work, and the inteirpretation
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holds that the life and the -«vritlng of Rousseau eochibit an alternation or a
mixture of "romantic*^ and "Roman" traits* In the end, the austere, Roman
pattern dominates the romantic pattern, and in Rousseau's polities this means
that freedom is surrendered to constraint.
Another genered -work of superior merit is the two-Tolume exposition of
Charles W* Hendel, Jean*Jaoques Rousseau Moralist (1934). This 'work might be
called a biography of Rousseau’s ideas* It shows the development of his
thought and the origin and background of his writings* The thesis is that
the orientation of Rousseau’s philosophy is moral throu^out.
A more strictly political analysis is fotmd in Alfred Cobban’s
Rousseap and the Mede
;
pn State (1934), a book tAiich was intended as a refutatien
of C* £* Vaughan’s description of Rousseau as a collectivist* A study of
Cobban’s contentions for the individualism of Rousseau makes a welcome point
of departure for the study of two important questions: (1) TShat type of indi»
i|
vidualism is basic in Rousseau's system? (2) Is the final outcoae of
Rousseau's theory favorable or unfavorable to the individual and his liberty?
These questions will be studied in this dissertation by making a comparison
of the argumaats of Cobban and Vaughan.
A recent contribution to the problan of freedem in Rousseau is the
inaugural dissertation of Erich Schwarz, Freiheit tuad Staatsomnipotenz in
Rous seau' s ,^Conbrat soo ial“ ( 19 36 ) Herr Sohwarz concludes, in a manner famil-
iar in totalitarian philosophies, that the individual is not surrendered in
Rousseau’s collectivism because the individual finds his freedom in fulfilling
the general will, and finds his protection in Hxe unity of his will with
that of the state* This interpretation Is faithful to the main emphasis of
the Conbrat social
,
but it suffers fr<m being derived frem that writing alone*
The Frenoh criticisms of Rousseau are also neglected
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Apart from Rousseau, the witing on the philosophical problem of
political liberty is small in smount, although the -writing on liberty in
general is almost endless* The classical literature on this subject, with
I the single excep-fcion of Mill’s essay. On Liberty , deals, not -with the philo-
sophical problem, bub with seme special aspect of liberty* Thus, Junius
Brutus’s Vindicae Contra Tyrannos (1579) -was a tract on religious liberty
addressed -to the French Huguenots* Milton’s Areopagitica (1644) is a plea
for the freedom of printing* Locke’ s Four Le-fcters on Toleration (1685-1704)
are a defence of the freedom of isDrship* The writings of Thomas Paine, par-
ticularly the Common Sense (1776) and the Rights of Man (1791-92), are mainly
an attack on monarchy and a defence of the American and French Rev-clutions*
Thoreau’s "Civil Disobedience" (1849) is a plea for individual liberty*
Mill’s essay. On Liberty (1859), is a philosophical analysis of the
problem of individual liberty* His vie-w is that "liberty consists in doing
what one desires,"^ subject to -the restraint that for sudi actions as are
prejudicial -bo the interests of others one may be held accountable by socie-
ty*^ As -will be sho-m later, the difficulty with Mill’s definition is that
it is oriented toward the desires of the individual rather than toward the
properties of social organization* This unfortunate orientation results in
the fact that the obligations wiiich the gro\;p o-nes the indi-vidual are omitted
entirely*
Last in the list of the classics is Sir James Stephen’s Liber-by
,
Equality, Fraternity (1875), -ahich is an anti-liberal, anbi-democratic denxin-
ciation of Mill’s essay, coupled with a vigorous defence of coercion* It
^ has no principles to contribute to a philosophy of liberty*
1* Mill, LIB, 170.
2* Ibid*, 167*
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I: Mr. Walter Lippmann, otiose -VBriting on liberty bears mostly on the
T'
economic aspect of the problem, makes the suggestion in Liberty and the Ne-ws
(1920) that the familiar arguments for liberty are narrow because they plead
for toleration in matters which their authors regard as of "indifferent”
importance, -ihile at the same time introducing qualifications -which deny tolex^
ance in those ma-tters to -which the -wnriters are opposed. Indifference, he
concludes is too feeble a foundation for liberty.
Mr. Harold Laski, in his Grammar of Politics (1926), links liberty with
equality, or the absence of special pri-wllege, and defines liberty as "the ^
right of personal initiative in -the things that add to our moral stattire,"
or as "that atmosphere in -which men have -the opportunity to be their best
sel-ves."^ One chapter in Liberty and the Modem State (1950) presents the
-view that "liberty is essentially an absence of restraint. It implies power
to eacapnd, the choice by the individxial of his owq -way of life without im-
posed prohibiticns from -wdthout."^ In -liie article on "Liberty” (1935) in -the
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences
,
however, Mr. Laski emphasises method,
and makes the existence of liberty depend upon "otar willingness to build the
foundations of society upon the basis of rational justice, and to adjust them
5
to (hanging conditions in terns of reasoned discussion and not of violence."
Professor John Dewey also stresses the importance of method in his
paper, "The Future of Liberalism" (1934). He holds that method is the central
-thing in liberalism. The -weakness of earlier philosophies of liberty was
their atomism. Liberty -was conceived as a ready-made possession of the indi-
-vidual, ra-ther -than as an achievement ^diich stands in relation to physical,
1. Laski, GOP, 143.
2. Laski, lilS, 1.
3. Laski, Art. 2, 446.
•iff- J 'x-i'-.'id zl >'- :.'. *?v <Hl ''• ‘I* »
r."w.. .' X"
-
- 3<?»:iV«r v-icr a/fo- *vO vr>>;«::;3 o:.):,nao’>$
3,'Mi 3 oy cJ' vr'o
f




'’ aa ;5‘^.-/'Xin v.-:)- - isnl-ifw i ;; .r. r. •.<.•
.
tXi!it.fp '‘A/i'S>y6o*TAhti: ©cd# -vjrf' J',3 (»£lm ^
•
p-i;
yr.; ?X-'' . ’i»<ociTC ‘'ijK Hiai-i'iw ihMiitf oX t;-.'- .;' •*7 'loaoii^ 'vx •aav
»
'r'l'i /rOi:-tx!-L'>»aro-'i a yX-J-) )‘‘ oyJ 3 X s '!£vi'i?>..'i''
r cr '"i'/ / 'iftra^'xO :i?,Xal , ':*e*.3 bXc'X/’H .'.’itW'
'"I
J
>'., : /'I c:-' ,. ,0y; , • {••V*
p'
*i uX X.! ;ti T-' if -'.o '.'• , 3^v X y c
oc?' f^TT i'VA'i roaiit.; i' ,w. «'» ‘5C
>r;.t '..'.j K'XPi’'i .'.•tic' ...




'•n:,'- J’«oiX“vX‘-- .X, ZX If ff.jv fyj-o lo I.e{rf. ' ?’ ‘''r : ''vli ycf ^t-Xoriy y.- ;?•
,
;>rq/xir.' cc?





,X^.^l':r riyx r *' , , • -xfv I0
yXJ',;
'' *' 7 Xi,*.vf 'iv/o” coot}' {«i9q< aO o u'y.JtriJXirJ ftffd- w-jW.
,'i'X c f lanc/Zc^jc^ ’i') yiyrft :ioi;fr' y;inZy:»3 '2“o aAr^t'Xc''.
IC'Z'.- 'X; .J-X 3 Xxic TOi.3 Sj:’r-.'j;ii6 <SyaC'j£**-/' 'io r'i' a ai
X’o r- •f;, •'•jr' 3 c-:;X£: y'->vV'‘'a xXoX '!y'.to-jX[
X’j'idcno 3 : b- ' •' V- fj XX sblorf or , ' .•X;! ,t *^603 ;' !.‘/ri'3dx.i Xo ac:’!’' , ':a.3jj-;v
'Xv'H'/.XC Z.o - Lii'iO^iyxliiq ‘I t* 'luiyifiX i:i xv.X'w
•'.
:..Z *-.. ^
'0 r-JA r.riacr'oc ,-Nfv»f*f,'»Yf'*vin 8 J1 > e.fsrf v ‘ »-TL‘3 i'rtf0.ta
,
oJ' 'cr> ^>3.rf''.' .:f '..OiW ,'Ti r'/xfirr d’o:i«srtCC»3rf.tX''*Oi' ,:i» n.a afixyJ- 'tOii;i,'Tn
'
w*^ .iki..* M ••. 4«* * t V»IM





economic^ legale political, and other conditions.
Professor W# E. Hooking* s paper on "The Future of Liberalism" (1934)^
outlines a view rhich was later developed in his book. The Lasting Elements
I of Individualism (1937). His contribution to the problem of the individual-
group relation is the conception of the "co-agent state," -which is character-
ised by the "oommotive function" and the "incompressible individual." The
former signifies the ability of individuals to move together in those domains
in liiich all have an interest. The latter refers to the fact that neither
the state nor the individual is tree to deny the irrepressible nature of con-
science. This conception of the state maybe described as aiming at a society
of free beings, a society in vhich state policies are formed out of the ideas
of the competent members of the state itself. There is to be freedom, but
not the atcmistic freedom of laissez-faire liberalism.
The 1930* s brou^t forth a number of books on liberty. Among them
were Everett Dean Martin* s Liberty (1930), Herbert Hoover* s The Challenge to
Liberty (1934), Walter Lippmaim*s The Method of Freedom (1934), John
MacMurray’s Freedom in the Modern World (1934), Bertrand Russell’s Freedom vs .
Organization (1934), William F. Russell’s Liberty versus Equality (1936),
and George Soule’s The Future of Liberty (1936). These works deal, not with
the philosophical prdblCTi of liberty but with seme special phase of the prob-
lem, usually the economic or the historical.
>
1. The papers by Dewey and Hocking are parts of a symposiian on Liberal-
ism sponsored by the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Associa-
tion. The other papers may be found in the Jour. Phil ., 32(1935), and in the
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CHAPTER II
THE V.RITIHGS OF ROUSSEAU
THE DISCOURSES
Rousseau’s first Discourse^ "was an essay on the question proposed
I
hy the Academy of Dijon: "Has the Restoration of the Arts and Sciences
r 2Had a Purifying Effect Upon Morals?" The answer of Rousseau is direct ajid
j!
iimqualified: "Our souls have heen corrupted in proportion as our sciences
|l
,1
jiand arts have advanced tov®.rd perfection*" The product of this advance,
I
so far as man is concerned, is artificiality and deceit, -sdiich we are




Historically, societies -Rhich have "become civilized have become physically
weak, and been conquered* The physical and military virtues flourish or
fade in proportion as the arts and sciences are absent or present*^
I
The sciences have sprung from our vices and their progress has added
j
i nothing to oxa* real happiness* Luxury has corrupted our morals and vitiated j
g from
our taste*® This is a state of affairs.which nature, left to her ownA





2. Bosanquet complains that the title of this Discourse is rarely
j
stated correctly and he cites Morley (R, I, v) and Saintshury (Ency* Brit*,
I Art* "Rousseau") as offenders* The French for "Restoration of the Sciences
and Arts" is "Retablissement des Sciences et des Arts*" He contends that
j
this refers explicitly to the Renaissance so that it is a question of the
j
moral outcome of the Renaissance (Bosanquet, Art* 1, 323-24)*





5. Ibid,, 5-10; 12-14*
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devices^ vrouId have snatched men, "as a mother snatches a dangerous weapon
from the hands of her child*”^ This "weapon” has operated to destroy "the
simplicity -vihich prevailed in the earliest times,” the image of which "may
he justly compared to a beautiful coast, adorned only by the hands of
naturej toward idiich our eyes are constantly turned, and which we see re-
ceding with regret,”^ The departure from the state of nature is a departure
from the state of virtue, because the principles of virtue are graven on
the heart of the natural man« To learn the laws of virtue we need only to
"examine ourselves and listen to the voice of conscience, when the passions
•2
are silent."^ The artificiality, the immorality, and the corruption of
modern societies are due to the departure from this early state of sim-
plicity, and the cause of that depart\n*e is the advancement of the arts
and sciences*
Such is the line of the argument* Civilization, instead of bring-
ing the individual a larger liberty has brought him only a more vicious
bondage* Bosanquet interprets the attack here as against civilization
under the aspect of intellectualism, an indictment of the view which holds
that the panacea for the evils of the world is the extension of our
Imowledge of the laws of nature and the advancement of science, vhile the






4. Art. 1, 326.
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The second Discourse ,^ like the first -was -written as a prize essay-
on a question proposed hy the Academy of Dijon: "Quelle est I’ori^ine de
I
I’in^galit^ parmi les homes, et si elle est autoris^e par la loi
nattirelle?" This particular form of the question implies a reference to
the "state of na-ture," and Rousseau follo-wed this suggestion in drafting
his ans-wer. As in the first Discourse
,
his ans-wer here is a glorification
of the state of nature at the expense of ci-^ril society* He summarizes his
argument as follows:
II suit de cet exposd que I’in^galit^, dtant presque nulle dans
I’^tat de nature, tire sa force et son accroissement du d^veloppement
de nos facult^s et des progr^s de 1’ esprit humain, et de-vdent enfin
stable et legitime par 1’ ^tablissement de les propri^t^ et des lois.*^
Fully half of the second Discourse is occupied vdth a description of
the benefits of the state of nat\nre. Some ha-ve lamented the vagueness of
A
Rousseau* s conception of nature but the accomt in the second Discourse
seems adequate enough. The state of nature is a state of natural goodness
and not, as Hobbes conceived it, a state of bellum omnim contra omnes.
... Plusieurs se sont hSt^s de conelure que l*homme est naturell-
ement cruel, et qu’il a besoin de police pour I’adoucir; tandis que
rein n’est si doux que lui dans son ^tat primitif, lorsque, plac^
par la nat\Are A des distances ^gales de la stupidity des brutes et
des lumiAres funestes de I’homme civil • . *^
1, Discours sur l *origine et les fondements de I ’in^galit^ parmi le s
homes (DSI^, 1755, in Vaughan, PWR, I, 125-220.
j
2. Vaughan, PWR, I, 125 note. This Discourse
,
unlike the first one,
did not -win the prize.
3. Vaughan, PlffR, I, 196.
4. W. A. Dtuming, for example, says that "seeking to comprehend
; clearly his conception of ^nature’ is like trying to visualize the fauna
i of the Apocalypse" (HPT, III, 13).
j
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the basis of civil society is the source of "crimes, -wars, and murders."^
Mais, d^s 1’ instant qu’un homme eut besoin du secours d’un autre,
d^s qu’on s’aperovrb qu*il ^tait utile h. un seul d’ avoir des provisions
pour deux, iMgalit^ disparut, la propridt6 s’ introduisit, le travail
devint n^cessairej et les vastes forets se changbrent en des campagnes
riantes qu’il fallut arroser de la sueur des horames, et dans lesquelles
on vit bientSt I’esclavage et la mis^re gemer et cro^tre avec les
moissons. • • • Ce sent le fer et le bl^ qui ont civilis^ les hommes
et perdu le genre h\imain*^
i
' The happiest epoch in human history was that semi-social period in-
Itermediate between the absolute savagery of the primeval state and the
modern civil society, a period in which, although it represented some ex-
pansion of the hrxman faculties, nevertheless kept "a just mean between the
I
indolence of the primitive state and the petulant activity of our egoism."'^
I This state, as near to the state of natwe as it is possible for hinnan be-
I
ings to be Yhile at the same time depending on each other for the simple |
necessities, was "the happiest and most stable of epochs," and the departure
from it must have been "only through some fatal accident, -vdiich, for the
,
public good, should never have happened • • • All subsequent advances have
'
I
been apparently so many steps towards the perfection of the individual, but j
,4in reality towards the decrepitude of the species.
1
Rousseau traces the progress of inequality through three stages:
!
1(1) The establishment of property; (2) the "institution of magistracy";
(3) the "conversion of legitimate into arbitrary power The growth of
civil society is thus a grovrth in exploitation. Injustice, on this vievf,
I




4. Loc. cit. I
I
5. Ibid., 190.
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is the inevitable product of the civil state; government is an instrument of
oppression serving the rich against the poor* This is not an accidental
state of affairs arising in a situation •where the aims of government have
been prostituted and the po'wers of government abused, but it is a natural
and inevitable condition necessarily conjoined -vidth any government whatso-
e-ver* ’’Car les vices qui rendent necessaires les institutions sociales sont
les m^es qui en rendent I’abus inevitable.
Such then is the contrast bet-ween the state of nature and the state
of society in the second Discourse * Society and la-w have destroyed
natural libertjj and the civil state, instead of conferring advantage upon
the individual, destroys utterly the ad-vantages udiich the indi-vidual en-
joyed in a state of nature*
THE SkiLE
A third writing, -vihich Rousseau considered as forming a vhole with
|[the t-wo already mentioned, is the l^ile *^ On this work Rousseau spent
I
'
t-wenty years of meditation and three years of labor* ^ He regarded it as
Ijthe best as -well as the most important of his -writings*^ It is a treatise
on education but the last book is presented as an abstract of the Contrat
I
social .
1* Vaughan, PWR, I, 190. Cf. also 180-81 and ^ile, IV in Oeu-vres .
I'll, 206.
2* ". . * Ce premier Discours
,
celui de I’in^galit^ et le Traitd de
l*dducation; lequels trois ouvrages sont insd'parables, et forment en-




li-vre, VIII in Oeu-vres
,
VIII, 275*
4. Ibid., Livre, XI in Oeuvres, IX, 22.
I
is the inevitable product of the civil state; government is an instrument of
oppression serving the rich against the poor* This is not an accidental
state of affairs arising in a situation •where the aims of government have
been prostituted and the po-wers of government abused, but it is a natural
and ine'vitable condition necessarily conjoined -with any government whatso-
e-ver* "Car les -vices qui rendent necessaires les institutions sociales sont
les nl^es qui en rendent I’abus inevitable.
Such then is the contrast bet'ween the state of nature and the state
of society in the second Discourse * Society and la-w have destroyed
natural libertjj and the civil state, instead of conferring advantage upon
the individual, destroys utterly the advantages -^diich the indi-vidual en-
joyed in a state of nature*
THE ^klLE
A third writing, -which Rousseau considered as forming a -vihole -with
j
the t-wo already mentioned, is the ^ile *^ On this work Rousseau spent
*2
t-wenty j;ears of meditation and three years of labor* He regarded it as
|ithe best as -well as the most important of his -writings* It is a treatise
on education but the last book is presented as an abstract of the Contrat
social .
|!
1 . Vaughan, PWR, I, 190. Cf. also 180-81 and ^ile, IV in Oeu-vres .
i!ll, 206.
2* ". . * Ce premier Discours
,
celui de I’indgalitd et le Traitd de
1’ Education; lequels trois ouvrages sont inseparables, et forment en-




li-vre, VIII in Oeu-vres
,
VIII, 275*






JO ^Ti'\ -xr^ j. r > </ ri. ; ••/ Xivt:.-
.rjjs of I oi ai/i:
•*:00''i brfi :‘r2’f »n:f .'rr-ir -je-i;-.:,.
»v/3^ »-v-i';'. *' 1 ie; • *rr{,;.''x£! aTiii'rtj !c
r.-*'-. ...•Ar .a ii'i Jx ti.DCi)0’n ,f\\r':ii?3'i0^cr5 ! a^wj-T Ain-> £-rt) xi&fvrf
'jr!'v :te?-tiar ’.B- n' rj'aJjir i>fwri v' I /*./''*- >t> ':•»/; I’cir/fecc'j f>XdBJS :
, I'oJ-J fr<S l&'rri r.yf i /•ai ' -.W.. ‘.ivor i.»*t ?o^^v a--'!
3"
-.
.)3 v-t>- >- .• * p.- .A.i/y.?; ao.w led -j c o arid ir.
r_, 'vxf <-:0ja ^ s'u.ootxu Ji'-'.'t o£-3 rri T^r'. '•£ . .
-v‘;v f-'- '1 ;f jj.'i v’ff^ix
1
w :',*.• •‘•.•^r.ni .SACtP^ia f rm
&
biu= ;'j‘-i€>dil
-L? 'fijivi .:'tx’':x atW5>-'..t •'• add vf.Vidtrf :! Lx'i '><iv
0 'lo *:' tree's .<'ij )v«;of.
y-:'..
*» *>Xoi'iir X '*& xv;- -• dvl-M . : x. . ,v-iix< < A
j'oea^uor >So’». t.':i''' ;.> ‘As - . • ..•'' -x ^ O'vt iv;
yx -it !::. nZ '• . • •• •= X " ' >•/ /i--> *5:
o'
-avium •»//:•
i ij 'jil :<'I , ^ /xx Ic -'i /.'/» 'aoxt fA-'V 'x 7. » «;*•<
xfij'j.iir--. ' ea,:' 'io aV 0* .’ '.'Tq ^0;-'. I 'jrj ac
,
'
.n? ;T hiv; j,' -U'
r
-'^3 .<:0f ,J' ,-.'''1 /

















The reason for linking this -writing -with the t-wo preceding is doubt-
1
less that the thought familiar in the two Discourses, that nature is good
/ 1
and society is bad, is taken up again in the Emile * It has been said that
the central thought of the simile is expressed in the opening sentence: "Tout I
!




mains de I’homme*”'^ This -work, like the earlier -wri-tings, is a plea for morj
[
nature and less society, "Everything should therefore be brought into hamonjr
I




natiire and follo-w the path -which she traces for you," he commands. The usua^
!
I
description of the system as "education according to na-ture" is^ therefore,
j
' 5 '
accurate and in keeping -wdth -the author’s o-wn estimation of his system. The.
I
goal or aim of education, says Rousseau, is the same as -that of nature. "Quej
est ce but? C’est celui m^e de la nature; cela -wlent d’etre prouv^,"°
Education is only habit, and the problem, therefore, is to cultivate habits
•which are conformable to na-bure.
This plea for nature is balanced by a correlative condemnation of
society, "Tout n'est que folie et contradiction dans les insti-tutions
humaines,"' Society is the cause of -weakness in man because society places
1, Vaughan, PWR, I, 15,
















a restriction upon the natural strength of man vhile at the same time increasjf
ing his desires through the stimulation of the imagination, this latter beingj
the work of ”h\mian prejudice and human institutions.”^ Man must call hack
2 'his life to vdthin himself if he is to escape his misery. Prevailing stan-
|
dards violate nature, destroy individuality and prohibit freedom.
j
In this contention Rousseau was undoubtedly right. Artificiality was
I
the cult and fashion of the period. Education, instead of producing men,
j
produced "embroidered, gilded, pompadoured, and poiwdered little gentlemen"
1 /
who were well versed in the empty art of "striking charming poses, repeating
i|
‘i
compliments learned by heart from the tailor, the hairdresser and the dancing|>
master. "2 A stand against the moral futility and the political injustice of
the period of Louis XV was in order and Rousseau’s was the voice of the
prophet. "All our wisdom consists in slavish prejudices," he cried. "Civil
man is born, lives and dies in slavery. At his birth they sew him up in
swaddling clothesj at his death they nail him down in a coffin. So long as
he maintains the figure of a man he is chained by our institutions."^ Speak-
ing of the habit of midwives in rubbing the head of the infant to give it a
,|
i'
better shape, he taunted them with believing that "our heads would be bad as i|
I
fashioned by the Author of our being; it is necessary for us to fashion them ij
on the outside by midwives, on the inside by philosophers."®
|j
Rousseau proposed to cut throu^ this net of slavery spun by conventio|ti












f.v ? ^ riert 'to , i+; ; a T ..-f .t T.--jr ;, i:|?( ^r.•^5'}•• ^
a/v
: t :J ;,u ! :r’'^LL yn" 'lo !: .-nf i \ J i;'i.'..f oo~^; ;.' :.'•, :• I
l-,h''l &r.:..r.r rvili *• ", •;i’r'.’- “ri .(W'n.'fri' tm/} »o iJ?.-:/'.-" vq sj/i-n/rif” ‘1>'; .i*;' t
-•»
- M.T-; y" I •'•''•iH ^v.i; --'.x n sjrf ai' :'d 'is faa/rtjT..-. iw o;r ; h
..aOOV-;*il J i.fj-,;'0':q iW ».7x iXv’yivioai ; jJ; '[ 0.ttI.UV ‘-.c-i't.
s co.' i.Lrf-'^,, . M;:. vJ' y/;iv ?> y.c: '' re i/rr j^i
r
^ "
, . . '-rr ‘V.- u ,-;i hjj3 i^Lno
'
.01 yl.ri'r jooTiSirog ,.v ^ I)^Do!:.r; ji
• !' ""'•
-r; -T/!i/o vuf^fild-S " lo 7T^ V j :r.r^ n ^ ;/ [£_-; ,>.jv''
jl'rrr..'.. CM :: ; I'*; .:f?;{ ©**0
,
':<•• Tisio'' f.dd 'i .•'x'! c»rf v>‘f Wr*S/:©I ?. [q.’tT'O
'}
-
. -yi.’uiIQClI I iXog 'ido /x'W r->':..!J!T ' J-^o fJ3*>£t ifj.isJ'J A ‘ , '.©J-asr-
;;';a 10 >-;o v; 'iv ? ' fii.e • (yr' o nc VX .ej n.3r*j;:;c vrk’
.f'''0’ .h-i'-i'j f'.i
-'^jC L-.i 3.-.- Irm.o ''\.:’".ir -i.vO 'XA’” . .+ :'
0 .' 0 /! fi:,' X ;v 3y ,'f ? .'.n’
3C .. . ,,r.^‘to... c ' :!’TOh »iTc.’:f Ci;©’" -^yr/r" rirr’rt ; d rt,;> ;o ^ 'e .[-0
' ''"•o.a yTT;; V rcion c 'i-;c
'v.’.' L^.-rr ^pj'i 0 ?i ou' aom si 'lo ^ vi‘'..' r^./i cjc:i ,v'





'X :** i T:C) ox? if oifj" ;-i.fr it ?</;,• 1 stc aov im '10 :-r'd' ‘ .v
XX- e- bXM •-».%' rxiit ,5Ki\-oj Xx.rf liiXw wti.J bjd.XfJisJ -r ,0-r;'ffx ^
•
' ' ''





.ic; •• ' ij/otir i’-- .x9VWbX:n ^;o •^l.lod'xo 'ClI' y'
•oilvrovi.'- > ... ; or 3 r*iov’l 3 lo ' • .. ir
.
i;









S'. ;.-xv(.ro J- n I
» Of;
,
, : ,: o'; , 2
,i'oS
,




"train a man for himself" and not "for others,"^ thereby allowing the indi-
viduality which nature has given him to come to a full, free, and natural
expression* The circtimstances of the period were set against such an aim and
the contempt which Rousseau felt for those circumstances penetrated his inner-'








against the society of the time or against civil society as such. Whatever
may be the judgment upon this matter with respect to any single utterance, an
analysis of the piinciplerupon -vdiich the system of education rests will show
I
a confusion. Even if one grants the assumption (and it is not- alvreiys easy to
I
I




of the society of the time, the fact remains that the principles of the sys-
' tern are not always consistent with the principle of social life* In order to
j










child alone* Do nothing until his individual bent or his natural disposition
I
has been discovered* Having discovered this, one then chooses the "fittest
j
moral training*"^ The first period of training extends up to the time vhen
reason manifests itself and this training is purely negative, purely natural*
The pupil is allowed vinrestricted freedom to do as he pleases, with the singl i
exception -that the means of doing damage are to be placed out of his reach*
Any fear about the child’s dodng evil in this state of natural liberty is
dispelled with the statement that in nature there is no evil* "Posons pour
maxime incontestable que les premiers mouvements de la nature sent toujours
1* Oeuvres, II, 6*
2* Ibid*, 61
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droits; il n»y a point de perversity originelle dans le coeur humain . •
The second step in the training of the child is to establish the
I
notion that the child’s liberty must be limited by -what is necessary in the
j
nature of things. In accordance -with this principle the pupil is to be "put
|
I
in his place and kept in it,” His whims and caprices are to meet with the
stem opposition, not of another will, but of necessity. He is to feel upon i
I
his proud head the hard yoke which nature imposes upon man, the yoke of
|
necessity,^ The desires of the pupil are, therefore, to be limited until
j
they are consistent with what is possible in the nature of things. This is
j
equivalent to extending one’s strength, for to limit our desires comes to the
|
same thing as to increase our strength,^
j
The third step in the training limits farther the liberty of self-
j
!
assertion, and the limitation now is in accord with -vihat is necessary in the i
natxire of society. The elaboration of this principle reveals a new concep-
I
tion of society and this ccnception is more reasonable and restrained than i
I
any heretofore presented. According to this new view the consciousness of
society is to arise naturally in the child’s mind and it is to come from a
recognition of the importance of the industrial airbs, which are social in
character because they require the cooperation of many hands. ^ Through
1. Oeuvres
,
II, 60, Nature "does everything for the best" ( Ibid.,
47). This is one of the teachings -vihich placed Rousseau against the accepted
doctrine of the time, for the prevailing belief was in the Christian doctrine
of original sin. Here he came into conflict with thinkers on the right. He
incurred the opposition of the intellectuals on the left when he made reli-
gion central in the life of the state. By this curious circumstance he
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I acquaintance with these arts the pupil learns the mutual dependence of
mankind* He also comes to see that society is a natural association in which
each man reaps a reward for himself as the result of the specialization of
talent and effort in general. This is the plain principle of all our institu4
tions.^ ”Sur ce principe, un homme qui voudroit se regarder comrae un %tre
isole% ne tenant du tout k rien et se suffisant k lui-m^e, ne pourroit Stre
que mis^rahle*”^
The state of society, once establi^ed, makes it impossible for an
individual to live in a state of nature. Consequently, he must find his
freedom in the social state. But this also is natural since man is not made
to live alone. The stxjdy of his relation to his fellow men is, therefore,
just as natural as the study of his relation to the physical world.
L’dtude convenable k I’homme est celle de ses rapports. Tant qu’il
ne se connoDt que par son 9tre physique, il doit s’^tudier par ses
rapports avec les choses; c’est l*emploi de son enfancet quand il
commence k sentir son 8tre moral, il doit s'^tudier par ses rapports
avec les hommes; c'est I’emploi de sa vie entifere . . .^
In these passages, which show with remarkable clarity that society is a naturf*
al and rational fbrm of association, Rousseau asserts the Aristotelian notion]
that man is a political animal. The social state is one -viiich answers a
need in his nature. Rousseau recognizes this fully. He says: ”^mile n’est
pas fait pour rester tou;)ours solitaire; membre de la socirtk, il en doit
remplir les devoirs. Fait pour vivre avec les hommes, il doit les oon-
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art for the man and the citizen.”^ The social state is thus natural to the |
individual and a part of the education of the individual consists in learn- '
I
ing to subordinate his self-assertiveness to social necessities. Hence,
Rousseau calls for the subordination of the particular -will of the individual'
to the volont4 g^ndrale . '
This idea is developed in Book V of the &iile
,
and this book is
j
p !
"mostly extracted from the Treatise on the Social Contract.” We are not
j|
concerned at this point mth the details of submission to the volont^ g^n-
j
drale . These vdll be considered -svhen we come to this doctrine in the Contrat
social . The point of importance at the moment is: In the notion of submission
ii
to the general mil we have an explicit statement of the subordination of the'!
:|
individual to society. The language in which the formula of the contract
;
3is couched, moreover, indicates that this subordination of the individual is
thoroughgoing. It extends not only to the property of the individual but I
even to his person and his life. It is too obvious to need remarking that |
i
this is at the uttermost extreme from the other things vfoich Rousseau had
written about society.
i
The final result of the system of education, Rousseau tells us, is to ''
be individual freedom. It is a freedom -viiich is consistent with the "eternal
laws of nature and of order." These "eternal laTira" are not to be confused
'!
with the chimerical laws of civil society because the free man is one wiio
jj
owes his freedcci to no government but finds it in himself. He would be free
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C’est en vain qu’on aspire k la liberty sous la sauvegarde des lois.
Des loisj oft est-ce qu’il y en a? et oft est-ce qu’ elles sont respect^es?
Psurtout tu n’as vu r^gner sous oe nom que I’inter^t parti culier et les
passions des horames* Mais les lois ^temelles de la nature et de I’ordre
existent. Elies tinnent lieu de loi positive au sage; elles sont Sorites
j
au fond de son coeur par la conscience et par la raison; ce’est k celles-
la quHl doit s’asservir pour '§tre litre; et il n’y a d’esclave que
' celui qui fait mal, car il le fait toujours malgr4 lui. La liberty n^est
dans aucune forme de gouvemement, elle est dans le coeur de I’hornme
litre, il la porte partout avec lui. L’homme vil porte partout la ser-
I
vitude. L’\m seroit esclave k Genftve, et I’autre litre k Paris.
1 We may say, then, that the principles -siiich underlie the system of
i
education are, first, the principle of individuality and, secondly, the
jprinciple of subordination to natural necessity and to social necessity. The
'Iprotlaa still remaining is that of a further examination of the principle of
i'
j[






There are two quite different conceptions of the individual, each of
ydaich contends for supremacy throughout the ^mile without ever being brought
jinto harmony witti the other. The first of these is one in vhich the nature-
principle is subordinated to the rational principle, and the beginning of a
I
harmony between nature and reason is definitely outlined. The second is a
conception in which the nature-principle is granted dominion over the ration-
al principle, thus making any harmony between them impossible. For the sake
|
of convenience we shall differentiate these two conceptions of the individualj
by applying the caption, ” l*homtne vraiment libre ,” to the first and the cap-
' tion, " I’homme naturel” to the second. We turn now to an analysis of these
two conceptions.
; It might be said tha.t the subordination of nature to reason is pre-
i
supposed by the idea of education itself and that Rousseau in writing the
1. Oeuvres, II, 445
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^mile must have had in mind l^homrae vraiment litre. However much the book
may be an appeal on behalf of nature, it must be remembered that ^mile, from
beginning to end is aoccaipanied by his tutor and is under constant cultiva-
tion. Moreover, the aim of this cultivation is to teach the pupil to become
subject to a twofold necessity, the necessity of things and social necessity.
In the conception of the individual now under consideration, the
harmony betvreen nature and reason is achieved in two ways, the first of
vhich affirms a compatibility between nature and reason. Nature in the
individual is consistent with training, and nature is good. The thing
continually insisted upon by Rousseau is that education is merely wise
habit, and wise habit is that vhich is in accordance with nature. As a
gardener trains a vine without violating the nature of the vine, so
mast the tutor train the chi Id Education is thus no more a violation
of nature than is cultivation.
A still closer compatibility between reason and nature is found
in Rousseau^ s doctrine that nature is good. This had already been im-
plied in the second Discourse in his objection to Hobbes’s view of nature
and in his own notion of "con5)assion." In the &nile the implication be-
comes explicit. Yie have noted that nature "does everything for the best"
and that "the first movements of nature are always right," this latter
pbeing an " incontest ible maxim." The opening sentence of the treatise
declares that "everything is good as it leaves the hands of God." a
good system of education is one which allows these good tendencies to
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work, lit>erty is something lAhich is ”in the heart of the free man."^
A second ground of harmony between nature and reason is found in
the notion that nature includes reason* In the development of this idea
Rousseau gives perhaps his clearest exposition of what he means by
"nature” as well as his soundest defense of 1 » homme vraiment 1 ibre * The
first pages of the Anile point to the necessity of carrying everything
pback to the "primitive dispositions,"'^ In defining "primitive dispositions,"
33,
iRousseau says that as soon as our sensations become active we are attracted
I
or repelled from objects, in the first place, because of pleasure or pain.
Later, attraction or repulsion is determined by whether the objects "suit
us" or not. Finally, attraction or repulsion is determined by "ideas of
happiness and goodness which reason gives us," These tendencies are ex-
tended in proportion as we become "more sensible and more enlightened,"
i:





in us is what these dispositions are before they are altered by "opinion",
Sitfet que nous avons pour ainsi dire la conscience de nos sensations,
nous sorames disposes ^ rechercher ou h fuir les objects qui les pro-
duisent, d’abord, selon qu’elles nous sont agrdables ou d^plaisantes,
puis selon la convenance ou disconvenance que nous trouvons entre nous
et ces objets, et enfin, selon les jugemens que nous en portons sur
l'id4e de bonheur ou de perfection que la raison nous donne, Ces dis-
positions s’^tendent et s’ affermissent h mesure que nous devenons plus
sensibles et plus ^clairesj mais contraintes par nos habitudes, elles
s’altbrent plus ou moins par nos opinions, Av^t cette alteration,
elles sont ce que j’appelle en nous la nature.
It may be concluded, therefore, that our "nature" is our "primitive
dispositions" of attraction or repulsion for objects which are presented by
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desire or "by notions of suitability or by reason* It is worthy of note
that reason has a place in what is "natural"* Yilhat is contrary to nature
I
I on the other hand is the restraining power of habits -which are the result
I
j
of mere "opinion" or con-wention,which is "slavish prejudice*"^
j
When "nature" is defined in such a way as to be consistent -with
training, -with reason, and -writh the rational requirements of social life,
and when the individual is characterized as one having such a nature, then
I
it may be said that the individual is conceived in terms which make his
I
life compatible -with -the life of society, and society, in turn, becomes
the rational fulfilment of his life* From the foregoing citations, which
' together may be taken as giving a description of I’homme -vraiment libre
,
it may be seen that Rousseau is not far from such a conception of the in-
I
di-vidual* In these passages the indi-vidual is concei-vBd, not as a being
•with an inalienable right of self-assertion, but as a being -whose self-
assertion much be within -the limits of what is possible* The notion of
I
"-what is possible" moreover, defines an area which is bounded by the cir-
[Icumstances of nature and the just claims of society, that is, it is defined
ij
jjby reason* The self-assertion of the individual is amenable to such
rational limitation because, as -we h&ve seen, his "ideas of goodness and
perfection -which reason gives" are a part of his nature* Such rational
jj
limitation is thus not a curtailment of liberty but a means to the self-
ij
1* Oeuvres , .II, 9* Rousseau, however, was not al-ways consistent in
I
his views on reason* He causes Julie to virrite, "J’ai plus de oonfiance k
I mon instinct qu’k ma raison" (Nouvelle Helolse , partie II, lettre 18)*
j
Httffding (JJR,lll) quotes the following from ^lie second Discourse: "I should
venture to assert that the state of reflection is a state opposecf to nature,
and that the man who thinks is a depraved animal." Cf * also Hbffding,
||
JJR, 64-65. In the Le-tter to Mirabeau (Vaughan,PWR, II, 160) Rousseau -wrote
I
that man "conducts himself very rarely by his reason ard very frequently by
|! his passions." Cf. also L*^tat de guerre in PWR, 1, 298*.
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realization of a free being* It leads from the chaotic and self-destructive
freedom of self-assertion to an orderly and defensible freedom under law*
The definition of liberty at which Rousseau himself arrives is a
definition which presupposes, in part at least, this more rational con-
ception of the individual* He says, ”L*homme vraiment libre ne veut que ce
qu’il peut, et fait ce qu’ il lui plait*"^ This definition is not as un-
equivocal as one might like it to be. It lends itself to two possible in-
terpretations, but it is vA^rthy of notice that on one interpretation the
definition reflects the first conception of the individual* It is not the
loan who does irfmt he pleases -who is truly free unless he happens to please
j
to will what he is able* This, of course, places some limitation upon his
self-assertion and calls into play the restraining action of reason. In
the same way, the second reference to l*homme vraiment libre reflects the
necessity of rational restraint.
Mais les lois ^ternelles de la nature et de I’ordre existent* Elies
tinnent lieu de loi positive au sage; elles sont d^crites au fond de
son coeur par la conscience et par la raison.. * * La liberty n*est
dans aucune. forme de gouvernement
,
elle est dans le coeur de I’horame
libre * * *2
The”etenial laws of nature and of order," written on the human heart "by
reason" is an even more explicit reference to the restraining pov/er of reason
and a stronger denial of the freedom of self-assertion.
In this first conception of individualism, therefore, we have excel-
lent materials with which to provide an adequate synthesis between the indi-
;
I
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1based on -this delineation. The freedom here presented is one ^ich looks
away from the isolated self-assertion of the individual man in a state of
nature toward a larger libeidiy which includes all the advantages of collec-
tive endeavor and at the same time affirms that collective life is a means
of self-fulfilment for the individual. The individual is so constituted by
nature as to find in this collective life the natural end of his existence.
But this is not the only conception of individualism in the ^ile,
and, as a matter of fact, we may have read more into the notion of I'homme
vraiment libre than the author intended. The definition of the liberty of
the truly free man is not as unambiguous as we should like it to beA It
lends itself to quite another interpretation and may just as readily be the
reflection of quite another type of individualism. This other interpretation
of the definition permits attention to center, not upon limitation in accord-
ance with what is necessary, but upon activity up to the limit of what is
i possible. The man wiio is truly free is one who wills, not only what he is
able, but he is also one who "does Tiiatever he pleases.” Moreover, the
limitation placed upon self-assertion by the first part of the definition may,
or may not, be in accordance with what is rational. It depends upon the
meaning of "qu’il peut.” Does ”vhat he is able” mean "what he is able to
will mthin the limits of reason" or does it mean "what he is able to will
within the limits of his power"? The two are far from being the same,
i
The same ambiguity may be seen to exist in the passage on the sage who
I
finds his liberty in no form of government. The reference to "the eternal
! laws of nature" in this passage is a clear-cut reference to limitation by
36 .
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"by reason in accordance -with vhat is necessary in the nature of things. It
I
' is thus consistent with the conception of I’horame vraiment libre. But ydiy
j
is there lacking a parallel reference to limitation by what is necessary in
the nature of society, vhich is also consistent with this conception? Ihy
the slighting reference to "loi positive"? and the denial that liberty is in
i any form of government? T/Vhy is the sage compelled to find his freedom within
|
himself and not in civil society? i
The answer to these questions is that in this passage there is an
I antithesis between the free man and the citizen, between the individual and
the group. Instead of finding his liberty in the group the individual finds
it in himself. Instead of yielding to the laws of the state, he follows the
1
law of his conscience. Instead of joining readily and naturally in the
j
collective enterprise, he stands off and will not join. !
The question now arises: Why should there be an antithesis between
|
I
the individual and the group? We found that the first conception of individ-
ualism is consistent with the collective entejrprise. The fact of a dis-
crepancy would, therefore, seem to indicate the presence of an individualism
of another kind. Grounds for holding this are not wanting.
We know that Rousseau had knowledge of an individualism of another
kind for he described it at the beginning of his work. It is the individual-
ism of I’homme nature 1:
'
L'homme naturel est tout pour lui; il est I’unitd numdrique, I’entier
absolue, qui n’a de rapport qu’A lui-meme ou k son semblable. L*homme
civil n'est qu’une miit^ fractionnaire qui tient d^norainateur
,
et dont
la valeur est dans son rapport avec I’entier, qui est le corps social.
Les bonnes institutions so dales sent celles qui savent le ndeux d^-
naturer l’homme, lui oter son existence absolue pour lui en donner une
relative, et transporter le moi dans I’unitd commune . . .^
1. Oeuvres, II, 6

Two things are significant in tliis passage: The natural man is described as
a self-sufficient unit who is “all for himself" and the antithesis between
j
the natural man and the citizen is reaffirmed. This passage, therefore,
I
suggests a kind of individualism vhich is incompatible with the collective
enterprise. It is the individualism of the state of nature, the characteris-
I
tics of which are self-sufficiency and self-assertion. In other passages it
I
is the latter which is emphasized and the emphasis revolves around the noticn
I of power.
La soci^t^ a fait I’horame plus foible, non seulement en Ixii Stant le
droit qu’il avoit sur ses propres forces, mais surtout en les lui rendant
insuffisantes.^
I
Avant que les pr^jugds et les institutions humaines aient alt^r^ nos
penchans naturels, le bonheur des enfans ainsi que des homnes consists
dans l^usage de Ifcur libertd'. • • • Quiconque fait ce qu'il veut est
heureux, s*il se suffit i lui-m^ej c’est le cas de I'homme vivant dans
I’^tat de nature
These descriptions of I’honme nature
1
reflect power as a central feature of
the natural man, and weakness as a central feature of civil man. A child in
the state of nature is not self-sufficient; he is weak. But vhat the child
I
is in a state of nature, man is in civil society.
|
1 I
Les enfans ne jouissent m@me dans I’^tat de la nature que d'une I
liberty imparfaite, semblable k cells dont jouissent les hommes dans
l’4tat civil. Chacun de nous, ne pouvant plus se passer des autres,
redevient k cet ^gard foible et miserable. Nous ^tions faits pour ^tre
hommes; les lois et la soci^t^ nous ont replongrfs dans I’enfance.^
Throughout these passages there runs a strong antithesis between the
natural man and the citizen, between the state of nature and that of society,
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Attention is called to the fancy Yhich Rousseau shows for the notion |
I
I
of power, vhich is a part of the notion of I’ homme naturel. In the Contrat
social^ Rousseau reminds Grotius that power or might is not a principle of
[
right, but he does not abide by his teaching in the l^ile
,
for here he
declares that if we had the power to do everything we would never do wrong:
Mais quand Hobbes appeloit le m^chant un enfant robuste, il disoit unei
chose absolument contradictoire. Toute m^chanceW vient de foibles se;
1’ enfant n’est m^chant que parce qu’il est foible; rendez-le fort, il
sera bon: celui qui pourroit tout ne feroit jamais de mal.^
[I
IjThis startling conclusion is buttressed with the reminder that goodness is
i










Rousseau also establishes a connection between power and freedom. The
boundaries of one’s freedom are determined by the extent of one’s natural
strength: ”Ta liberty, ton pouvoir, ne s’dtendent qu’aussi loin que tes
forces natwelles, et pas au delk; tout le reste ne’est qu’ esclavage, illu-
|
sion, prestige*"® Consequently, the cnly one who gets his own way is the one!
who does not need, for that purpose, to place the arms of anbther beneath his |i
own* He is the person wBao is sufficient unto himself: "Le seul qui fait sa I
I
i





1* Livre I, Chs* II and III.
2* Oeuvres, II, 35*
I
3* Ibid*, 50.
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; X > :v;x ' di "i;-) 3. im'- .oi/i oiAlq ; ' ,0.-. ; a xrn 'r/fd’ no ^ . '-o <'• .. ; : r-
pp. d .' / j r” :^ •, I. •’'o' . ' oJriu "fipy l‘. ''X' ..^ ox c>fi^ .*. ' •< q
::‘rid ::..r ’.ir'C'
, n X's'J ef lixoq a.oq ,^ * 1; r' io'oa
autre au bout des siens • • Men are weak and imhappy in the social state
because they cannot dispense with the help of others; they are no longer selfif
sufficient and, consequently, no longer men: ’’Chacun de nous, ne pouvant
jj
plus se passer des autres, redevient k. cet ^gard foible et miserable* Nous
jj
^tions faits potir etre hommes; les lois et la soci^td nous ont replonges <L-i.ns j!
2
I’enfance*" In the state of nature this was not the situation. The natural,,
!!
man does Yhatever he wants to and is happ;y* "Quiconque fait ce qu’il veut est
heureux, s'il se suffit k lui-m^.e; c’est le cas de I’homme vivant dans
I’etat de nature."^ I
These considerations our author finds very "important" for they "serve
to resolve all the contradictions of the social system"^—a modest claim for
considerations which are thanselves in utter contradiction of the social
system itself I In pursuance of this claim, however, we have the denouement
!
of the fortunes of I’homme naturel . Rousseau does not dravf the logical con-
|
I
elusion from the premises which he so firmly establishes; he does not recom-
mend the abolition of society and a return to the happiness of the natural
state. Instead, he attempts, -with remarkable determination to force the
natural man into society and the logic of the attempt is interesting. Having
established the principle that submission to what is necessary in the nature
of things is no infringement of liberty, Rousseau proceeds to argue that if
j
the same necessity could be attached to the operation of civil law as pre-
j
I
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there vrould be no infringement of liberty. Therefore, he argues "arm the
general -will with a real strength superior to the action of any particular
(will, so that the power of civil law approximates the power of natural law
and dependence upon it becomes the same as dependence upon things. In a
footnote to this passage, the author declares that in his Principles of
j
Political Right ( Contrat social ) "it is demonstrated that no particular will !
can be integrated (ne peut ^re ordonn^e) in the social system." In a con-
|
text vhich contended for a shift in the locus of sovereignty from the sever-
|
I
eignty of a personal will to a sovereignty of law this quotation would have •
i
I
significant meaning. But in a context dealing with the socializing of inde-
j
li
pendent, self-sufficient atoms its logic is curious. It proposes to accom-
]
!pli sh social unity by subjecting the recalcitrant individual to a force so
|
I
great that he cannot resist it. It is as if two mutually inconipatible ele-
I
ments were forced into unity by a pressure of oveiw^helming strength. !




between -the individual and the group is cancelled. The cause of the failure
|
I
is that Rousseau tries to form the social group (in this instance) by com- I
bining anti-social elements. The groundwork of the failure lies in his con-
ception of the individual, which is faulty. The conception is that of l*homm<i
naturel vho is characterized by the qualities of self-assertion and self-
sufficiency. These attributes render him incapable of harmonious participa-
tion in civil society and the attempt to force him into social relations is
tantamoimt to con5>elling him to swear allegiance to a foreign power. A civil,
group composed of such individuals is a rebellious composition, and in various
places throughout the ^ile the pages tremble with the rumble of this
1. Oeuvres, II, 52.
^v:
42 .
rebellion. It is -worth pausing to notice an instance.
j
/ !
Within the first eight pages of the Snile there is a clear case of i
conflict bet-iveen basic principles. The formulation of the problem antici-
I
pates the individualism of I’homme vraiment libre
,
but the solution -vdiich
•we are told to expect is given in terms of l*homme naturel
,
-whose description
is provided in these pages together -with -fche expositicn of the manner in
I
which the natural man differs from the citizen. The opposition bet-ween these
t
t-wo types of indi-vidual ism is clear and bold. Nor is this the full account
of the conflict. Exis-tdng alongside these two types of indi-vlduali sm and
opposed to both there is e^proval of the strongest kind of collectivism, that
|
of Sparta snd Rome. A fe-w citations -will support the contention. !
In an early section Rousseau describes the three kinds of education,
the education of "nature," of "men," and of "things," and explains that they
are in conflict because "in the place of training a man for himself, they
•yd sh -bo train him for others." He contrasts the education of natures
Reste enfin 1’ Education domestique ou celle de la nature; mais que i
deviendra pour les autres un horame uniquement ^lev^ pour lui? Si peut-
j
^tre le double object qu’on se propose pouvoit se r^unir en un seul, en
6tant les contradictions de I'homme, on ^eroit un grand obstacle k son
bonheur. II faudroit, pour en juger, le voir tout form^; il faudroit
||
avoir observe ses penchans, vu ses progr^s, suivi sa marche; il faudroit, i'
en un mot, connoitre I'homme naturel.^
||
' Here we have a statement of intention to produce the citizen by remo-ving the
self-contradictions of the man, -which may be interpreted in terms of the
pattern of I'homme vraiment libre. But in order to see the possibility of
this, it is necessary -tx) know I'honme na-burel . T-wo pages earlier Rousseau
2
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This description presents a being -who is independent sind self-sufficient.
He is an absolutely complete numerical unity as contrasted mth the citizen '
•vdiose value is only fractional. He must be "denatured” by good social insti-
tutions before he can become a citizen. His absolute existence must be sup-
planted; he must become the numerator of a fraction the value of vhich dependji
1
upon the denominator, the social -vdiole. Thus the same paragraph begins a
i
paean of praise for the institutions of Sparta and Rome which attained remark-ff
' 1 ii
j
able success in cancelling the independence of the individual. True citizens
l|
are never individuals; they are Spartans or Romans. The citizen is one whose I,
! self does not belong to him; it has been "carried over into the common unity. 2
!
There is little wonder that Rousseau observed, "Celui, qui dans I’ordre civil
veut conserver la primaut^ des sentimens de la nature, ne sait oe qu’il
veut."^ The gulf between the natural man and the citizen, if we may take
the author seriously, is impassible, and the candor with which he recognizes
and repeats this theme is the reductio ad absurdum of his theory.
One is "forced to combat (either) natwe or social institutions," he
writes. "It is necessary to choose between making a man and a citizen; for
one cannot make both at the same time.”^ This is the warning with vhich he
introduces the description of the natural man, ten lines later. A defender
of Rousseau might contend that he is here speaking, not about society as it
ought to be, but as it is, that he is criticizing the education "of men,"
1. Oeuvres
,
II, 6. For other instances of Rousseau’s veneration of *[
Sparta and Rome Cf. ^^le
,




2. This is an anticipation of the doctrine of the corporate self (le
j
moi commun).
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•vrilich, on account of its artificiality, makes it impossible to produce both
men emd citizens. The defender might point out that our reformer intends to
correct this abuse and restore the harmony between the education of nature,
I
of men, and of things. The defender would continue that the onus of the
j
attack is against contemporary education and contemporary society, both of
1
vhich violate ’’nature” and fail to produce either men or citizens. i
I
Perhaps so; common sense would seem to be in favor of such an inter-
j
I
pretation and the writing is sufficiently ambiguous to permit of doubt. But
[
I
one thing, however, may be said with certaintys ?Jhether Rousseau is talking I
I
here about society as it was or about society perse, the conception of the
|
nature of man which he unfolds in these pages is incompatible with any society
whatsoever, and the inconpatibility is precisely of the kind described by the
author, that is, it is such that one cannot at the same time train both the
man and the citizen because independent self-sufficiency is the nature of man
and that cannot be reconciled with citizenship. It is difficult, therefore,
to escape the suspicion that Rousseau places this unwelcome consequence of
his theory in the context of a criticism which can be construed as a criticisift
of the times fbr the sake of the protective coloration -viiich such a context
provides.
One feels some sjonpathy for Rousseau because of the dilemma which
he manufactures for himself in his dealing with the notion of "nature.”
To expect a philosopher of the time to avoid the use of this concept would
be expecting too much; it was a pervasive category in political thought.
j
I
Consequently, Rousseau uses it, and it is to his credit that his picture of '
the natural man is more plausible than the pictures offered by his prede-
cessors, Hobbes, Locke, or Spinoza. Rousseau’s natural man at least
"answers to his name," as Professor Vaughan has said. He is not the "wolf"
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which Hobbes declared him to be, nor the incipient Christian as Locke
' described him, nor yet the sagacious bargainer of Spinoza. The na^ral man,
i
according to Rousseau, was merely a self-interested individual, independent
and impulsive but at the same time peaceful and even compassionate. Rousseau
placed himself under heavy obligation to his own conception of I’homme natureii




But this conception came to be an embarrassment -vdien the natural man
[|
’was made the object of education and even more embarrassing vhen he was
I
called upon to become a member of society. ”But how can a man vho is trained
for himself ever come to be for others?" Rousseau asked. That is the ques-
tion which springs the trap. If it is admitted that the natural man is not
fit timber for the construction of a social edifice, then the conception is
j
as good as surrendered. But if the conception is surrendered the heaviest
j




Charybdis, and the unstable character of his position is clearly revealed in
j
the opening pages of the ^mile . "How can one -who is trained for himself ever
1 come to be for others?" We have in these pages no concise answer to the
i
I question, but it may be supposed that the writings which are more strictly
political will provide the answer.
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THE ^WRITINGS OF ROUSSEAU, COHTINUED
THE ECONOMIE POLITIQUE
The iloonomie politique^ Tjas published in the same year (1755) as the
second Discourse } although the latter -was -written about a year and a half at
the most before the former. ^ The main argument of the l^conomie politi que
anticipates the Contrat social and the treatises are the same -with the excep-
tion of certain minor differences. One such difference is that the idea of
[contract, important in the Contrat is incidental in the earlier -writing.
There is a difference in -the doctrine of property. In the earlier -writing,
property is regarded as prior to the state and the foundation of it,^ udiile
in the Contrat property is the creation of the state.® Another difference
lies in the fact that each includes or emphasizes matters eliminated or men-
tioned casually in the other. The later -writing, for example, contains a
section on ci-vdl religion lacking in the former. The earlier -writing has an
J
extensive trea-tment of taxation omitted in the later and the same is true of
! public education. But the emphasis is the same in both and that emphasis is
i
I
collecti-vistic rather than indi-vlduali stic. As contrasted -with the -writings
i
I i
, already revie-wed, Rousseau no-w illuminates, not the rights and character of
I
the individual, but ihe prerogatives and powers of the state.
|
1. In Vaughan, MR, I, 237-73.
2. Vaughan, PV/R, I, 14.
3. Cf. Vaughan, PV?R, I, 228-36.
4. Ibid., 159: ”. . .La propri^t^ est le vrai fondement de la sociStd
civile, et le -vrai garant des engagements des citoyens."
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It is protably no exaggeration to say that the Economie politique is
as sincerely collectivistic as the first t-wo Discourses -were individualistic.
The unconcealed opposition in point of view existing between the Economie
politique and the Disoours sur I’inegalit^
,
both of -vdiich were published
within six months of each othei^ is surprising. At the time vhen Rousseau
may have been correcting the proofs for a discourse on "full-blooded individ-
ualism" he must have been preparing the outline for a writing vhich is the
negation of individualism--a fact not readily explained even on the best
theory.
The collectivism of the Economic politique is evident in at least
five points: (l) The organic conception of the body politic, (2) the doctrine
of the corporate self, (3) the doctrine of the general will and law, (4) the
theory of educaticn, and (5) the theory of taxation.
The conception of the body politic, Rousseau explains by an analogy
with "an organized, living body, resembling that of man," though the com-
*2
parison is not exact in all respects. The sovereign power represents the
head of the bodyj the laws and customs are the brain; judges and magistrates
represent the will; commerce, industry, and agriculture are the mouth and
stomach; the public income is the blood; etc. The connection between these
parts is so close that the destruction of any part affects the whole.
The soul of the body politic is the "corporate self" (le moi commun).
"La vie de I’un et de 1' autre est le moi cammun au tout, la sensibility
r^ciproque et la correspondance interne de toutes les parties."^
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The soul of the body politic possesses a mil, -which is the general
•will; ’*Le Corps politique est done aussi un ^tre moral qui a une -volontd^; et
cette -volont^ g^n^rale, qui tend toujours & la conservation et au bien-^tre
du tout et de chaque partie • • The first and most important rule of
legitimate government is to follo-w in all things the general -will, for this
is the "premier principle de I’dconomie publique et rfegle fondamentale du
2Gouvemement •
"
2The notion of the general -will is explained by pointing out that
the political society as a -whole (toute soci^t^ politique) is composed of
other smaller societies of different kinds. The vrill of these particular
societies stands in -tvjo relations; For the members of the association i-t is
a general -will; for the political society as a -whole it is a particular -will.
Because of this, it often happens that such a -vtdll can be right in the
narro-wer context and wrong in the larger context. To use Rousseau's example,
it is possible for a person to be a good soldier and a bad cittsen.
It follows from this that the particular societies, since they are
always subordinate to the larger societies -which contain them, must, there-
fore, be subordinate to the general will, the will of the society as a whole.
The basic rule of public economy is thus to follow in all things the general
wrill, for it represents, not our personal interest, but our duty. Personal
interest is always in inverse ratio to our duty.^ The general will, since I
i
it represents our du-by and not our interest, al-tways stands for and is
1. Vau^an, PWR, I, 241-42.
2. Ibid., 244.
3. Ibid., 241-45.
4. "Mais malheureusement l’int4r^t personnel se trouve toujours en
raison inverse du devoir ..." (PWR, I, 243).
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synonymous mth the common good.
In practice the general mil is to be discovered by the method of
majority vote. This method is justified by the contention that the will viiicli
I
is the most general is also the most just, and in practice the thing which |
determines generality is the voice of the people.^ . . La volont^ la plus^
g^nerale est aussi tougiours la plus juste, et . . . la voix du peuple est
en effet la voix de Dieu.”^
We are not at the moment concerned witii the validity of this conten-
tion but only with the collectivism lAhich it implies and the shift of emphasii
which it signals. In the ^conomie politique it is not the individual, not
"nature’s man” vho is the captain of his fate; it is the citizen and his fate
is hardly in his own keeping. There is substituted for the individualism of
separate units the collectivism of the group. Instead of the will of the in-
dividual we have the general mil of society as the principle of action.
This is brougjit out clearly in the notion of law, the law being the
embodiment of the general will. "The first rule of public economy is that
•7
the administration shall conform to the laws,"*^ and in a well-regulated
government "no exception to the law shall ever be made."^ The law is the
"celestial voice" which teaches a man to act in accordance with his judgment
and thus avoid behaving inconsistently with himself. It is the "most subline
of all human institutions," establishing "the natural equality between men."
1. In this justification one detects a slight (but unconfessed) shift
in the meaning of the term, general will. In this instance the will is gener-
al, not because it stands for the common good, but because it is the will
yhich prevails generally.
2. Vaughan, PV7R, I, 243.
3. Ibid., 247.
4. Ibid., 246.
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The law accomplishes the miraculous feat of laying a constraint upon the vdll
•while at the same time preserving freedom from constraint. These ideas are
embodied in the follovang passage:
! ... II est certain que, si l‘on peut contraindre ma volontd, je ne !
I
suis plus libre; et que je ne suis plus raaitre de mon bten, si quelque I
autre peut y toucher. Cette difficult^, que devait sembler insTirmontable.
a 4t4 levee, avec la premiere, par la plus sublime de toutes les institu-
tions h\xmaines, ou plut<^ par une inspiration cdleste, que apprit k
l*homme h imiter ici-bas les ddcrets immuables de la Divinite'. . . .C*est
la Loi seule que les hommes doivent la justice et la libert^; c’est
organe salutaire de la volont^ de tons qui r^tablit dans le droit I'^gal-I
ite' naturelle entre les hommes; c’est cette voix celeste qui dicte k
|
chaque citoyen les pr^ceptes de la raison publique, et lui apprend k
agir selon les maximes de son propre jugement, et h n’etre pas en contra- j!
diction avec lui-m^me.^
A careful analysis of this passage -will reveal that it is one in •vAiidh
!
individualism and collectivism are at var -vri-th each other. The first sentenc<|
is individualistic; it supposes that liberty is the absence of constraint
I
upon my will and the integrity of my O'wn control over my property. Yet,
j




there is presented an apostrophe to Law, the -tx>ne of -which is
strongly collectivistic. There is, of course, a rational connection bet-ween
liberty and law, but it i s not the romantic comiection which Rousseau here
j
anticipates and later expounds in the Contrat social--the conception in
-w/hichl
the law is identical with the will of the natural man, who is a law unto him- 1
self. The conception of liberty here presented is the romantic conception of
I
the liberty of the natural man who is free of any constraint by others. Yifhili i
!
j
seeking to preserve a liberty without constraint Rousseau evolves a theory
I of law, the essence of which is constraint. The law does precisely those
1. Vaughan, PWR, I, 245. This passage reappears in the first draft of
the Contrat social. It is significsuit historically because it presents the
conception of ~an impersonal sovereign. A government of lawrs rather -b^ian of
men is axiomatic now, but the prevailing belief, which Rousseau here opposes,
•was the belief in the necessity of a personal sovereign— la-ws cannot command;
Onlyinen can command (Cf. Hendel, MO, passim)
.
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two things which Rousseau declares must never be done if one is to remain
j
free: It places a constraint upon the -will in accordance -witl-i the "precepts
j
i
of the public reason," and it "touches" one's property. How heavy a hand the!
I
law lays on property we shall se when we consider the principle of a liquida-,
ting tax on superfluities. The point at issue here, however, is that we have
before us an instance of the lack of connection between individualism and
collectivism. Both elements exist; both are mixed, but they form no compound
It is a juxtaposition without harmony.
The fourth instance of collectivism in the ^conomie politique is the
theory of education. In the first Discourse Rousseau had held that virtue
is "the sublime science of simple minds" and that one needed to do no more
to learn the la-ws of virtue than th "examine ourselves and listen to the
voice of conscience. He is of a different opinion, ho-wever, in the Economi
politique . Here he exclaims, "Make men, therefore, if you -would command men:
if you -would have them obedient to the laws, make them love the lawrs."^
j
The task of "making men" is the task of education, and for this task, strange
ly enough, the most efficacious means is patriotism, this "fine and lively
feeling" by -wiiich the greatest miracles of -virtue have been produced. Patri-
otism, "a hundred times sweeter than the love of a mistress," gives to self-
{
3 Ilove a force which makes of it "the most heroic of all the passions."
If individuals, the author continues, were sufficiently trained in
j
i
never regarding their individuality except in connection with its relations !





2. Vau^an, PWR, I, 248.
3. Ibid., 250-52.
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as a part of that of the state, they -would finally arrive at identifying
themselves -with the -rfiole#^
L’ Education publique, sous des regies prescrites par le Gouvemement,
et sous des magistrats ^tablis par le soverain, est done ^e des max-
imes fondamentales du Gouvemement populaire ou legitime
Not only are these ideas on education the very opposite of those iflhich form
the basic doctrine of -tiie Emile, they are also the ready allies of the total-
*Z
itarian state. If the object is -to teach individuals to think of themselves
only as a part of the state emd if their indi-viduality is to be appraised
only in connection with the body of the state, then individuals, in any
meaningful sense of tiie -word, are in the process of extinction. The collec-
j
tivism of the ^conomie politique is immeasurably strengthened by this treat-
j
ment of public education. !
We pass now to the last instance of collectivism in the ;^oonomie
politique, that is, taxation. Some of the utterances on this subject are
strongly socialistic, as, for example, the statement that protecting the poor
against the tyranny of the rich is a thing "most necessary and perhaps most
difficult."^ As a means of attaining this end, Rousseau endorses a high tax
on luxuries -which may extend even to confiscation of superfluities: "Celui
qui n’a que le simple n^cessaire ne doit rien payer du tout; la taxe de celui
li
qui a du superflu peut aller au besoin Jusqu’A la concurrence de tout ce qui
j|





3. It must be remembered, ho-wever, that these ideas are not ^absent
t
Ifrom the ^ile . The patriotism of Sparta and Rome praised in the Emile is on
jail fours witk the ideas presented here.
4. Vaughan, PWR, I, 254. !
5.
Ibid., 267. A more strongly sooiali stic. utterance maybe found in i
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victim of higher taxes to object that iriiat might be a superfluity for a man
of inferior station would only be a necessity for him, "for a grandee has
two legs just like a cow-herd, and, like him again, but one belly."
^
But, as Rousseau was not consistent in his teaching about property.
so he was not consistent in his teaching about taxation. If in one passage
I
he proposes a confiscatory tax on luxuries, in another he opposes it:
j
C’est done une des plus importantes affaires du Gouvernement de
!
prdvenir I’extrSme in^galit^ des fortunes, non en enlevant les trdsors
k leurs possesseurs, mais en ^ant k tous les moyens d’en accumuler.^
The injimction against "carrying away the treasures from their possessors" is
contrary to his theory of taxation but it is consistent with his teaching
that property is "the most sacred of all the rights of citizenship and even
I
more important in some respects than liberty itself."^ Another curious con-
tradiction arising from the property concept appears in Rousseau* s acceptance
of Pufendorf ’ s maxim that the right of property does not extend beyond the
life of the proprietor. But, having accepted this teaching, Rousseau,
j
I
instead of holding that at the death of the proprietor his property passes
into the hands of the state, or instead of advocating a surtax on inheritan-
ces, advocates that the goods shall pass from father to son and from relative
the Project for Corsica: "Far from desiring the State to be poor, I should
wish, on the contrary, to see all property in its hands, and no individual
^
admitted to any share of the connion stock, save in proportion to his services!*
li
. . . My desire is not absolutely to destroy private property—for that is
[j
impossible—but to keep it within the narrowest bounds: to give it a standard,,
I
a rule, a curb to restrain it, direct it, subdue it and keep it always subor-i|
||
dinate to the public good. In a word, I desire that the property of the
II
State should be as large, as strong, and that of the individual as small, as
j
weak, as possible" (in Vaughan, pyffi, II, 337). i
j




3. Ibid., 259. Cf. also 265: ". . . Le fonderaerrb du pact social est
|
la proprid^t^. . ." i|
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relative* They sliould go out of the family as little as possible "and be as
little alienated as possible."^ This, of course, is consistent with the
individualistic view of property but it does not harmonize with the collec-
tivistic view of taxation.
From such a medley of opinion it is difficult to draw a concise con-
clusion, but in so far as any conclusion is possible it would doubtless be
that Rousseau’s view of taxation is collectivistic while his view of property
is individualistic--in spite of the fact that taxation and property are only
two phases of the same topic. As a final estimate, do we not, therefore.
54 .
I
have to say that in the matter of taxation and property we have a cross-play
|




The prevailing temper of the ^conomie politique is undoubtedly I
collectivistic, but there is also individualism in the writing. It exists,
|
not only in the ideas aboub property, but also in the ideas about the general
will and law for although the law is defined as the embodiment of the volont^
g^ndrale
,
the discussion of the topic implies that it is identical with the
I
will of the individual. This implication is a necessary part of the theory
!
because Rousseau holds that "if anyone is able to constrain my will, I am
no longer free."^ As to the relation between the two strains present in
this writing, we may say that •tiie individualism which appears is of such
a character that it contradicts the prevailing collectivism of the writing.
It is a foreign strand #iich cannot be assimilated into the general pattern;
hence, the lack of synthesis between the two.







Dll contrat social (1762) is commonly regarded as the product of
Rousseau's mature political thinking;^ it is his most systematic attempt to
formulate the “principles of political right.” Our purpose at the moment is
to present a summary of the argument as it hears on the problem of liberty,
leaving the analysis and evaluation until a later chapter.
There are two versions of the Contrat social
,
the first and earlier
version being known as the Geneva manuscript. Professor Vaughan has conclu-
ded that the differences between the two drafts ’’hardly extend beyond the
cancelling of two important chapters" in the final version. Book I of the
Geneva manuscript contains a chapter (Ch. II ) entitled, De la society
g^n4rale du genre humain , and another (Ch. V) entitled, Fausses notion s du
lien soc ial . These chapters deal with the ideas of contract and common
advantage as the basis of the state. They are less abstract and more concret
than most of those of the final version. In this manuscript the idea of
3
contract is treated as an idea of right and not as a historical fact.
Another difference, too often unnoticed, is the fact that the final version
A
1. Jules Lemaitre, however, holds that Le Contrat social est, avec le
premier Discours, le plus mediocre des livres de RousseaiTr II en est, sous
i
une fo rra'e s e'n£e'n'cieu se
,
le plus obscur et le plus chaotique" (JJR,249). But
Lemaitre’ s estimations are consistently unfriendly. Cf. pp. 250, 261, 265,
266, 267. He finds the Contrat to be the work of a "maniac” (267).
2. Vaughan, PWR, I, 20.
3.
This is a difference which Vaughan emphasizes (PWR,1 ,439 ), But th^
is no good reason for supposing that the final version treats the contract
as anything other than an idea of right. The chapter on the social pact
(CS,I,Vl) says explicitly that the clauses of the contract "have perhaps
never been formally set forth," yhich could hardly be the case if the con-
tract was a historical fact. The emphasis in the Contrat from the very
first is not upon historicity but upon legitimacy.
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-ft r n r •,
contains a chapter on civil religion not included in the first version.
I
The idea of contract is the point of departure in Rousseau’s political!
,
I
masterpiece, as is implied hy the title -vdiich he finally chose for the work.-'-j
The idea of contract was, of course, not first used by Rousseau. Locke,
2Hobbes, and Grotius all used it and in the second Discourse Rousseau
referred to it as a common opinion which he was content to adopt. It has
j
|i
been suggested that the idea of contract serves a double purpose in political!
'i
theorys It provides a natural explanation of the origin of the state and a ^
3 '
rational justification for the continuance of the state. The idea holds li
'1
I
that individmls freely consented to leave the state of nature and surrender
j
I
their mils to the constraints of civil society. The idea is thus both
j
individualistic and collectivistic in character, and writers vary in respect I
I
to the part of the idea which they select for emphasis. Locke stresses the
j
individmlistic element while Hobbes and Spinoza stress the opposite.
Rousseau’s first emphasis is closer to Locke than to Hobbes because he elects
I
I'
to use the pact as an instrument of individual freedom, but it must be ad-
j
mitted that under the terms of the pact the individual surrenders to a
collectivism which is almost without limitation.
Rousseau states the fundamental problem as follows:
56 .
1.
”The successive stages of the title in the Geneva MS. are Du con-
trat social (cancelled); De la socidtd civile (cancelled); and finalTy
Du contrat social ( restored ) I' VaTr^’emT, iPVilR ,1,22 note 3.
2. Early versions of the contract-theory go back at least as far as
Epicurus, -who taught, against Aristotle, that the state is a human construe
tion and not a natural one. Cf. Barrett, ETH, 276. For a history of this
theory, Cf. Ritchie, DAH, Chapter, VII.




.'ojt ooi, : t.i’J n'> ju Sii : a:^£^C‘t>
X,r,6 -* ; J'c'-;' t 'LI.. *'i.: rsr 7:103 'i;? L^oix ed?




.fwjfiv.iO.-’ V'.' idix: oX'T d x.snJ’xrox
o
fx60-''i‘?iL'C;jI 'ifi-rxi-'si'l fjL.'OcxT'. v;£r nx ijr.x ' IXxi SL'icfor ’;
aij.'i j-'' oiX j 0 CKi'r;' :. ......v •_' xioxrrw trci'xcfori ;• x .c b5>*: o*r
: br ;; rr,' --r /'.rfq oXnr;-;- . : ; •?;'., / obb ;-'-xo;i7 xov'
-: c'- or‘:-f o;£ ’Xo :r.c^ 'no flx'n ". n, ;Xp,:ivJ. 7 .-.'uojx-rr l^ -ntiMVonq
.
r
j'orf ijo."/ O'. 7 t vox-.Bcu. .' .jiTOO oo
-.'..-I ,:oxJ'Sl .rll:*t.iii,
n s; bi : 3no:’/=<n r.H’..-' j r.--; r, •> ‘Ao.x/.r-r. j ,<;l99*3:''l c* Xa; £• ' ' •.'-nx




', Ti'. .' y*^-o 'IV,- L, .X. . Mvo.'/in- n.i: '.rr? i'v '.tx.'© r.roo nn/. o * . rA'jXi.^v/.bni
i^u'v ?> x'4oo I . x7/;f‘q.ni'9 ".'^j'oc
-> 7 xiiiiiv.' 'rii J' xv.r o/.o 07
. e ; b. ; JO o..,: o -J':’"! JrJ -'.'’oax-'Tj j-l. •..k/'jH i'OX'r>'i'f'X0 0 f 'X.;/:- £.''.(; inii
x-txf j.’L.f0O0o' ?. 'Xrfo ’ '’O'" o'f;>oj ot no 'rx- ;! :'m i;"i o
-OH ..'j Ja..! i fJ: J'l.cf ,(30500^*7 ['• t../'. i.oix.f ‘'i j otrxt.-; ':. r
-i 'w x.© 9,.-,'' o.'-';.' oJ"
..': Cci/o'xv ^6u-i; i •*• 'b 'ro •?• j *20**r:L' )jcff7 ba-.-JIm
.
'
i i.t..j j ‘‘in XX -fhoM' -i 7 : X.:?. ax .ioxifw r'iXo^XIco
X'j-v.: C; -q ?;.• .;.jr.-. f.-fovq rn.tn3;ojjon?/l o.r<.t u.)J-£Xs
0 orr ,'i , ..( 11- :•
•'.’C: '.' i.i"’' 7 ''.'’ « ?7’; -i.'b'* "I .X'! ;!?' .0 .';. ;o •-. , X
'Tt. -(bsiJ r.joxcs/ 'iXo.tyoe si -1 7 -{ bull- o; .';o oc
.1* >Jon S? j Ji . i,*..'"- , oxirfricx/tV Xw !rx •’’ - • •r ;. 1 :T
•:?’; L,' 'xo
-r 7XJ :f3 cd' 00 'qo: v'' -:ro;‘-; '/no O'-f.' ..O’ 0





















Trouver \one forme d’ association que d^fende et protdge de toute la !
force commune la personne et les biens de chaque associ^, et par laquelle
i
chacun, s’unissant k tons, n’obeisse pourtant qu’^ lui-mdme, et reste '
aussi libre qu’auparavant.l
|
The focus in this formulation is upon the individual
and the liberty vhich he enjoyed "before,” that is.
,
his person, his property
in the state of nature.
The liberty of the individual is a persistent theme in the Contrat. The
|
||
nature of the free man and the means of realizing; this can indeed be regarded
jj
as the ruling motif of nearly everything Rousseau wote, TAhich is not strange
|
|i
since this was the preoccupation of his personal life. "Renoncer h sa
|
liberty,” he wrote in the Contrat
,
"c’est renoncer k sa quality d’homme, aux
j
Idroits de l’hinaanit4, m^me h ses devoirs.” He, therefore, formulated the
I
!
problem of his political inquiry in terms of individual freedom,
j
The solution offered is the "social pact,”® the clauses of Tiiich are
reducible to one: "The total alienation of each associate with all his rights
j
to the vhole community" (l’ alienation totale de chaque associ^ avec tous ses
droits k toute la communaut^ )
.
^ This total alienation is equally binding on
all and the individual, "in giving himself to all gives himself to nobody.”
57
.
This idea is embodied in the follomngt









4. Ibid., 33. Jeanne Mairet’s translation of Lemaitre’s work on L
Rousseau contains an error of considerable proportions at this point. She ii
translates the clause of the contract as consisting in "the total separation j'
of each member vdth all his rights from the whole community*!' (Mairet,LJJR,259)j.
"Separation from" and "alienation to" are quite different. j'
5. Rousseau’s statement, "... Chacun se donnant tout entier, la |
condition est egale pour tous. . ." (PWR,II,33) is probably the ground for
j
"W.A. Dunning’s remark that all becane equal by reducing themselves to zeros.
Cf, Vau^an, PViTR, I, B6. •
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Enfin, chacun, se donnant fe, tous, ne se doime k persoime, et coitime il
n’y a pas un associ^ sur lequel on n’acqui^re le mime droit qu’on lui
c^de sur soi, on gagne 1* Equivalent de tout ce qu’on perd, et plus de
force pour conserver ce qu'on a.^
By the act of association there is formed the body politic, vhich, in Ian-
j
f
Iguage reminiscent of the Economie politique
,
is possessed of a corporate self4j
X 1’ instant, au lieu de la personne particulilre de chaque contractant,
cet acte d’ association produit un Corps moral et collectif, composE
d’autant de membres que I’assemblEe a de voix, lequel rejoit de ce mime
acte son unitE, son moi commun, sa vie et sa volontE.^
Thus, the first result of the social contract is the creation of the corpor-
ate self vdth a mil of its o-wn, a self vhich stands "in the place of the




the subordination -vhich is to follow, a subordination of the individual to
j the general will. ". . . Quiconque refusera d’obEir a la volontE gEnErale
|y sera contraint par tout le Corps: ce qui ne signife autre chose sinon qu’on
1 2
le forcera d’Etre libre."
I
j
This description of the social contract and its results soxmds stranger
[
ly negative of the original freedom which it set out to preserve, but Rousseaii
offers against such a conclusion at least tw considerations: (l) The sover-
eign to vhich the individuals surrendered was composed of those individuals
|
themselves^ and (2) the will of the sovereign was to be the general will, !
I
which was defined as the will to right or to the common good. In the chapter]
on "The Civil State"® Rousseau admits that as the result of the pact the
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individual loses his "natural liberty*' but in exchange he gains "civil liber-
ty." He loses the unlimited right to everything "whioh he is able to get,




but he gains ci-vll liberty -vdaich is restrained by the general will. Ci-vil ji
association makes of the individual "an intelligent being and a man*"^
!
It may be seen from this -that everything depends upon -tihe general -will,
the characteristics of -which we must now note. The first characteristic is
that the general will aims at the common good.
!
La premiere et la plus important consequence des principes ci-de-vant
etablis est que la -volonte g^nerale peut seul diriger les forces
de I’^tat selon la fin de son institution, qui est le bien commun.*^
The object for which the state was established is the common good. The gen-
j
eral will is that alone which is able to direct the state toward this end.
The general -will differs from particular -wills in that the former has regard
only for the common interest v;hile the latter have regard for private in-
g
terests. What generalizes the will is not the number of voices voting but
the common interest which unites them: "On doit concevoir par Ik que se qui
I









1. Vaughan, PWR, II, 36. The -d.ew of society presented in this chap-
!
ter is exactly the opposite of that presented in the first Discourses .
I 2. Ibid., 39. The idea of a general -will. Professor Vaughan thinks, jl
i.made its first appearance in political thought in Diderot’s article, "Droit
|
llnaturel," -whence Rousseau may have received his inspiration, though there areii
i'
some reasons for thinking that Rousseau may not have borro-wed the idea from
jj
[[Diderot (Cf. Vaughan ,P7/R, 1 ,425) . C.W. Hendel finds elements of Rousseau’s i
conception in Pufendorf
,
Bodin, and Grotius (Hendel,RM,99-101).
3. Vaughan, PWR, II, 42
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”11 s'ensuit de ce qui pr^cbde que la volont^ gdndrale est toujours droite
et tend toujours h. l*utilit^ publique.”^ When an opinion contrary to my OTvn
prevails, it proves that I was mistaken; what I thought to be the general
I
will was not so. i
I
Quand done I’avis oontraire au mien I’emporte, cela ne prouve autre *
chose sinon que je m’etais trompe'^, et que ce que j’estimais ^re la
j
volonte'^ geneVale ne I’etait pas. Si mon avis particulier l’e{it emport^,
j
j’aurais fait autre chos^ que ce que j’avais voulu; e’est alors que je
j
n^aurais pas 4tc libre. i
i
Rousseau sometimes describes the general will as indestructible. It is
i
indestructible, not because the individuals from whom it proceeds are persons;
I
of infallible rectitude, but it is indestructible in spite of their falli-
bility. In writing on the question of -whether the general -will is able to
ji err Rousseau answers roundly that ”the general -will is al-ways right.” He
I adds, ho-wever, that "it does not follow that the deliberations of the people
I are al-ways equally correct.”^ The people can never be ’’corrupted” but they
can be "deceived" and only -when they are deceived to -bhey "seem to -will -wihat
I
Ij is bad.”^ The reader -will, of course, recognize that -wiiat we have to deal
li
-with here is a mere matter of -words. The argument, in so far as there is an
‘I
argument, is circulars The general -will is always right; if a will prevails
-which isn’t right, it is no longer general. Moreover, Rousseau himself did
1. Vau^an, P7»R, II, 42. Mr. Hillaire Belloc (Art. 1,165) points out
that Rousseau's phrase, "toujours droite" means "al-ways direct," but by an
"extraordinary blunder" it has been translated by the "howler," always
"ri^t." Bosanquet, ho-wever, replies (Art. 2,195) by insisting that "direct"
is morally too neutral, although "straight" in the slang usage is close to
the meaning intended. "Right" cones as near as anything in English to giv-
ing the correct nuance of Rousseau’s meaning, he concludes.
2. Vaughan, PV'ilR, II, 106.
3. Ibid., II, 42.
4. Loc. cit.
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Inot really believe that the people can never be corrupted for he later con-
siders a possible situation in vdiich the state is on the verge of i-uin, the
social bond is broken in every heart and private interest becomes the basis
of every law—a corrupt situation if there ever was one. With this situatioi
I
,as a test, he askss "Does it follow that the general will is exterminated or
I
jcornipted?” The answer is instructives "Won; elle est toujours constante.
I
lx / ' Iinalterable et pure; mais elle est subordonnee a d’autres qui I’emportent sur




-mais inefficace; a\;ssi bien dire qu’elle n’existe pas; ou
I 2discns mieux qu’elle ne compte pas."
j




;by voting. ". . . Et du calcul des voix se tire le declaration de la volonte,,
h
generale,"*^ In the chapter on "Voting" Rousseau presents again the ideas of
j
/
the Economie politique, holding that the will which is the most general is
j
I
most just and that this will is determined by the vote of the majority. This|
chapter declares that tlie nearer the opinion of the assembly approaches
|




debate and disserrbion is the sure sign of the ascendency of particular inter-|
ests.^ The social pact is the only matter wiiich requires unanimous consent;
1. Vaughan, PV/R, II, 103.
2. Schinz, LPR, II, 406. •
3. Vaughan, Op. cit., 106.
4. Ibid., 104. Bosanquet, #io draws upon but modifies Rousseau’s
I
notion of the general will, introduces a modification at this point vixen he I
I
declares that the general will is "not merely the de facto tendency of all i
that is done by members of the community" (Art. 3, Sib). "J^or another modern




Wilde has said (Art. 1,361), "Wo one has more clearly expressed the real
meaning of the classic doctrine of the general will."
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aside from this, the majority rules. "Hors ce Contrat primitif, la voix du
plus grand nombre oblige toujours tous les autres."^ By this method the
general will is discovered because "the general will is found by counting i
I
^ «2 ivotes.
Another characteristic of the general will is that it is general in
its origin and general in its scope, or as Rousseau put it, "general in its
object as well as its essence." "General in its origin" means that the will
of the state must proceed from all the members of the state. "General in its
scope" means that the general will must not be directed to a particular ob-
ject, but must aim at laws which embody a general interest of the state. For
example, the general will may decree that there shall be a government, but
it may not, as the general will elect the officers. This latter, because
it is particular, is an act of government, but not of sovereignty.^ As may
t
I
be seen, however, this contradictory situation would call for an act of
I government before the govennment existed. Rousseau recognizes the difficulty '
! 6but his solution has been described, not unjustly, as "artificial." TWhat
i
;
happens is that the political body merely changes its name from "sovereign"
' 1. Vaughan, PV®, II, 105.
2. Ibid., 106.
3. Ibid., II, 44.
4. Careful distinction is made by Rousseau between the sovereign and
the government. Sovereignty belongs to the people; it is indivisible and in-
alienable (CS,II,I & II). The government is composed of the "deputies" of
the people, but the deputies of the people are not their "representatives"
for sovereignty cannot be represented (CS,III,XV). The sovereign power in
Rousseau’s system would correspond to the legislative power in a modern de-
mocracy, while his governmental power would correspond to the executive.
5. CS, III, XVII.
6. D\arkheim, Art. 1, 157.
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properties of tiie body politic." Be that as it may, the illustration serves '
to diow that the general -will is to be general in its object and not particu-
lar.
The intent of this restriction upon the scope of the general Tiill was
to deny the right of the state to pass any law iwiiich was discriminatory or
vhich did not apply to all persons and sections of the community alike. The
stipulation is a reflection of the idea of equality -svhich Rousseau always
associated wi-th liberty. But Professor Vaughan has pointed out that, with
the complexity of modem states at any rate, laws regulating particular group^
are essential. And even Rousseau favored a discriminatory tax, heavier for
•2
the rich than for the poor.
The notion of equality is also present in the stipulation that the
will must be general in its origin; the sovereign is composed of all the
members of the state and the voices of all must have a hearing. "The con-
stant will of all the members of the state is the general will."^ It is in
this connection that Rousseau makes his satirical remark about the people
of England vho regard themselves as free. They are free, he says, only
during a general election, but when the members of Parliament are elected
"slavery" overtakes the people; they are at the mercy of their representa-
tives. The use which the people make of their ^ort moments of liberty
C !
"shows indeed that it deserves to lose them. ° Rousseau held that sovereignty
63 .
1. Vaughan, FV.H, II, 100.
2. Op. cit., I, 66.
3. ^upr^, p. 52.
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cannot be represented and that "every law the people has not ratified in 1
person is null and void.”^ The general will, therefore, proceeds from all
the people equally.
We have seen that the general vdll is the will in the state -vdiich
aims and the common good and is always right, but it also is the will of the
majority discovered by voting. The objects of this will are always general
and never particular. The general will proceeds from all the members of the
state equally. These may be said to be the main characteristics of the
general will as Rousseau presents them. It is by submission to this will
that the freedan of the individual is to be preserved. Rousseau’s contention
is that moral and civil liberty become the heritage of the individual when
1
he makes a total alienaticn. of himself to the general will. Are there any
j
considerations -which -mould tend to -mlidate this contention?
Rousseau would doubtless claim in his defense that the general will
i
j
is defined as -fche -will to Right, and the liberty of the moral man is not
infringed by the laws of Right. These are the object or the motive of the
moral man’s actions. If the matter could be left there the defense of
liberty would be stronger than, as a matter of fact, it ttarns out to be. The
matter cannot be left there, ho-wever, because the general -will is described,
not only as the ideal -will to Right, but also as the actual will of the
i
majority discovered by voting. Not only are these definitions inconsistent,
;
but in practice the latter cancels -the former. There may be a vast differ-
i
ence between the -volontd gdndrale and the volontd de tous , as Rousseau con-
tends, but it is the latter wliich prevails in practice and it may or may not
[
1. Vaughan, PWR, II, 96. Bentham sarcastically remarked that
Rousseau’s doctrine -would make all laws invalid, excepting, perhaps, those
of the Republic of San Marino (quoted by Bosanquet, PTS,99).
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coincide mth the ideal will to Right. The arguments by which Rousseau seeks
to make it appear that the ideal will still remains incornaptible and pure
even when particular wills have corrupted the state, and the argument which
seeks to make it appear that the individual is vfrong in what he thoxxght to
be the general will when the majority overrules him are merely verbal subter-
fuge. The logic of the system calls for the plain admission that in prac-
|
tice the individual makes a total alienation of himself to the will of the
majority. Unless one wants to hold, against common sense and the teaching of
history, that the majority is always right and that "the voice of the people
is the voice of God,” one must admit that the final result is the surrender
of individuality or individual freedom to the will of the group.
Before passing final judgment upon the consequences of this view for
liberty it is necessary to pay some attention to the provisions which may be
construed as checks upon the sovereign power. If we count as the first
check the definition of the general will as the ideal will to right, then
there are altogether four. Our estimation of this first check, however, is
that it is cancelled by the further definition of the general will as the
will of the majority.
I
A second provision which may be construed as a check is that which we
have noticed as another character of the general will* It must come from all.
We shall have more to say of this when we come to consider the romantic
elements in Rousseau’s approach to the problem of liberty. As a check
i
[
against the tyranny of the majority it is sufficient to say here that it re-
i
duces in the end to a matter of wordi^ for, as we have noted, Rousseau sa3^
that when a will contrary to my own prevails it proves that I via.s wrrong.
This implies that the majority is Always right, a consequence which Rousseau
both accepted and denied. The general wrill is always right, but if a wrill
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which is not ri^t should cone to pre-vail, it is not then the general
-svill
—by definition. This does not provide much protection in practice.
A third provision -vhich may be construed as a check is that character
I
of the general -will by which it cannot apply to particular objects, and
! cannot, therefore, become preferential or discriminatory. Y/e have found that|
I
this is not only impossible of application in a complex society but also that i|








There is a final check Tsdiich -we have not heretofore noted. It might
|
be called the principle of the public utility. Rousseau says:
Le droit que le pacte social donne au soverain sur les sujets ne
[
passe point, comme je I’ai dit, les bournes de I’utilite publique. Les
sujets ne doivent done compte au souverain de leurs opinions qu*autant
que ces opinions important ^ la communaute^^
Another reference to the principle of the public utility, ho-vrever, contains
a qualification -viiich destroys the principle:
i
On convient que tout ce que chacun alilne, par le pact sociale de sa
j
puissance, de ses biens, de sa liberte, e’es-b seulement la partie de
,
tout cela dont 1' usage importe a 1 «l coramunaut^j mais il faut convenir
j
aussi que le souverain seul est juge de cette importance*^
The principle is sound, even liberal, but the qualification destroys it.
1. Vau^an, PYJR, II, 131-32. This passage is reminiscent of a lengthy
I one in the ^conomie polit ique (PWR,I,252) in -which Rousseau sajrs that "in
I
point of ri ghit^ -wre^^s o"cral* ^ct -would be dissolved "if, in the State a single
citizen perished Tuho might have been succored, if a single one -was held in
prison -wrongfully, and if a single one were cast a-way with manifest injus-
tice."
2. Vaughan, PWR, II, 44.
I
3. As indicating a drift to-ward collecti-vlsm, it is WDrth noting that
[this qualificatioQ is not Resent in the first version of the C ontrat , and
that the passage from the Economie politique does not reappear in the final
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;^ile Faguet has observed that the sovereign mil always judge important
"everything -which the individual possesses."^ We may agree that at least
i
there is nothing in the principle to prevent the sovereign from so judging I
if it deems it important.
|
Some, however, defend Rousseau at this point. C.E. Vaughan, for
j
I
example, says that the right of the state -bo judge -what is important is a I
j
1 right -vhich will be persistently abused, but he adds:
j
The answer to this is that frcra that danger there is no sound -way of
j
escape. ... The only remedy is to di-vide the sovereignty, and tha-t—
as the experience of -the Uni-bed States she-ws—is a remedy -worse than the
disease. It puts the State at the mercy of the individual. .
Putting the indi-vldual at the mercy of the state is, he believes, a lesser
e-Til than putting the state at the mercy of the individual. Without enter-
ing upon a debate as to the wisdom or the folly of dividing the sovereignty,
I
one may fairly observe that if political theory in the last analysis reduces 'i
h
,1
to t-wo evils, -the lesser of which is to sacrifice the individual to the
state on terms -which -bhe state and not the indi-vldual shall lay do-wn, then
political theory is indeed in a bad -way. Be that as it may, Vaughan’
s
reference to Rousseau’s qualification at this point as a sacrifice of the
indi-vidual to the state is, we believe, a fair estimate of the significance
j
of this pro-vision as a check upon the general -will.
We may conclude, therefore, that, so far as the general will is
concerned, there is no check -which can be relied upon in practice to save the '
indi-vidual from the collectivism of the general -will or a possible tyranny
of the majority. Whether this conclusion shall stand as the final estimaticni
i
of the fortunes of liberty in the Centrat so ci al -will depend upon -what
-L
1. Faguet, MRV, 21
2. IWR, I, 67.
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results are obtained from an examination of the further ramifications of the
Droblera of liberty in this -writing. This -will be revie-wed in connection -vd-lli
j
bhe interpretation of Rousseau

CHAPTER IV
THE INTERPRETATION OF ROUSSEAU
'
1
The writing of Rousseau lends itself to two different and opposed in- '
I
terpretations, each of ch has been frequently presented by the critics.
To some, Rousseau is an individualist; to others he is a collectivist.^
Within the last tw decades this problem has been sirgued afresh in the
j writings of C.E. Vaughan and Alfred Cobban, the former affirming the collec-
tivist interpretation and the latter denying, it. It may be doubted whether
anything new or instructive can be said on a subject already so widely
j
I
treated, but the very fact that two such opposite views of Rousseau’s work
j
exist would give rise to the suspicion that perhaps the most adequate view
2
would contain references to both individualism and collectivism. The pur-
i
pose of this interpretation is to test that suspicion and to determine also
|




(or charged) with being an individualist.
j
For a clear and adequate understanding of these opposed interpretation)!!
it is fortunate that we have at hand the writings of two British scholars
whose works came before the public in 1915 and 1934 respectively, the latter
being almost obviously intended as a refutation of the former. Professor
1. Cf. Cobban, RMS, 5-6. E.H. Wright says, ”It is hard to say whe-
ther (the Contrat social) has been oftener indicted for an individualism
that will run to "anarcliy or for an absolutism that will bring the final
tyranny." Anglo-Saxon opinion, he points out, is usually dependent upon the
"marvellous diatribes of Burke" who held that the book dissolved France in
the individualism of the Terror (MR, 102).
2. C. Delisle Burns has written, "The fundamental point for me is that





C. E. Vaup;han’ s masterful and scholarly edition of The Political V^ritings of
Rousseau was the first to appear, and whatever vicissitudes the author’s
view of the work of his hero may undergo, his collection of all that Rousseau
I
I
said on the question of politics will remain an invaluable aid to students
of Rousseau, both because of the completeness of the edition and its authen-
ticity,^
I
' To find Rousseau classified as a collectivist comes as a surprise to
to;'/one who has associated the name of this writer with the Romantic Movement
and its glorification of the individual,^ Professor Vaughan, however,
classifies Rousseau as a collectivist, "Strike out the Discours sur I’in-
^galit^ with the first few pages of the Contrat sooial ," he says, "and the
3
’individualism* of Rousseau will be seen to be nothing better than a myth,"
He finds Rousseau to be the "most powerful assailant" of the individualist
4
theory, his signal service to political philosophy being to attack and
vanquish it (individualism) in its stronghold, as a speculative theory of
Right, For Vaughan, Rousseau becomes in the end "the father of modern
g
collectivism," The political writing of Rousseau, taken as a whole.
1, Vaughsin was T, H, Green’s cousin, H. W. Schneider declares that
"Vaughan was able, as (W.A,) Dunning was not, to see the philosophical
settings and implications of the various political theories he describes"
(Art, 1,155), But Schinz had written earlier, "Professor Vaughan has an
altogether too scanty knowledge of the vork of French scholars on Rousseau"
(Art, 2,215).
2, "One of the most commonly accepted ideas is that Rousseau is the
father of individualism" (Schinz, Art. 2,219),
3. PWR, I, 1.
4, Ibid,, 2, Cf, also PV7R, I, 97 note,
5. Ibid., 111.
6, "Collectivism" is not to be understood in an economic sense.
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"presents an unbroken movement from one position almost to its opposite* He
starts as the prophet of freedom, in the most abstract sense conceivable,"
which is the ideal of the second Discourse. From the abstract individualism
of this -writing he moves to the abstract collectivism of the Contrat social,
beyond wMch he moves further, in the -writing on Poland, to a recognition of
external circumstances and concrete conditions* "And Rousseau now stands at
the opposite point of the coropass from that at -which he started*"^
It is necessary to examine the grounds on -which it may be seen that ih<!
indi-vidualism of Rousseau is "nothing better than a myth*" There are four
major arguments supporting this position, and they ares (l) The early -writingsi
are moralistic, not political; (2) the "state of nature" is hypothetical,
I
not historical; (3) the idea of "contract" is secondary; (4) the Contrat
social is unquestionable collectivistic* These arguments need evaluating.
Vaughan holds that Rousseau first came before the -world as a "moral
reformer" and that the first Discourse has no reference ftt all to "political
theory in the strict sense*" 2 Moreover, the second Discourse cannot be re-
;
garded as a call to political action or to political reform because the only
|
conclusion to -which it can logically lead is the conclusion that we should
return to the state of na-ture, and Rousseau himself repudiated this deduc-
tion*^ Neither can this writing be regarded as a theory of Right, a rough
draft of the Contrat social, because the events leading up to the forraation
of ci-vil society are "a tissue of injustice and -wrong," and, moreover.
1* Vaughan, PWR, I, 80-81. '
I













the writing argues that all forms of society lead sooner or later to the
’’slavery of the many and the yat more hateful despotism of the few.”^ Nor is 1
the Discourse a sketch of historical origins because Rousseau insists that
1 2the origins assumed are hypothetical. There remains, therefore, the neces-
sity of considering this and the first Discourse as "the despondent wail of
the moralist denouncing evils -which neither he, nor any other man, has the
power to remove."
Vau^an calls atten-bi on to the fact that when Rousseau himself recordec
the history of those years during -which these -writings were composed, he
dwelt on the moral and religious side of the argument and not on its political
4
aspect. Book VIII of the Confessions bears this out to some extent. Of the
first Discourse Rousseau himself said that it was "totally lacking in logic,"
1
i
and was, of all the -writings -which proceeded from his pen, "the weakest in
1 C
reasoning." Moreover, he recognizes the presence of a "bitterness and ill-
1 humor" in the first works, which he traces to the circumstances of life at
1
the moment as well as to a psychological attitude of rebellion against social
usages -which he affected to despise because he -was unable to practice.®
1
1 The psychological factor is more particulary present, ho-wever, at the
time of -bhe -writing of the first Discourse, -which followed upon the crisis
or trance which took place near Vincennes. In the letters of 1762 to
1
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Malesherbes the description of his state of mind furnishes ample ground for
regarding this as an occasicn of "conversion” or "auto-hypnosis."^ The idea
which came to him in this ecstatic vision was that "man is naturally good and
that it is by those (social) institutions that men become evil*" His mis-
I
sion was to make good this idea.^ The first Discourse is the product of a
feverish enthusiasm bom of this incandescent period of psychological integral
tion. The scattered fragments of a new idea became suddenly crystalized in
tlie theme of this Discourse and a basic idea in Rousseau’s philosophy was
bora. The writer himself was aware of the extravagance with which this idea
was first presented, but the significant -thing is not the extravagence but
the idea. It was the idea of the "natural man."
In the second Discourse the basic theme is the same: In the state of
nature men are self-sufficient, independent, equal, and good; society makes
men corrupt and destroys their natural equality. It is important to notice,
ho-wever, that Rousseau does not regard this Discourse as the product of any
unusual psychological condition, nor does he think of it as "totally lacking
in logics" His estimation of it was higher.
The circumstances of the writer’s life at the time of this composition
were pleasant. He tells us that after deciding to write on the question of
the origin of inequality he went to Saint-Germain for seven or eight days of
meditation. Here, freed from all anxiety, he buried himself in the forest
where he sought to find "the picbure of primitive times" of -which he -was to
trace the history.
1. Cf. Josephson, JJR, 155-58. Also Tfilde, Art. 2 and Vallette, JJR,
Bk. I, Ch. IV.
2. Le-tter -bo Malesherbes, 1762. Oeu-vres , X, 301.
3. Conf . IX in Oeuvres, VIII, 298.
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G
. . • Je faisois main basse sixr les petits mensonges des homines;
J’osois devoiler k nu leur nature, suivre le progrks du temps et des
choses qui I’ont d^figur^e, et comparant I’homme de I’homme avec I’homme !
naturel, leur montrer dans son perfeetionnement pr4tendu la veritable
source de ses miskres* Mon kme, exaltke par ces contemplations sublimes,
^
s’^levoit auprks de la Divinitk* •
A note added later to this exposition admits a "harsh tone" and "gloomy air"
2in connection with one passage but this passage is aside from the main
argument* He blames its presence on Diderot, -v^iose influence gave the writ-
ing a "melancholy tinge." If there are other vagaries, the author does not
mention them. Indeed, vdth the exception of the passage mentioned, the
i
attitude of the author toward this work is one of satisfaction and pleasure.
He praises its insights as having lifted his soul to the Divine.
?fhat then of the contention that holds the earlier varitings to be
"the despondent wail of the moralist"? This view m.ight apply to the extrav-
agances of the first Discourse
,
as Rousseau himself would admit, but it
hardly does justice to the main idea of both works, the unity existing be-
tween them, or to the author’s recorded estimation of the significance of
that main idea. We may admit with Vaughan thnt the second Discourse cannot
logically be regarded as a theory of political right, a history of political
origins, or a call to political action. The earlier writings cannot logical-
ly be interpreted under any of these three heads and for the reasons -viiich
Vaughan cogently adduces. But at the same time it i s not necessary, indeed,
it is a mistake to discount the political reference of these vjorks and the
importance of tiieir place in Rousseau’s political philosophy as a Tiiole.
The reason for this is the fact that in these writings there is
^




2. It is a passage against the philosophers, in Vaughan, PWR,I,162.
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presented an idea -wiii ch was to have a definite hearing on Rousseau’s politi-
cal thought, an idea which was destined to embarrass even his most mature
political writing, namely, the idea of man in a state of nature, the idea of
I’homme naturel .
To set these early writings aside as ’’moral declamation” is to intro-
duce a gap in the work of Rousseau as a vdiole, a gap of -which the author him-
self was unaware and vrhidi it is unnecessary to assume. We have already
noted that for Rousseau the first t-wo Pi scour ses and the !^ile "are insepar-
able, and form together a single whole." ^ Since the Simile contains a summary
of the Contrat soci al, and since the Contrat social contains traces of the
I
ideas of the first Discourses, it is not incorrect to assert that all the
works belong together. The first Discourses do not violate this unity, for
their main argument is never absent from Rousseau’s thought. It seems, there^
fore, a false interpretation to set aside the earljr writings as the "despon-
dent v/ail of the moralist." i
The attempt to dissipate -fche indi-vi dualism of Rousseau by assigning
p
the idea of the state of nature a place of secondary importance is like-wise
not entirely comincing. We may admit that Rousseau regarded the state of
I
nature as hypothetical and not historical. It is also tnie that Rousseau
never proposed what seems to be the most obvious inference fror\ much of his
j
-writing, namely, that we should return to the state of nature. Whenever he
-was accused by his critics of advocating this, he always repudiated the
1. Supra , p. 24.
2. Cf. Vaughan, FVJR, I, 42-43.
3. The Preface to the Di scours sur I’in^galit^ describes it as "a
state vhich no longer exists, which perhaps never esdsted, -wiiich probably
never -will exist."
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charge.^ He did not use this idea, -vdiich -was "the keynote of all eighteenth-
century thought," as an explanation of the historical origin of society.
But from these facts it cannot he deduced that Rousseau did not use the idea
of a state of nature at all. There is no major witing from -which traces of
the idea are entirely absent, and it is the central theme of the first t-wo
Discourses and the 6nile. It -would be hardly likely, therefore, that this
conception should not be found in Rousseau’s political -writing. As a matter
of fact, the -thing -we shall attempt to show is that Rousseau’s concep-bion of
man in a state of nature is the conception -which plays havoc with his politi-
cal -writing, and in spite of this fact he held the conception to the end.
Associated -with the notion of a state of nature is the idea of con-
tract. A great deal is made of the fact that Rousseau, in the first draft
of the Contrat social, repudiated the conception of "natural Law," the logi-
cal consequence of -which is the fall of the idea of contract also. Thus,
"the conception so dear to the indi-vidualists and so essential to their plea
A
had been expressly repudiated."^
It needs to be pointed out, however, that in overthro-wing Locke’s and
Diderot’s conception of "natural La-w" or "na-bural Society" Rousseau used an
argument more utterly individualistic than either Locke’s or Diderot’s. His
argument proceeded from his own conception of the state of nature. We may
admit that Rousseau reduced the idea of a state of nature to the status of a
"fiction" and the historical importance of this advance in thought may
1.
Cf. Dialogues, III in Oeuvres
,
IX, 287; Reponse k M. Bordes in
Oeuvres, 1,65; and P^7ace de Karcisse in Oeuvres, V, 108-9.
2. Cobban, RMS, 216.
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rightly be amplified. But it is net to be overlooked that this is a fiction
Tiiich Rousseau employed and approved. This is evident even in the first
draft of the Conbrat social
,
for here, and -this is -where the "repudiation"
is said to take place, the argument is not against the state of nature as
such but rather against a particular conception of the state of nature,
namely, Diderot’s.
The best s-budies -which have been made of the relation bet-ween the tyro
drafts of the Contrat social are probably those of Professor Albert Schinz an(|l
M. Ren^ Hubert.^ From these studies, as -well as from the original itself, it
is clear that Rousseau is opposing the point of -Tlevj- of the article, "Droit
Naturel," -written by Diderot. The problem on vaiiich Rousseau meditates in
the first drafb (and in the final drafb also) is that of finding a motive
-vhich -will lead a man to consent -bo obey the la-w -when it is to his disadvan-
2
tage and -wiien he could both disobey and escape punishment. The ans-wer gxven
to this problem by Diderot had been that man is by na-bure sociable.
Rousseau assailed this answer by holding that society is a human convention
4
rather than a natural condition. His object was to oppose the doctrine of
5
a social contract to the idea of na-tural sociability, and in doing so he
drew a picture of man as naturally unsociable rather than sociable. This
pic-bure is the familiar one of I’homme naturel.
1. Schinz, Art. 1 and LPR, II, Ch. V. Hubert, REE, Chs. Ill & IX esp.
2. Schinz, LPR, II, 359. Art. 1, 781.
3. See excerpt from "Droit Naturel" and comments thereon in Hubert,
REE, Ch. III.
4. Cf. the title of Bk. I, Ch. II, first draft: "De la socidtd
g^^rale du genre h\imain."
5. Cf. Hubert, REE, 48.
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%Vaughan is, of course, correct in holding that the same arguments
•vdiich are valid against Diderot’s theory of natural law are also valid
against Rousseau’s theory of a social ccntract, since the contract calls for
the free consent of the individuals participating and if the individuals
participating are naturally unsocial they would be as unlikely to participate
in a social contract as they -wDuild be to obey laws to their disadvantage.
It was for this reason, Vaughan suggests, that Rousseau tore the manuscript
in half and left out of ihe final version the material of the fatal chapter
(chapter II ) of the first book of the Geneva manuscript. He "felt that his
only course was to silence the battery winch he had incautiously unmasked.
Schinz had arrived at essentially the same conclusion in his article i/diich
2
appeared three years earlier.
As to the first draft, therefore, we may say that instead of repudi-
ating "the conception so dear to the individualists" Rousseau uses a most
individualistic form of this conception as a weapon against Diderot and as
a fulcrum to pry overboard the notion of natural law. The state of nature,




1. PWR, II, 441.
I
2. Cf. Schinz, LPR, II, 379 note. C. W. Hendel suggests other reasons!
for the suppression of the first draft. He points out that after writing
|
the preliminary version Rousseau had openly broken with Diderot, a matter
|
which he regretted almost as soon as he had done it. As a matter of taste,
therefore, he suppressed the record of his own intellectual controversy with
|
"the philosopher"—a designation vhich no reader could mistake (Hendel ,RIJ, II
,;
185). Hendel also points out that it was \msafe to write against monarchy
while residing in France. "Perhaps it was because the Third Book and -vdiat-
|
ever followed it in the manuscript of the Social Contract also fell short of
|
that prescription of safety that made him destroy it and revise the vhole
treatise, (it seems to the present writer, however, that this view is ne- i
gated by the unfavorable criticism of monarchy vhich appeared in the pub-
lished version.) But it is also very likely that the making of these studies |
of government in the projects of St. Pierre really advanced his own think- [
ing ... which forced him to discard what had already been written in the
j
previous essay" (Op. cit.,1,223).




> ^ I’ I
--!
^
‘-. r-v.r , -t' 'io ,aiu(?riv-^V ,••<1
rv'.rnv f>2la ?r‘ --r:;f ;x>',.;r.rr 'i<-. •"^.•v;.v
•»
• J.»‘s.>f.irr hrUr nr. :int:\‘-.




: '<ly -rLirc :>'
‘
'i !
•• rri.'l’Bq £) r-'i’*. i'O 9 -1 /«•:.:• Lv '.!'nl y-''^ 'x'^ j ’ ..r[of) oo'fx '
u-rjrH.e't o-’i" -'T-W (.r.-K/ rr !': L)£irr>: fs .'•iy>s'' B v i! 9'<3 xrtj
, i.‘- Tfvi-: r.-i s ».'«»: '^orfo '.i- 9Cf ; u' •« v--:f ?< rfr.v.T.taco C.s'-
;;?: J./b;: c^e:i.! ^B.h3C.:qU'3 < fi ^ j J' . >
' v .yj
'/(•'.T rto /!> 'T't*V l ^r.'!:'] ‘i t; two ^"’io .. ' . ^
>^r»xi'Dr 9 d:' Ic .'•i'.''‘»xf 0 :u. :o ./I •j!).T;r'.^o;‘
, Ii9JilL;ijMi:r£jO vI";; o'O crtr.'.Br' i. -u ri eri /io i a’ y;‘tifd:*'r;r, ao'-.jff.a od" .'’i.-.'t'; .
•fr i.icr 3ii; -i:; ;'•/•; .I-'-dt *> oiru-i.?. :v-<;r y *! Ib r.;- Yt>> 30 di’- b':^'r -.'• r ’'od :srirDi
,
*<'? L .'*r,® ' a’il*' . ' >'' 'tt'd ijvT ? 'I'lqB
xf;-,-. ;*i xO X - ''r:; .; •.ai: yr<rr r?: , .j ^ dciirl exid- od aA
' 303W urtj&’.3C'::“ '‘BO'd I.;'£fii-.£’wB:r-rrd. Ovt- oa cro jd-xiar^itoci
!’C’:?6rq dr;;r ' "o-t/? •'.•»>• .0 ex? itc- id'a^oxTO'* siad' 'j.o Xii*. j'i .oi^-?.c£j’it;^ir 'J
‘io , ,« C.rici/rn lo ntoidCiT -.' k: -/aq od c*’./.. .''
'••
c
; If;..; ' ; .a'.Tx :c d-+'i:;- •: ,Mi>-:\fj!oa ic -. ai
,
.+.c ;;;
ir:' +;;X3 C^ 'I-/;'' o:
.’. 3 .j*i 'If' TO 2 B X - 1 r •'; r n / ; , , , rjn.I , £ixi.'4''c. .
arrd:T7 ':‘:r‘,.r. sd-n-'ot, r-'£,:'. .• id' iss;J^^qq£,?; yKj -xol
e
^









ytno'i ©.d do r- Vr
’ o r . -'-i v.-f -'v A •-.y '^tni .if/o 3.f. :.• lo triOO 1 byaca'TTToq ^4 f.
''-4.) t'/y 4 J i ' 1' L CO 'rb.'''dT 0 .2 •.;. r (f-/ oro j 'rny-. '-ioh o-'-'Soilqca •)£ ..V-'-' i
--
-.T





.'I’i . ’. ]*x*'
'
[ 0 .'^ ;. 0-v ;r -jc .ocixrtfti rTrlbioo” ...
:••.•' iVi .? r / J ' ‘ *'.4 0 :. ^o(ooc- •; /‘i 0 Ic/':'- ^ rr..' .T '^ffi ;i./ di. Cn'i » ^ '/ 1'
' j.v.vj r7(' -ii--; J" 'ic !.*:.;) .ii"; ’'i' i «Tc •f 1’ .'"
i. r > 'v is '.id
,





'.q -; *• ,T r ‘ ••vTC ;. :,• -. .1 0 f--; '-o.riXTO '.,'.f.t.''s'£0i'.3'’i.rr:.'' o i; yd : .r> ^J^“n
'rb; :"!». -X' '- .7 >i '> 0 3 .1’ q 2i dA.'ti (•ro/v-. ... q .1
'-('?((; ^id - ;ia'>;ba = ' "io yj • oi.'riq qji;: itx . ".0
-. i.i rri i-vy./.?;'.?: bdfi’iL:: d;;;. 'x2 ''-. bq;a:>3 l£ 'if* boDyo'.i" . . , .,;
*' «••* ^
- a.







But Rousseau destroyed this first draft. Does this not indicate that '
he surrendered the conception of a state of nature? Rot necessarily, for
the correlative notion that society rests upon a convention or a contract
-was!
not surrendered, although Rousseau quite probably saw that it was logically
I
undermined. We have not only the title of the final version to vouch for
the preservation of the idea of contract but also his clear statement in the
I
opening chapter that society "does not come from nature and must, therefore,
be founded on conventions." This indicates that Rousseau had not, i/dien he
wrote the final version, abandoned his attitude of opposition to Diderot* s
notion of natural sociability, which is another way of saying also that he
had not abandoned his own conception of the state of nature.
j
I
The weight of the evidence, therefore, seems in favor of those critics'
I
who, like M. Henri Rodet and Mr. Alfred Cobban, hold that two master ideas I
lie at the base of Rousseau’s whole system, his theory of the state of nature
3 !|
and his theory of a fundamental pact. !.
This conclusion and the evidence upon which it rests serves to answer
il
also the criticism that the idea of contract, like the idea of a state of
|
nature, is secondary in Rousseau. There is little doubt that Rousseau had ji
II
misgivings about the contract. These are manifest, as Vaughan points out,
|




treatise, in his suspicion that the contract in reality provides no guarantee
1. Rodet, LCS, 31.
2. Vaughan, PVilR, II, 24.
3. Rodet, LCS, xi. Cobban, RMS, 21b.
4. Vaughan, R/R, I, 22 note 3.
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for civil obligations, in his temptation to substitute "common advantage"
I
as the basis of the state, and in his repudiation of natural law which
2 !
carries the logical rejection of the idea of contract. In spite of these
i
misgivings, however, his final decision was to sweep them all aside, tear up
the refirtation of natural law, use the term in the title of his treatise, and!
write the following defense of the idea in the Letters From the Mountains:
• • • J’ai pose ^our^ fondement du Corps politique la convention de ses
membresj j’ai refute les principes diffbrents du mien.
Ind^pendemment de la vdVit^ de oe principe, il I’emporte sur tous les
autres par la solidity du fondement qu’il dtablit; car quel fondement
plus sOr peut avoir 1’ obligation parmi les hommes, que le libre engage-
ment de celui qui s’ oblige^ On peut disputer tout autre principe; on ne
saurait disputer celui-ll,.'^
!
"Why Rousseau should have retained the notion of a contract \'dien his
|
stand against Diderot on the question of natural law refuted alike both
i
himself and Diderot has been a matter of speculation. Some critics, impatient
!
with such an obvious contradiction as that implied in the notion of a naturalj
man voluntarily entering an agreement contrary to his nature, have called
|
i
Rousseau’s sincerity into question and because of such contradictions have
!
concluded that he wrote only because he wanted fame or money.^ This, how-
ever, is not the most charitable or even the most logical supposition. It
1.
Cf. Vaughan, R’JR, I, 444.
2.
Schinz holds that Rousseau did not derive social obligation from
the contract, and that his effort to free himself from this idea is evident
in the Contrat social itself. Feeling his own idea weakened by his attack
on Diderot, he tried the Roman method of "forcing the individual to be free,
but rejected that as the method of might. He then tried the expedient of
the Lawgiver, but saw that such a one would have to be nearly divine. In
despair he turned to the conventional method and derived obligation fron\
religion. Hence, the "Civil Religion" is not a digression but the "keystone
of the whole stnict\n*e." (Schinz, Art. 2,225. Cf. Art. 1 & LPR ,II ,Ch.V.)
3.
Lettre VI in Vaugjian, PT/ilR, II, 200.
4.
So M. Espinas. Cf. Schinz, Art. 1, 780 note
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is inconsistent -vrith Rousseau’s high moral sensitivity about other matters
of a similar nature. Better reasons are given by Professor Schinz. He
points out that Rousseau had \mdertaken to solve the problem of social con- .
I
straint upon philosophical rather than upon theological grounds; he began by
I
laying aside the conventional method of invoking obedience to laws because |
they represent the vdll of God and resorted instead to the rationalist prin-
ciple of a social contract. In so doir^g he could battle his enemies, the
”philosoph es," upon their own ground. Moreover, he vdshed to modify the notior;
of contract from a principle of constraint (Hobbes) to a romantic principle
of social freedom. That is to say, he believed in his pact as a foundation
of a state -where man would find social happiness -without constraining him-
self. He could not bring himself to give up this -si^rdch ”in a splendid vision,
prolonged during several months" appeared to him as the marvelous key -which
j|-would resolve all difficulties.^
j
The idea of contract furnished one element -which Rousseau -was con-
vinced must be present in a political system if liberty is to be preserved.
I That element -was the consent of the individual. It -was this to -which he
I
pointed -sdien he defended his use of the idea. "For what more reliable foun-
|
dation can obligation among men have," he asked, "than the free agreement !
upon that -which obligates them?" As C.W. Hendel has pointed out, Rousseau
I
-was firmly convinced that "the only basis of any human association is the
^agreement of the persons concerned. . . .It -was his belief that all obliga-
itions, duties, la-ws, regimens must be self-imposed." Hendel adds that
%






3. Hendel, RM, II, 164.
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obligation, contract, equality, freedom -were the chief values of his ovtn life
They vrere the principles on vhich he acted in his personal affairs.^ Wealth
influence, position he had held up in scorn as the instruments of oppression.
By contrast, the notion of an obligation freely undertaken he held up as the
instrument of liberty. Our opinion, therefore, is that Rousseau foxmd it
impossible to surrender that bulmrk of liberty -irfiich he discovered in the
notion of consent, and on that account he retained the idea of a social con-
tract even though he had become a-ware of its difficulties.
It is possible to show that the idea of contract contradicts some
other things Rousseau said about common advantage as the basis of the state;
it is possible to show that his theory has difficulties, of -viiich he himself
2
was probably avrare; it is possible to show that his theory would have been
more consistent if he had eliminated the idea of contract and its related
ideas; but it is not possible to show that in his final judgment the idea of
contract is secondary or unimportant.
It may be concluded, -therefore, that the arguments against the indi-
vldualism of Rousseau from the allegedly secondary character of the state of
nature and the idea of contract are not con-^lncing.
This leaves us with the final point in Vaughan’s case against the
indi-vidualism of Rousseau and that point is the unmitigated collectivism of
the Contrat social . With this point, ho-wever, there is no possibility of
cogent disagree7nent and for -the moment it is necessary only to notice the
arguments upon -which it rests. The first is the fact that the social pact
calls for the "total alienation" of the indi-wldual as the result of Yhich he
1. Hendel, RH, II, 165.
2. The -wfords of his defense, "Ind^pendemment de la v^ritd de ce prin-
cipe," cast suspicion upon a -wholehearted acceptance of the idea. Cf. supra,
1. p, 80. _
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becomes only a part of the corporate self#^ Secondly, partial societies
2
idthin the state are banned* Thirdly, the supposed guarantees for the free-
dom of the individual are either a matter of mere isords or they come to noth-
ing in practice*^ It is not possible to dismiss Rousseau* s collectivism as
readily as this* however, since it is a bone of major contention in the
interpretation of Rousseau* Even Professor Vaughan seems none too certain
of the stand which, in the first place, he had so definitely taken when he
said that Rousseau made the idea of contract ”the porch to a collectivism
as absolute as the mind of man has ever conceived*"^ ”For the purpose of
founding the State," Vaughan wrote before the Weur, "he had reduced the indi-
vidual to a cipher*"® Then came the war, and new account was taken of the
prophets of national! an idxo, like Treitschke, had unleashed against mankind
the doctrine of the absolute state* Tfhether Vaughan recoiled at having
identified the name of Rousseau with the vainglorious swaggerings inherent
in the philosophy of Staatsomnipotens we do not know. But we do know that
after 1914 he wrote and Epilogue to his etvdy of Rousseau and in it he
pointed the finger of blame, not at Rousseau, but at Fichte* In so doing
he brought forward agsdnst his earlier interpretation of Rousseau every con-
sideration within reach to show that the collectivism of the Contrat social
was not nearly as absolute as he had first described it* True, Rousseau
1* Vau^an, PHR, I, 48} 57-61} 70} 111-12} 455-57} II, ^ 145-46}
200-01 } 550 . The pages underlined are in the writing of Rousseau*
2* Ibid., I, 50-60*
3* Ibid*, 64-67*
4* Ibid*, 30.
5* Ibid*, 56* Of* also p* 59*
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had called for the total and absolute surrender of the individual and had
forbidden the existence of partial associations within the state, but
Rousseau introduces qualifications.^
i
It is in support of this new interpretation of Rousseau for which
Vaughan himself had generously prepared tlie way that Doctor Alfred Cobban
enlists his energies. "It is not fair," he vjrites, "to take this (collec-
tivism) for granted. ... The effect on political liberty of a closer con-
nection between the individual and the state can be judged only after a de-
tailed examination of the nature of that connection." One of the arguments
in this detailed examination is that which is dedicated to the proposition
3that Rousseau did not really forbid partial associations within the state.
In view of Rousseau’s words on the subject it would seem somewhat hazardous
to assert such a proposition. Rousseau said, "II importe done, pour avoir
bien I’^nonc^ de la volont^ g^n^rale, qu’il n’ y ait pas de soci^t^ partielle
dans I’^tat . • Tifhat are Cobban’s grounds for the assertion of the con-
tradictory view?
The first reason he gives is that Rousseau acknowledges the utility




III, chapter VI. Rousseau says, in this passage, that in a monarchy there
must be "intermediate orders" of princes, personages, and nobles. But these
are necessary because of a condition which he does not approve, that is.
1. Vaughan, PVJR, II, 520-21.
2. Cobban, RMS, 136.
3. A point made also by Vaughan in the Epilogue .
4. In Vaughan, PVJR, II, 43.
5. Cobban, RMS, 72.
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because "il se trouve une trop grande distance entre le prince et le peuple,
/
et I’Etat manque de liaison." Furthermore, he adds that such intermediate
orders are not suitable to a small state,^and it is the small state vdiich
Rousseau approves. If one adds to this consideration the further fact that
throughout this same chapter Rousseau presents a thoroughgoing criticism
against monarchy itself, it will then be hardly possible to cite any passage
in it as one giving to partial associations a basis in right.
A second reason given in support of the proposition in question is that
2
Rousseau praises the Polish Confederation. But the praise accorded this
partial association is that which vrould be accorded a necessary evil. "It is
evil extremes which render violent remedies necessary," says Rousseau.^ It
is not to be supposed that Rousseau denies that partial associations exist
in fact or that under certain (evil) conditions they have a usefhl purpose.
Cobban’s citation of the passage in the l^conomie politique^ to mention
his third reason in support of the argument, admits that partial associations
exist in fact. One feels, however, that this circumstance is introduced here
by Rousseau to illustrate what he means by the volont^ gdndrale , for he point^
jout that the will of these "particular societies" stands in tvro relations,
for the members of the society it is general? for the society at large it is
particular. It often happens that the will is right in the first respect but
vicious (vicieuse) in the second. The teaching of the paragraph is that
particular societies are to be subject to the vUciole society -which contains
1. CS, III, VI in Vaughan PWR, II, 78.




3. Vaughan, PWR, II, 470.
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them*-^ Cobban admits that even in this citation there is no "recognizing in
O
so many vrords a right of association," Even so, it is necessary to take
exception to Cobban’s f\irther statement that the passage "does inhat is even
more important in acknowledging a necessary social fact."* There is nothing
in the paragraph which states that partial associations are "a necessary
social fact." Indeed, hovr could Rousseau regard them as "necessary" when
he admits that there is every possibility that they may pervert the general
will? The most Cobban could legitimately derive from Rousseau’s words is
that partial associations sure actual social facts, not that they are neces-
sary.
A similar criticism meets Cobban’s last citation. He holds that in
the Contrat social (Bk. II, Ch. Ill) Rousseau proposes an alternative to the
abandonment of partial associations and iiiis proposal is for the multiplica-
tion of them. Strangely enough, this citation takes us to the paragraph, the
first sentence of which is, "II iraporte done, pour avoir bien I’^nonc^ de la
volont^ gdh^rale, qu’il n’y ait pas de soci^t^ partielle dan I’^itat."^ It
is the next sentence wiiich contains the alternative; "Que s’il y a des
soci^t^s partielles, il en faut multiplier le nombre et en pr^venir I’in^gal-
it^, comme firent Solon, N\nna, Servius." The thought is; It is important for
an expression of the general will that there be no partial societies within
the state, but if there must be, then it is best to have as many as possible
and to prevent them from becoming unequal, for if one became powerful





4. Vaughan, RJR, II, 43.
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it could influence the e^^pression of the general vdll. In other words, the
alternative is: Have so many that none is effective—which would produce a
result no better than that produced by banning them all at the outset. More--
over, even if we admit the fact or the possibility of partial associations
we are still far from finding any indication that Rousseau granted them a
right to exist.
For tliese reasons, therefore, it is necessary to reject Cobban’s
contention that Rousseau "does not deny to associations the right to exist
and to regulate their ownaffairs* *"! There is nothing in Rousseau's
Principles of Political Right #iich would guarantee partial associations the
right to exist. If it is a question of right, then Rousseau's judgment of
the matter is: "It is essential • • • that there be no partial societies
in the State."
In seeking to clear Rousseau of the charge of being one of the prime
founders of the despotic state, which represents "the weight of opinion,
even today,"'^ Cobban asserts that although we may admit that Rousseau grants
power to the state, this tells us nothing "unless we know what are the
*2
conditions he lays down for the exercise of the authority of the state."
He observes -that Rousseau takes a strong stand against the despotic system
because it is a government of men rather than a government of laws.^
One of the conditions, therefore, which he imposes upon the pov/erful state
is that its power shall always be exercised only in accordance with law.
1. Cobban, RliS, 75.
2. Ibid., 45.
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That this is a basic theme in Rousseau and that it is a check against
the despotism of personal government there is no denying* His hatred of
privilege and those vAio enjoyed it Twas genuine. His appeal to law against
privilege ms thus a genuine thrust against that vvhich he despised.
The problem cannot be dismissed here, however. It is necessary to in-
quire about the conditions which he lays down for the rule of law. In
Rousseau’s theory the law is the expression of the general will and its orgaii
Consequently, the rule of law is the rule of the general will and the general
vd-ll, as Cobbsn correctly states, is the central doctrine, not only of the
Contrat so cial but also of Rousseau’s wiiole political system.^ The power of
the body politic under the direction of the general will is sovereignty.
The character of sovereignty is that it is "unlimited." Hot only did
3
Rousseau affirm this aS a basic principle in the Contrat but he reaffirmed
4
it in the Lettres de la Montagne." Cobban minimizes the importance of this
principle, however, by declaring that Rousseau "hardly does himself justice
in describing it as an tmlimited power, for in fact it is limited most effec-'
tively by the terns of its own definition."® This remark refers to Rousseau’ii
statement that the general will is almys the will to Right, on the basis of'
which definition Cobban affirms, "Thus the state is sovereign for him only
so far as it is the embodiment of social justice ..."





4. Cf. Cobban, RMS, 121.
5. Ibid., 122.
6. Ibid., 124.
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Although we may appeal to the fact that Rousseau defined the general
will as the will to Rii^t, we must remember also that for Rousseau the will
of the people is a S5®.onym for the general will, and in actual practice it
is that, rather than the abstract conception, vhich prevails* Cobban does
not omit to notice this second definition of the general will^ but he fails
to follow out the implications of it; he bases his case rather on the abstraote
definition alone.
Much of the debate in the interpretation of Rousseau arises at this
point, and it is encouraged by the ambiguity in Rousseau himself. In the
ideal or abstract delineation of the volontd gdndrale he concentrated on the
requirements of social organization and apparently forgot for the moment the
kind of men who constitute society* He admitted as much himself;
Je ne serois pas ^tonn^ qu’au milieu de tous nos raisonnemens, mon
jeune homme, qui a du bon sens, me dit en m’ interrompant; ’On diroit
que nous b^tissons notre Edifice avec du bois, et non pas avec des
homroes, tant nous alignons exactement chaque pifece h la r'bglel' II
est vrai, mon ami; mais songez que le droit ne se plie point aux
passions des hommes, et qu’il s’aggissoit entre nous d’^tablir d’abord
les vrais principes du droit politique*^
In establishing the principles of Right, Rousseau concentrated on the
ideal aspect of the volontd gdndrale
.
abstracting his description from the
contingent aspects of human behavior. The result was a principle which has
been compared by Charles William Hendel to Plato’s principle of Justice, anc^
Eendel adds, "in thus preserving the general will as the supremely perfect
and ideal will, he was obeying some of the most ancient impulses of his own
1* "Yet we must remember that for Rousseau the will of the people is
a synonym for the General Will. • ." (RMS, 145). But contrast the following:
"Far from being open to the charge of identifying the will of the sovereign
with that of the majority, one might almost claim that Rousseau is one of th^
few modem authors -vdiose theory of government is immune from it" (RMS, 130).
|
2. ^ile, V in Oeuvres
,
II, 439. Cf. Vfright, MR, 104-5.
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thought.”^ Thus Hendel, concentrating on -this aspect of the matter, Yould
'
agree -with Cobban, for he holds that sovereignty cannot exist "save as a
povrer directed by the general will for the good of the comnunity." Other-
wise, "the power is not sovereign and the citizens are not in the least
2 ^
obliged to obey."
This contention is true from the point of view of political right, but
Ijnot from the point of view of political practice. The difficultj'- arises from
the fact that Rousseau gives an interpretation of the volont^ gdndrale from
S 1both points of view. He does not remain in the domain of abstract idea
and pure speculation. M. Henri Rodet, an able critic, has pointed out that
j
he YDuld have been found less full of contradictions if he had so remained.
"But his reflections on the volonte gdndrale descend from the metaphysical
4





Had Rousseau ended his account of the volontd gendrale with the ideal
|
I
description vhich he gave of it, he would then have been the exponent of the
j





2. Ibid., II, 193. Rudolf Stammler emphasizes this point in contend-
ing that the volontd gdndrale must be distinguished from the volontd de tous
^
the former being "qualitative" the latter being "quantitative." He adds, '
".
. . M^e en allemand on a souvent traduit ‘volont4 generale’ par ’allge-
meiner Wille, ’ alors que I’ondevrait dire ’ allgemeingultiger Wille* c’est-a*f
dire volonte legitime ..." (Art. 1,386). It must be noted, however that
"allgemeiner Tiille" often carries the meaning -vdiich Stammler pleads for.
Consider the following from Hegeli "Das Missverst'dindniss uber den allgemeinoi
Willen fSngt aber da an, dass der Begriff der Freiheit nicht im Sinne der
jtuf&lligen WillkUr Jedes genommen werden muss, sondem im Sinne des vemiinft-
igen Willens, des V/illens an und fUr sich" (GdP,III ,528) . "Der Wille is nur
als denkender frei" (ibid., 529).
3. As Bosanquet points out (PTS,98), Rousseau vacillates between the
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too much of a pragmatist to propound principles unrelated to practice. Con-
sequently, #ien he came to the application of his principle, vJxen he came to
consider the indi-siduals "who make up society and not the principles
-vdiich
underlie it, he felt the necessity of giving a new interpretation of the
volont^ gdh^rale . It is precisely thi s attempt to make the principle of
political ri^t also a matter of political fact that makes the difficulty,
for the volontd gdh^rale then becomes the vdll of the group -which is dis-
covered by voting, and one ought not to forget that the individuals voting
are "by nature" interested in their private rather than in the public good.
A different account of the "nature" of man -would have served admirably to
soften the impact of this clash, ^ but given the individual as Rousseau most
frequently described him, and given Rousseau’s con-viction of long standing
that society terds -to render all men corrupt, it is little -wonder that Ms
ideal principles appeared to himself as being "-wooden" when he placed them
alongside the individuals to -whom the;;/- -were meant to apply.
We may conclude therefore, that this attempted union bet-ween the
general characteristics and the actml characteristics of the volont^ gdn-
d'rale is an attempt which ends in, ambiguity and even contradiction. We are
inclined -to agree -with A.D. Lindsay’s assertion that Rousseau’s "account of
the general -will as everyone, including Bosanquet, has pointed out, is
ambiguous. Bosanquet points out that although Rousseau distinguishes bet-ween
the general -will and the -m.11 of all, he ccntinually speaks as though the t-wo
1. E. H. Vfright pro-vides us wT'.th -this "better" account of the nature
of man. His book, -which has been heralded as "a -welcome statement of essen-
tials" (Hendel, RM,ix), goes far toward unifying the thought of Rousseau by
holding -that "consciaace and reason" are parts of nature. They are its
better parts "and are appointed to control desire" (IV[R,7. Cf. also p.32).
We have noted above that these are the qualities of -vhat we have called
I’homme -Traiment libre. The question, so far as the interpretation of
- c : o
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-were identical."l Criven the statement that the sovereign-£y~oT the gener*alT
will is unlimited and the further statement that the general will is the willi
of the majority discovered hy voting, the practical outcome of a possible
tyranny of the majority is inevitable. Cobban’s contention, therefore, that
this sovereignty is limited by the definition of the yolont^ gdh^rale as the
mil to right is negated by Rousseau’s further definition of it as the
actual will of the people.
Cobban notes a similar restriction upon the general will wiien he
asserts that the general will is the rational will. He contends that
Rousseau would distinguish as strictly as Burke himself betv;een the
passions of the populace and the voice of a people judging deliberately,
,
in accordance with the light of reason, and under right guidance, on
its own proper and permanent interests.^
In support of this a passage from the first version of the Centrat and one
from the Lettres de la Montagne^ are cited. The latter reference, however,
contains also a repetition of the slogan that "the voice of the people is
the voice of God.” Cobban himself notes that this slogan was "one that
was to be used to justify every sort of popular imbecility in the course of
C
the subsequent century." This being the case, how can it be maintained
Rousseau is concerned is the question of whether Rousseau, when he speaks
of the individual, most often has in mind the characteristics of 1 ’ homme '
vraiment libre or those of I’hocrie naturel. Before the interpretation of
j
Rousseau is conpleted we hope to have shown that it is the latter which undefi-





1. Lindsay, Art. 1, 34. ‘
2. RIIS, 145.
i
3. In Vaughan, PT/R, I, 452.
I
4. Ibid., II, 256.
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that the general will, being also the will of the people, is also and always
the rational will or the will to right?
It vDuld seem especially difficult for Cobban to maintain this thesis
for he praises Rousseau for his recognition of the role of passions in the
state* He cites from Rousseau "an argument ... of considerable efficacy
against the Idealists, whom some have accounted his disciples."^ This argu-
ment is fron the ]^tat de guerre where Rousseau pays his respects to those
who have dared to assert that "the body politic is without passions and that
there i s no other reason in the state besides reason itself." Such a con-
dition, says Rousseau, is that of a "dead body." On the basis of this, and
other passages, Cobban concludes, "It follows that, the essence of society
consisting in the activity of its members, the state itself can be no more
free from passion than the individimls of wiiich it is comprised." Now,
since Rousseau himself freely admits (sometimes boasts) that passions as well.
4
as reason operate in the state and since history shows the v/ill of the
people often in support of "every popular imbecility," how much encouragemenl|
can be drawn from the fact iiiat Rousseau defined the general will as the




2. Vaughan, FVffi, I, 298.
3. RMS, 160.
4. The fault he found with the wrritings of Saint-Pierre was the fact
that the Count could not get rid of the notion that men act in accordance
with -their lights rather than their passions. "He labored for imaginary
beijigs," iaid Rousseau, "-while belie-^ing that he -was working for his con-
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A further step calculated to break dovai the collectivism of Rousseau
is found in the denial that Rousseau thought of the state in terms of that
unity which constitutes an organism. A study of this point provides the
student witii ample amusement over the way in vhich the contradictions of
'Rousseau throw his critics into a veritable furor of debate. Vaughan, vdth
the taste of a historian for historical development, watches the progress
of Rousseau from a radical individualist to a rigid collectivist. Conse-
quently, he fastens upon and makes capital of all the passages referring
to the organic character of the state, noticing, of course, that a certain
allowance has to be made for Tsdiat Rousseau said in other connections. Cobbai,
on the other hand, -ygho is interested in establishing, not only the miity
of Rousseau’s work, but also the fact that Rousseau is to be classed along
with Burke as a romantic individualist, fastens upon the passages denying
the organic analogy, noticing, of course, that a certain allowance has to be
made for the times -vdien Rousseau said the opposite. For example, Cobban,
in taking strong exception to Vaughan, lays himself imder obligation to show
that Rousseau "expressly repudiates the analogy between the state and the
animal organism."^ But, he adds, "at first sight he does not appear con-
sistent in his observations in this connection, and a passage of the
l^conomie politique certainly utilizes the analogy between the state and the
human body." This citation, however, he dismisses as no more than a "use-
ful analogy, and thereupon turns to the Contrat social to show how Rousseau
"expressly repudiates the analogy." His best citation from this writing is
1. RMS, 136.
2. Ibid., 136-37.
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the folio-will;^ ”Mais, outre la personne publique, nous avons a consid^rer
les personnes privees qui la coraposent, et dont la vie et la liberty sont
naturellement ind^pendentes d’elle."^ Unhappily, ho-wever, this citation
occurs in a chapter -vdiich contains just as explicit an affirmation of the
organic conception. The opening paragraph of the diapter asseirbs:
Si I’^tat ou la Cit^ n’est qu’une personne morale dont la -vie con-
sists dan I’union de ses membres, et si le plus important de ses soins
est celui de sa propre conservation, il lui faut une force universelle
et compulsive pour mouvoir et disposer chaque partie de la mani^re la
plus convenable au tout. Comme la nature donne h chaque homme un
pouvoir absolu sur tous ses membres, le pact social donne au Corps
politique un pouvoir absolue sur tous les siens . •
It -mould be easily possible to cite other passages from the C ontrat social
affirming the organic vie-w in perhaps even stronger terms. The chapter,
3
”t)u Pacts social" asserts that -tiie clauses of the social contract reduce to
one, namely, "the total alienation of each associate -with all his rights to
the entire community."^ The same chapter asserts that the act of associa-
tion produces "in the place of -the particular person of each contractant" a
collective body -with a unity, a corporate self ( moi commun), a life, a -will^
It is passages such as these -vMch give Vaughan just ground for asserting
g
the collectivism of the Contrat social
,
and to these others from Rousseau
7
might be added.
1. CS, II, IV. Cobban, RMS, 137.
2. Vaughan, PWR, II, 43.
3. CS, I, VI in PFJR, II, 32.
4. Ibid., 33.
5. Loc. cit.
6. Cf. RVR, I, 48, 70, 111.
7. Cf. op. cit., I, 455-56; II, 44, 145-46, 200-201, 350.
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That Rousseau made statements which are opposed to the organic view
there is no denying, and. Cobban commits no error in calling attention to
those statements. It is an error, however, to leave the collectivist pass-
ages out of account and conclude on the basis of statements to the contrary
that the attempt "to read (an organic theory) back into Rousseau would be
a perversion of his thought."^ One does not have to read it back; it is
there.
It is possible to note other qualifications intended to mitigate the
absolutism of the state. Vaughan, in the repentant mood of the Epilogue,
finds one such qualification in Rousseau’s assertion that "the state is not
entitled to exact from the subject anything beyond what is necessary for
its service." Vaughan had treated this qualification before, however,
and on the former occasion had observed that it was a qualification idiich,
in practice would "com^ to nothing"^ because of the amendment which Rousseau
adds to the qualification, "Mais il faut convenir aussi que le souverain
5
seul est juge de oette importance." In his first treatment of this "check"
g
upon collectivism Vaughan concluded, and we have followed his conclusion,
that the amendment destroyed the check. In the treatment in the Epilogue
,
however, Vaughein omits to notice the troublesome amendment, presenting the
principle itself as a qualification of the absolutism of the state.
1. Cobban, RMS, 138.
2. Vaughan, FWR, II, 521. Reference is to CS, II, IV.
3. PWR, I, 65, 67.
4. Ibid., 66.
5. In Vaughan, PV»R, II, 44.
6. Supra , p. 66.
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A further check which Vaughan notes (and Cobban follows) is that the
general will vhich Rousseau has in mind "is not that which overrides, but
tiiat which has inspired and penetrated itself with, the needs and interests
of the members taken as a whole. As Cobban puts it, Rousseau does not
conceive society as a "super-individual" whose interests are opposed to those
2
of the members of society. Frcm this Cobban concludes that Rousseau was
3 '
"in a general sense utilitarian and individualist." It is true that
Rousseau affirms an identity of interest between the individual and the grouji
The argument by -which he achieves this identity of interest is most instruc-
tive:
Or, le souverain, n’^tant fom^ que des particuliers qui le composent,
n’a ni ne peut avoir, d’int^r^t contraire au leurj par consequent la
puissance souveraine n’a nul besoin de garant envers les sujets, parce
qu’il est impossible que le corps veuille nuire k tous ses membresj et
nous verrons ci-apr^s qu’il ne peut nuire k aucun en particulier. Le
souverain, par cela seul qu’il est, est toujours tout ce qu’il doit "^re.^
i
The sovereign cannot wish to injure the subjects because it is impossible
that the body should wish to injure its parts! Here -we ha-ve the identity
of interests resting entirely upon an argument from analogy with the biolog-
ical organism (-which Cobban found to be repudiated in the Contrat social ).
This qualification on state absolutism, like the former, is one which
in practice "comes to nothing." Cobban sees its weakness for -while he adnitii
that -bhe identity of interest bet-wreen the individual and the group is an
"essential step in his argument," he has to add that "it is regrettable that
he (Rousseau) does not emphasize or specifically justify its he simply takes
1. Vau^an, PVVR, II, 521. I
2. Cobban, RMS, 139. '
I
3. Ibid., 141.
4. In Vaughan, PV/R, II, 35.
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it for granted.”^ The wonder is thab having made this admission, Cobban
should be found, ten pages later, asserting that Rousseau ’’does not assume
any automatic connection between the two principles of individual and social
welfare. It is true that Rousseau does not assume that the selfish inter-
est of the individual is allied to the well-being of the group. T/Vhet
Rousseau does assume, however, is even more impossible, namely, that indi-
viduals, who by nature act only for themselves, will in the group relation
act only for the good of the group, and by so acting reveal the identity of
interest vMch prevails between them and the group. This, as we shall see
in the next diapter, is an aspect of Rousseau’s romantic approach to the
problem of liberty.
From the preceding analysis, therefore, it may be concluded that the
attacks on Rousseau’s collectivism, from Vau^an and Cobban alike, are
xuasuccessful* Partial associations are denied any right of existence, and
considerations to the contrary are insufficient to set aside this conclu-
i
sion. The qualifications placed upon the general will, by -which it is
defined as the -will to right or as the rational will, are qualifications
•which cannot be made effecti-vre in practice; they are, therefore, merely
verbal, since the general -wdll is also and at the same -time defined as the
3
•will of the people. The notion of the state as an organism is an idea
•which Rousseau both affirmed and denied, the affirmation being consistent
•wnth his concep-tion of ci-Til society and the denial being consistent with
his conception of the individual. The checks in fa'Tor of the individual
1. RMS, 131.
2. Ibid., 141.
3. Lanson has observeds "Mais cette volont4 g^n^rale, on le salt,
Rousseau en postule la bonte; il ne connait aucun moyen de faire que la
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and against the ahsolutism of the state are checks -which provide no restrairfc
in practice* Thus, -vhetlier one includes the organic analogy or leaves it
out, it cannot be successfully denied that the Contrat social is predominant-
ly collectivisti c, tending in the end, to-ward the sacrifice of the individual
to the state*
But individualistic elements are present even in the Contrat* The
romantic approach to liberty in this -vsriting is, as we shall see, individual-
istic in character* The problem, therefore, arises of the relation betiween
individualism and col lecti-vlsra in Rousseau’s thought, Vaughan, -with keener
appreciation than Cobban, recognizes more fully the problem of individualism
versus collecti-Tisra* He ^writes:
We are therefore compelled to asks Is there any means of reconciling
the t-wo strains -V7hich ans-wer to each other throughout the -writings of
Rousseau: the one represented by the t-wo Discourses and tlie main body
of Anile; the other by the Contrat so cial
,
the Economie politique and the
int
r
0(Tuctory paragraphs of Anile
Vaughan solves the problem by holding that the thought of Rousseau developed
from individualism to collectivism* Proof of this thesis calls for sho-wing
tliat the Anile is less individualistic and the Contrat so
c
ial less collec-
tivisti c than at first they seem to be. But there are difficulties in the
-way of this -vie-w. We ha-ve already seen -what obstacles lie in the -way of
any attempt to mitigate the collectivism of the Contrat social* Vaughan’s
original conclusion on this point, that Rousseau made the contract the porch
to a rigid collectivism, -was so well establisheAby himself that his emenda-
tions are hardly adequate to change it,
A further objection to -this interpretation is that if there is a
volontd du peuple soit cette volont^ g^ndrale, id^ale, et non une expression
de I’egoisrae d'*xme majority, * *" (Art, 1,22),
1, Vau^ian, PWR,^137*
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strai^t-line development in the thought of Rousseau from individualism to I
collectivism, it becomes necessary to find one of these elements gradually
fading while the other is appearing on the horizon. Vaughan finds this meta-
morphosis taking place in the ^ile.^ Not only is the individualism of this
writing less individualistic than at first sight it appeared to be, but also
the collectivism here is less collectivistic than it is in the Contrat social*
The treatise on education, says Vaughan, does not present individualism
unrelieved, because bridle is constantly under the direction of the tutor,
and he is constantly subject to restraint in accordance with culture. But
,
is not this restraint in the interest of individualism—not the individual-
ism of the savage in the woods, to be sure, but the individualism of the
,
savage in the city? It is a training which begins with an emphasis on the '
natural man and vhich, in the end, leaves ^mile independent and unsocialized.
^
]^mile is trained ’’for himself” and not ’for others.” Even after social
training has been administered, Rousseau declares that the wise man finds
his freedom, not in society but in himself. !^ile, in this respect, is not
unlike Wolmar or Julie in the Nouvelle HeloSse. The conscience of Wolmar
or of Julie, says Gustave Lanson, would never know how to give to the volont^
p
g^neVale the absolute right of prescribing for him or of regulating her.
T/hat is presented, therefore, in the i^ile, taking all restraint
and training into account, vrould seem to be, not the individualism of man in
a state of nature, it is true, but a tutored individualism which nevertheless
leaves the individual very independent of the group.
1. Some embarrassment to this thesis would seem a priori to arise
from the fact that the limile is conten5>oraneous with the Contrat social , bolh
having been published in~~r762. (Schinz, LPR,II,510, refers tTiese as the
tYio works which are ’’properly philosophical.”
)
2. Lanson, HLF, 783.
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As for the collectivism of the &iile
,
Vaughan holds that vhat is a ’’ strongly i
collectivist theory" in the Social Contract "has taken individualist varnish'*
in the ^mile, because, in the latter, the doctrine of the communal self is
entirelj/- suppressed and the notion of the general vd.ll is "virtually" sup-
pressed, giving an effect "strangely different."^ A comparison of the pass-
ages in question, however, vail show that this is hardly the fact.
Contrat social
Chacun de nous met en commun
sa personne et toute
sa puissance sous la supreme direc-
tion de la volonte g4n4rale; et nous
recevons en corps chaque membre
^
comme partie indivisible du tout.
^mile
Chacun de nous met en commun ses
biens, sa personne, sa vie et toute
sa puissance, sous la supreme direc-
tion de la volontd^ gdn^rale, et nous
recevons en corps chaque membre
^
comme partie indivisible du tout.
It may be seen from this that not only is the general vill mentioned in both
forms of the formula for ilie social pact, but also that the form in the Anile
is, if anything, more collectivistic than that of the Social Contract since
it calls for the surrender of propei*ty and life, not mentioned in the other.
Moreover, the doctrine of the corporate self is also clearly present in the
Anile although not explicitly nameds
\ 1’ instant, au lieu de la personne
parti culibre de chaque contractant,
cet acte d’ association produit un
Corps moral et collectif, compost
d’autant de membres que I’assembl^e
a de voix, lequel revolt de ce
meme acte son xinit^, son moi commun
sa vie et sa volonte. Cette per-
sonne publique, qui se forme ainsi
par 1' union de toutes les autres,
prenait autrefois le nom de Cit^, et
prend maintenant celui de R^publique
ou de Corps politique. .





4. Vaughan, PWR, II, 33-34.
5. Oeuvres, II, 432.
au lieu de la personne
particuli^re de chaque contractant,
cet acte d’ association produit un
corps moral et collectif, compost
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It may be seen from this that there are verbal differences between the two
accounts. The explicit name for the corporate self, moi commun, is omitted
in the &nile but the idea is clearly there, and a synonym is given in the
expressioi "corps moral et collectif. It seems then that there is no
groxmd for inferring any esoteric intent on the part of the author by the
omission noted, and there hardly seems any basis for assuming that the
accounts are "strangely different," or that the strong collectivist account
in the Contrat social takes on an "individualist varnish" in the ^ile. It
is true that there is more said about individualism in the Jtoile than in the
Contrat social and more said about collectivism in the latter than in the
former, but there is collectivism in the 4nile. It is the collectivism of
Sparta and Rome, the collectivism of the property, person, life, and power
of the individual under the direction of the general will—a collectivism
as strong as that of the Contrat social.
Professor Cobban seeks to unify the work of Rousseau, not by having
him develop from an individualist into a collectivist, but by contending
that he remains an individualist from beginning to end. This arg\iment holds
that although Rousseau started with the "natural man" he modified, but did
not nullify, the cha,racter of the natural man so that he could become a
member of civil society. This membership was consistent with his natwe as
a natural man and it afforded him a larger freedom than that which he lost
2by leaving the state of nature.
In order to make the natural man fit for society and society desir-
able for the natural man several obstacles have to be removed. It has to be
1, Cf. also Oeuvres
,
II, 6 (^ile , l), supra , p. 37,
2, Cobban, RMS, 227-28.
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shoTNii that there is no basic contradiction betv/een the natural man and
society; and that the liberty of the social state is greater or better than
the liberty of the natural state. It has to be shorn that there is in
Rousseau no philosophical condemnation of the principle of social life.
A critique of these conclusions brings us to the heart of the problem of the
relation between the individual and the group, and this critique, together
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THE INTERPRETATION OF ROUSSEAU, COITTINUED
Professor Alfred Cobban, as previously noted, asserts the consistency
bet-ween the natural man and society, and he fortifies this assertion mth the
contention that there is no philosophical condemnation of the principle of
social life in Rousseau. All that he said against society -was "the view of
his more pessimistic or paradoxical moments,” or it vjas ’’most often • • • a
criticism of the society of his own day."^ This is a moderate, middle-of-thi
way interpretation of the extravagant utterances of Rousseau and, if it
could be accepted it vrould go far toward reducing the inconsistency of the
Citizen of Geneva.
In the opinion of the present writer, the most difficult point in the
interpretation of Rousseau’s thought is the problem of arriving at Rousseau’s
real attitude toward civil society. Did Rousseau really intend by his denxm-
ciations no philosophical condemnation of social life, and -v\iien he wrote the
second Discourse
,
vhich Voltaire dubbed his ’’second book against the human
race,” was he speaking merely of the deformities of society and not of soci-
ety itself? That this was the true intention of the writer is borne out by
the chapter in the Contrat social on ’’The Limits of the Sovereign Power”
where he asserts that an individual gains liberty and security in the civil
state as contrasted with the independence and insecurity of the natural
state. Further ccnfirmation may be found in the same work in the chapter
1. Cobban, RMS, 219-20. Cf. also Wright, MR, 23. M..Henri Rodet
says (LCC,55) that Rousseau in the Discourses is attacking only the deformi- '
ties of society and not society it self. But" "m . Rodet does not neglect to add
that society for Rousseau is an ’’accidental result and an unhappy one,” a
’’necessary evil.” Simile Boutroux holds (Art. 1,267) that ”It is in reality
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on ”The Civil State” iwhere the author contends that the civil state substi-
tutes justice for instinct and makes man a moral being instead of a stupid
animal.^ Further confirmation of -die moderate interpretation of Rousseau’s
attitude tOTward society comes from the a priori consideration that if
Rousseau had really been opposed to the principle of social life he -would
never have taken the trouble to propound the true principle? of social right;
he -would not have -written the Contrat social .
But if this moderate interpretation of Rousseau’s attitude is the true
interpretation, -why did Rousseau speak so gi*udgingly of the civil state?
Why did he use language, -which, if it does nob apply to society as such,
certainly sounds as if it did? A fragment exists in -v^ich Rousseau faces
2
directly the question of -vdaether society ”in itself” is good or evil. He
ansvrers that the reply depends upon the couparison of good and e-vll -which
comes out of society, and he adds that "on that count the question is only
too easy to solve.” Society presents a spectacle both "hateful and danger- >
ous.” The fragment is, thus far, in keeping -TOi-th the anti-social utterances
the abuse of the social condition, not -this condition itself, -which has
caused (man’s) loss.” Yet M. Boutroux adds that the most contestable part
of Rousseau’s system is the notion that there appertains to the individual
as such an "absolute and naturally independent existence” (271), and that,
as a result, the state becomes "purely fonaal and external” to the indi-
vidual (273).
1. Vau^an finds in this chapter "the most crucial passage in the -vdio]?
treatise" (PWR,I,26). The point of -view of this crucial passage involves
"no-bhing less than a revolution in political speculation,” because the indi-
Tidualistic bent in politics for t-wo h\mdred years prior to Rousseau had
sought to make politics independent of ethics. Rousseau, in asserting the
moreQ character of the civil state reverted to the sounder doctrine of Plato
and Aristotle that "man is a political animal” and finds the full realization
of his moral being only in the civil state (PWR,I,41. Cf. also pp. 50-52).
Rousseau presents the same idea in chapter tv/o of the Geneva MS.
2. Vaup^an, FWR, I, 336.
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I of the ^ile and the Disoourses .^ It is in keeping mth the letter to
M. Philopolis in niiich Rousseau asserted that "society is natural to the
! human species as decrepitude is to the individual^’ It is in keeping mth
the thought of the letter to Voltaire on the Lisbon earthquake in y?hich
Rousseau contended that iiie damage of the disaster was increased by the fact
{that men were living crowied together in a social community; it could not be
blamed entirely on God, fbr had men been living in a natural state, the
3
terror would have been greatly diminished.
Some critics have pointed out that Rousseau celebrated the primitive
conditiaa of man because he lacked faith in the possibilities of social im-
provement.^ This lack of faith, says Jean Jaur^s is "the key of those appar-
ent paradoxes on the progress of civilization."^ Even the Centrat social
,
which is more friendly to society than any of the other wnritings, is regarded
by some of the ablest critics as being, not a treatise on the principles of
social improvement, but an "abstract study of the logical constitution of a
social contract,"® or a utopian presentation of "an absolute ideal. Its
1* It is particularly reminiscent of the second Discourse where "the
attack throughout is directed, nob against any one form of Government but
against civil society as such" (Vaughan, PWR,I,13).
2. In Vaughan, PVJR, I, 223.
3. Cf. Hbffding, Art. 1, 284-85.
4. Cf. Jean Jaur^s, Art. 1, 375: "S’il avait cru possible de rectifier
la soci^td actuelle dans le sense de I’dgalitI et du bonheur, il aurait beau-
coup moins c^l^br^ la condition primitive de I'homme." Cf. also Lanson,
HLF, 782.
5. Loc. cit.
6. Momet, HLF, 166.
7. Lanson, HLF, 782.
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reference is theoretical rather than practical. In the Contrat social, says
Monsieur M. Bourguin, Rousseau's rfi'le is to "trace models of perfection and
not to descend to the realities of the application."^ Are we to believe thai
that even -vshen Rousseau spoke a kind word for society he was thinking of a
utopian state of affairs far removed from the practical world, and that his
opinion about actual society is at best that it is a necessary evil? Some
critics, and the more able ones are included among the number, seem to draw
this conclusion. Albert Schinz declares, "Toute sa conception de la soci^t^
repose sur ceci, que la soci^t^ dictcun langage oppose ^ celui de la nature.
Gustave Lanson finds this idea lying at the base of all of Rousseau's thoughbt
La nature avait fait I'homme bon, et la soci^td I'a fait m^chants la
j
nature avait fait I'homme libre, et la soci^td I'a fait esclave; la
j
nature a fait I'homme heureux, et la soci^td I'a fait miserable. Trois
j
propositions lides, qui sont des expressions diffdrentes de le mdrne '
vdritd: la socidtd est A la nature que le mal est au bien. LA-dessus se
|
fond tout le systbme.^
j
6nile Faguet agrees with this estimation and holds that "the etenial thought*^,
of Rousseau i s to be expressed in the double idea, "man good, society iniqui-
tous."^ The state of nature is the primitive paradise fron -vdiich man depart^,
and having departed becomes wicked. In Rousseau's system, says Faguet, "the!
1
5 I
fall of man is his transformation into a social animal."
I
What now of Cobban's conteirbion that there is in Rousseau no philosopl^
i
ical condemnation of the principle of social life? Does not the weight of
j
1. Art. 1, 368. Cf. Momet, HLF, 166: "Dans la pratique, il n'a
jamais songd A donner les rigueurs systdnatiques du Contrat comme un mdthode'
rdelle de gouvemement."
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of critical opinion speak against it? Such -mould seem to be the fact, but
the critics are neither as unanimous nor as consistent in their opinions on
this point as might be supposed. Their expositions often reflect, unavoid-
ably perhaps, the double-minded attitude of the -writings they explain. M.
Lanson, for example, after having told us that ’’society is to nature -what
e-vll is to good," -then raises the question of whether Rousseau thought that
all the evil in the world can be imputed to society. "Is not society a
natural fact, therefore good if nature is good," and "-was not society founded
in order tn remedy evils already existing?" asks Lanson. He replies that
Rousseau -would not contradict the answer implied by these questions.^
2Returning -tn Rousseau himself, we find that the fragment which
charges that society presents a spectacle both "hateful and dangerous" con-
tains a significant addi-bion. Rousseau does not stop -with this denunciation.
He adds;
But on looking at it closer, one soon sees that there are other
elements in the solution of the problem, -vhich philosophy ought to take
accovmt of, elements calculated to modify very much so melancholy a
a conclusion.^
The writer does not in this fragment elaborate this suggestive remark but one
may assume that in tl-ie Contrat social perhaps he presented some of those
elements "-which philosophy ought to take account of," elements which modify
his earlier "melancholy conclusion." It is worth noting also that even in
the second Discourse there is a significant concession made on behalf of
society. The conclusion of the First Part of this work carries the implied
1. HLF, 780.
2. Noted above, p. 105.
3. Vaughan, PWR, I, 336.
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admission that the social virtues are potential in the natural man. One of
the sentences of this Discourse begins as follows: "Apr^s avoir montr^ que
la perfectibilite, les vertus sociales, et les autres facult^s que I’horame
naturel avoit revues en puissance • • Thus ^mile Durkheim, recalling
this passage, declares, ”11 ne faut pas dire de I'hoinme consid^r^ k cette
phase (I'homme naturel) de son developpement qu’il est insociable mais qu’il
n
est a-sociable.” And Lanson, -vho found Rousseau’s anti-social tendency
basic to his syst®n, comes later to the conclusion that Rousseau’s real aim
was not to substitute the state of nature for the civil state but only to
restore to civil man ”la bont^, la liberty, le bonheur qui furent les attri-
buts naturels de I’homme primitif.”^ This work of restoration falls into two
parts* The restoration of the individual ( ]^mi le ) and the restoration of
society (Contrat social ).^
Concentration upon this line of thousjit would lead one to agree with
Cobban that there is in Rousseau no philosophical condemnation of the prin-
ciple of social life, but if we contrast with this line of thought the cita-
tions already considered, opinion wo\ild tend to turn to the contrary. As a
matter of fact, therefore, one would have to say that Rousseau both affirmed
and denied the principle of social life. His personal need for independence
(or better, his personal failure to adjust) led him to rebel against the
the principle of social living, but the common necessities of life made any
such rebellion futile.




2. Art. 1. For a treatment of the relation between the natural man
and the citizen, -vide pp. 4-11.
3. HLF, 772. Cf. p. 780.
4. Ibid.. 772.
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regardless of vhat Rousseau may have said for or against society, there is
one principle in the logical structure of his thought #xich amounts to a
philosophical condemnation of the principle of social life. This principle
^ may be called sociological materialism. According to Rousseau, society is
not the logical extension of the internal nature of man. The passage from
the second Discourse #iich began by implying that the social virtues are
potential in the natural man continues to point out that society does not
result from these natural potentialities but rather from the "fortuitous
concurrence of many external causes." The potentialities, says Rousseau,
"could never develop of themselves," and had it not been for chance circum-
stances there -mould have been no such thing as civil society, for man would
have been left "eternally in his primitive condition":
Aprfes avoir montr^ que la perfectibility, les vertus sociales, et les
autres facultys que I’homme nature! avoit regues en puissance, ne
pouvoient jamais se d^velopper d’ elles-memes
,
qu'elles avoient besoin
pour cela du concours fortuit de plusieurs causes ytrangbres, qui
pouvoient ne jamais nalltre, et sans lesquelles il fiit demeury ytemelle-
ment dans sa conditicn primitive • •
Lanson, therefore, is perfectly correct in saying that what Rousseau meant
by saying that society is unnatural vras that "it does not result from the
2
internal nature of man, but from an external necessity." Recurrent evi-
dences of this sociological materialisra can be found in the Contrat and in
the ]^mile. In the former -writing, Rousseau says, in the chapter on "The
Social Compact," that the change from the state of nature to that of society
may be supposed to occur because "obstacles" in the way of self-preservation
in a state of nature become greater than the resources of each individual.




2. Art. 1, 12n.
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from nature. Emile Durkheim gives what seems to us an accurate interpre-
|
!
tation of Rousseau on this point. Referring to the causes which produce ^
socie'ty he says,
Mais la soci^t^ ne pas pour cela chose naturelle, parce qu’elle n’est
pas impliqu^e logiquement dans la nature de I'hoinme. L’homme n'^tait
i pas n^oessit^ par sa constitution primitive ^ la vie sociale. Les
causes qui ont donn4 naissance k cette derni^re sont ext^rieures k la
nature hxjmainej elles sont d’ordre adventice.l
Does not Rousseau's sociological materialism then ccmpel us to admit
that there is in principle a philosophical condemnation of social life in
Rousseau’s system? If society is -bhe product of causes external to the
nature of man and if society would never have developed except for these
causes, is this not tantamount to a philosophical condemnation? If man is
not hy nature a political animal, as Aristotle said, it is difficult to see
how the operation of causes external to man could ever form a society. They
might force men into an aggregation; they could never produce among men sin
association. In Rousseau’s -view man becomes a ci'vll being only -wiien a series
2 I
of natural catastrophes, famines, floods, and the like, make it impossible '
for him any longer to ronain in the state vhich is conformable to his nature,
How man becomes a ci-^il being as the result of these causes is far from
clear
We may conclude, therefore, that between Rousseau’s notion of socio-
logical materialism on the one hand, and his belief in the moral character
of the civil state on -the other there is an irreducible inconsistency. It
is possible to hold, as Cobban does, that Rousseau proclaimed the superior
^ 1. Art. 1, 15-16.
2. Cf. Durkheim, op. cit., 12.
3. Simile Faguet declares (DHS, 344-45) that Rousseau never explains
how man, bom in a state of nature, departs from it.
I*
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benefits of civil association. The logical corollary of this is, of course,
that the individual realizes his highest potentialities only -within society
and the individual, therefore, needs society. Rousseau himself asserted this
but it is one thing to copy Rousseau’ s assertions and quite another thing to
validate the logic upon -which they rest. Taking all things into account, one
is extremely hesitant to admit that Rousseau’t thought is a consistent devel-
opment of that kind of indi-vldualism -which finds its completion in society,
and -that Rousseau in his conception of society did not "nullify" the indi-
vidualisra of the natural man. It is precisely this fiction of the state of
nature and -the natural man which stands in the -way of a coherent development
of the social point of -view. Had it not been for this fiction, -which makes
ci-wi.1 life foreign to the "nature" of man, there would have been no need for
assuming that society is the product of causes outside the individual. But
given the fiction of the natin*al man, the origin of civil life must be found
in external causes. And given this notion of origins, how can one maintain
that Rousseau’ s thought is a ccnsistent development of indi-viduali sm? A more
valid interpretation -would seem to be that Rousseau’s thought represents a
failure of synthesis between the indi-vidual and the group in its logical
structure, this failure arising from the fact that the individual is con-
ceived initially as one -who is xmsuited for society. In other -words the
cause of the failure is the pervasi-we fiction of I’homme naturel.
Let us review now the considerations by -wdiich Rousseau sought to
establish his assertion that the liberty of the social state is greater or
better than the liberty of the natural state. We ha-ve already noticed
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made it good. Cobban takes Rousseau’s claim at its face value, observing \
that Rousseau hoped to create a form of society in -which the natural man "in
the place of his lost independence should gain a greater freedom.”^
We mi^t, without undue disparagement, refer to Rousseau’s first at-
tempt to establish this "greater freedom" as his adventure in social roman-
ticism. The designation is a precise one if understand by social romanti-
cism the theory -v\hich holds that the individual fulfils his social obligation*
merely by following his o-wn nature. Rousseau’s development of this theory
j
consists in sho-vying, first, that the social pact, and later that the volontd
gdndrale created by the pact, are merely the extensions of the wills of the
indi-vlduals in the group, and thab in submitting to both they are in reality
only submitting to themselves. In both instances duty and interest are made
to coincide, and justice is the simple product of the -vdlls of the individual^
•who are bo-tii sovereign and subjects.
Rousseau serves notice of his intention to use the pact as a romantic
principle of social freedom in the formulation of his problem. He phrases
it as follows:
Trouver une form d’ association qui de^fende et protege de toute la
force commune la personne et les biens de chaque associd', et par laquelle
chacun, s’unissant k tous, n’ob^isse pourtant qu’^i lui-m^e, et reste
aussi libre qu’ auparavant. Tel est le probl^me fondamental dont le
Contrat social donne la solution.*^
The individual is to obey only himself and to remain as free as before. He
1. RMS, 227.
2. This is Professor Schinz ’s description of Rousseau’s intention.
Vide supra, p. 81 note 1.
3. CS, I, VI in Vaughan, PWR, II, 32. Attention is to be called to
the fact that the -words "Contrat social" are not to be italicized as G.D.H.
Cole’s translation of this passage implies. Rousseau is not speaking of his
book of the same name as gi-\ring the solution, but of the idea of contract
itself. As the next sentence implies, the context, as well as the manuscript,
calls for this interpretation. Vide Cole, SCO, 14.
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is to find preserved in the civil state the orij^inal liberty ifihich he enjoyed
in the natural state. The social contract is the guarantee for this. Let us
see how.
We have already noted that Rousseau retained the notion of a contract
because that notion made it possible to ground society upon the consent of
the individuals.^ The liberty of an individual is not denied if the indi-
vidual gives his consent to the constraint imposeiupon him. Hence, consent
is basic in the contract. "Civil association is the most voltintary of all
acts," -wrote Rousseau, and on that account, consent to the original pact must
O
be unanimous. Rousseau’s belief -was that "man is not a machine and that
free choice is a sacred thing for -the dignity of man as for his well being."
The definition of liberty presented in the Contrat so cial is a reflection of
this same belief. Liberty is defined as "obedience to a law which -we pre-
scribe to ourselves."^
Connected -with the idea of consent in -this romantic delineation of
the contract is the notion of an identity between duty and interest. The
contract -was supposed to effect tins identity. Rousseau announced his pur-
pose to unite duty and interest by sho-vnng that individuals perform their
social duty because to do so is in their interest and indi-vriduals naturally
pursue their interests; they do not have to be constrained. "In this in-
quiry," he -wrote, "I shall endeavour always to unite -what right sanctions
-with what is prescribed by interest, in order that justice and utility may




2. CS, IV, n in Vaughan, PWR, II, 105.
3. Rodet, LCS, 97.
4. CS, I, VIII, in Vaughan, PWR, II, 37.
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romanticism, he spoke as if he had accomplished his aim* "Duty and interest
* equally oblige the tifro contracting parties," he said, speaking of the
sovereign and tte subjects.
But almost on the same page he called attention to that part of his
theory vhich in reality makes any identity between public duty and individual
interest impossible:
En effet, chaque individu peut, comme homme, avoir une volont^ par-
ticuli^re contraire ou dissemblable ^ la volont^ gdh^rale qu’il a, comme
citoyen. Son int^r^t particulier peut lui parler tout autrement que
I’inter^t commun; son existence absolue, et naturellement ind^pendante,
peut lui faire envisager ce qu’il doit k la cause commune comme une
contribution gratuite, dont la perte sera moins nuisible aux autres que
le pavement n’en est on^reux pour lui . . . il jouirait des droits du
citoyen sans vouloir remplir les devoirs du sujet • .
I
Because of the private wills of "absolute and naturally independent" indi-
;




they would fulfil their undertakings. • ." In other words, Rousseau sees
j
j
that his romantic notion of a social pact is logically in the same position
i
I
|as Diderot’s theory of natural law. If men do not naturally and spontaneous-!
ly consent to obey the laws because their "absolute and naturally independent
existence" makes them consider their private advantage first, then there is
|





to consent to a social pact or the laws proceeding from it. In answering I
I
Diderot, Rousseau had answered himself. His admission indicates that he had
i
;
i not yet abandoned the conception of the natural man which he urged against
;
I
Diderot although that conception plays havoc with his own romantic notion
of consent.
I
Besides the notion of consent, liberty is related to another notion
1. Vaughan, R’/R, II, 35.
2. Ibid., 35-36.
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in Rousseau’s system, that of equality, and there are romantic elements
present in the development of this theme similar to those in the preceding.
Equality is the condition implied in the acceptance of the pact. ”. . .Each
gives himself absolutely, the conditions are the same for all.”^ As Profes-
sor Laski points out, freedom was for Rousseau ”a function of equality.” In
the second Discourse Rousseau had contended that men in the state of nature
were free and equal but that freedom was lost when inequality supervened. It
is not surprising, therefore, that he should attempt to transfer the equality
of the state of nature to civil society.
The difficulty of performing this transfer is readily observable if
we remember that on coming into the civil state the individual makes a "total
alienation" of himself, "his person and all his power ... together with
2
all his rights." Rousseau, however, seeks to show that the individual does
not really lose anything by this renuncia,tion, but that he "remains as free
as before." He sayss
Enfin, chacun, se donnant I. tous, ne se donne k personne; et comme
il n’y a pas un associ^ sur lequel on n’acquiSre le m^e droit qu’on
lui c^de sur soi, on gagne 1' Equivalent de tout ce qu’on perd, et plus
de force pour conserver ce qu’on a.
^
On Rousseau’s terms, therefore, we are expected to believe that since all the
individuals equalljr alienate their liberty there is, therefore, no alienation
at all. Each, "in giving hiinself to all, gives himself to nobody." Or, if
|the individual does lose something, "he gains an equivalent for ever;'/thing
he loses." As Professor Tfright says, interpreting Rousseau, "Each man
1. Vaughan, Hm, II, 33.
2. Laski, Art. 3, 52.
3. Vaughan, P\T/R, II, 33.
4. Log. cit.
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acquires over all the others the same power he surrenders them, and thus
recovers the Equivalent of what he loses • • The interpretation is faith-'
to the contention interpreted, but, strictly speaking, if the contention
represented the actual situation, we should then be left vdth the conclusion
that liberty is the surrender of one’s own freedom in return for the privilegti
of c\irtailing the freedom of everyone else.
Actually, however, Rousseau’s contention is false. The individual
does not recover the equivalent of what he surrenders. I do not receive, as
a result of the pact, the liberty wiiich another associate loses, nor does he
receive the liberty which I lose. If, in the state of nature, I was free to
I
ido as I please, and if I surrender that privilege on coming into the civil
state, my loss is not anyone’s gain because my privilege is not transferred
jto any other. On the contrary, all alike surrender the same privilege. Ther«i




We may, of course, admit a point -gMch "Wright urges in justification
|of Rousseau, namely, that the surrender vhich the individual msikes of his
(liberty in sx;ch a matter as the payment of taxes, for example, issues in a
I
jcondition vhich is advantageous to the individual himself as vrell as to otheriN
He receives in ret\arn the advantages made possible by taxes and, therefore,
gets back something from what he loses. This justification is true apart
from Rousseau, but it is difficult to see how it can be allowed as an inter-
pretation of Rousseau at this point. If we may te,ke the writer at his word,
what he is trying to establish is the contention that the individual is just
117 .
1. Wright, MR, 73. Cf. also the note on this page.
2. Schinz, LPR, II, 394.
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as free in the social state as he was "before," that as a citizen he suffers
no diminution of his natural liberty. The appeal to equality is a part of
Rousseau’s attempt to establish the pact as a romantic principle of social
118 .
freedom, and the aim of the whole argument, as he himself said, is to estab-
lish the conclusion that it is "untrue that in the social contract there is
on the part of the particulars any real renunciation."^
So far as the logic of the matter is concerned, one has to admit that
Rousseau’s romantic approach to the problem of liberty is inconsistent. The
attempts to make the individual yield to all and yet to none, to make him
obey the laws while obeying only himself, and to preserve' in the civil state
the freedom of the natural state are attempts vriiich are doomed to failure at
2
the start. The chapter on "The Social Pact" is thus a chapter of enigmas,
in vhich Rousseau gives us the romantic formulation of his problem and the
confusing justification of his solution, ^mile Faguet, a philosophic and
impersonal critic, declares that "neither Rousseau nor any one else has ever
clear Ij'’ comprehended this text."^ By the pact, he promises to preserve the
freedom -which the indi-vidual enjo;^;ed "before," but the same pact calls for
the total alienation of the indi-vldual, -which, in turn, is justified on the
gro\mds that it is not really an alienation at all since everyone submits to
it equally and since the individual gets the same as he gives.
The cause of the incoherence in Rousseau’s social romanticism is
1. "Ces distinctions une fois admises, il est si faux que dans le
Contrat social il y ait de la part des particuliers aucune renonciation
veritable ..." (Vaughan, PVm, II, 46. CS, II, IV).
2. CS, I, VI in Vaughan, RTO, II, 32-34.
3. Schinz, LPR, I, 12.
4. Faguet, MRV, 20.
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plain enough. It is the persistent use of the fiction of the state of nature
and the natural man. This fiction underlies the formulation of the problem;
because "obedience to himself alone" is a main characteristic of the natural
man, and the desire to have him remain "as free as before" is reminiscent of
the state of nature. But if the fiction of the natural man underlies the
formulation of tiie problem, it also nullifies the solution of the problem.
Rousseau faces mth disarming candor the logic of his position in the chapter
where he treats the relation existing between the sovereign and the subjects."
Here he admits that the sovereign must have guarantees that the subjects -will
fulfill their undertakings, and the reason for this is instructive. The
reason is that there is actually no dependable identity between what the
sovereign requires and what the individual mil freely consent to give. "As
a man," each individual has a particular interest deriving from his "absolute
and naturally independent existence," and this interest is often contrary to
the common vrelfare. Here again we encounter the fiction of the natural man.
This time the fiction intrudes in such a way as to make it plain that a
romantic solution to the problem of social constraint is impossible.
Rousseau himself seems aware of his position for his thought now
takes a turn in another direction. Having failed to make interest lead
logically to duty, he tries the reverse procedure of laying the emphasis
upon duty and for the next four chapters he talks about "The Civil State,"
jthe mastery which it holds over all the goods of individuals, its inalienable
j
and indivisible sovereign will. The emphasis novi is upon vdiat the state can
,1
expect of its members, rather than upon the freedom vhich the members will
obtain from the state. This rising tide of collectivism is introduced by an
1. CS, I, VII in Vaughan, PV;R, II, 34 ff
ov-^iKri If' eiU^ 'io ncr>'’Ox1 oricf *^o 351;, o/id' ax d'"'' ^rfeaon> ni/’JTg
;7tr^ftfo'ig ‘to «o id’^XiiTu'io'i and" 3€> x TTcaiwit.' n^-'ldo i t, >l:riZ ,a'^ Cx?*xu.t«.t etid- rxxs
' rxcT ?r^d- 'xo ofdB (;*iadri»'i,^r’n fria® j? 9t "onolo qxt sofraiwi/o”
v;raoRX^£x!ei ax a.9 aa'il' afl’’ tuM od ';BeX) arfd' bit<?
•3u.d a-.'i rxflfrt r*»*i(.x!^Afi 'io no i 'oil Afiri 'tx "rirb ,3'x.'d£fr lo o^iius eji;J':
.nr>rcfo''q 'io .-.'^i^oXos ^^rld- e '»f'i;i£i'tfrT os£p, d’.' ,sr:3'^:-n’f.r^ g>r# *}o tf-r-ol
'ie»tqg?do arid >'jx Xfpid^iaoq a i:i lo oxjol arfd *to£wx>o sjixm«a rf> rfdiw aaoal rcPo-^ocoJI
', adoaocfcja erld 6'in rs xfr:o’roo arfi £x»>*nvd‘e</ ;vftJaixe .'Toid'flXet exiti*- sd-sd-id ari
f-'jt.' ad-ojjj^dop odd d.offc>- aaadrysudxf^^ 8Y^''xf •dax'Ri rr /gia-ycsj odd" djarti aditrij^ ax{ y*£oH
.
i
odT . aTtd’otrxd'aiti ai aidd- %ol d^san-i odd Lera
,
agxtiaCadialirri/ t codd .11x11 tA
s.:J d;xr?w 'Toewd^cf vdxdtto&i s.CdaLiidgdfc ort y;£Xx;Ldoa ax oiarfd darfd ex coaa^i
;
aA.”' .'yvc;^ od drrosxroo vCaeil XILt fjsaLivi&xrx aicfd djarf'.r hjorB cexixme'x ir?ioifjvca
oduXog’<fj&'' aid rto-;! rj.'txvc'ioL dafriodxii: 'laljxoxd'i 1-. a a,oH £j?,i/bivif)fri doao a
i
: od ••'iXPir.titct' rrt^dlo af. dea-iodo i: aidd was " oof.r.irr.lj;© dneurxoqoiicrx ’^Xlx^i'rd^n Lna
- xprx Ljeiy "Pa sdd I*' rto ed-xA ^dd 'idirn/coao &.r acs-AB oieE .e^'iXoF ifcnjaoo odd!
B J.t dd fiiwlo d ’: 8^'artT od aa a xlova al eaLjo'idffi aoxdocl o.dd onid
•, a Cef
'
380 ai J•lTia^d^xIOO laioorx lo xmido'^q add od -to idi/Xo a oid^tatiw^
>»on dif^x'on'd 8.c/f xol rroxdiaoq aid lo ot/w/.? sardoa 'iCosarid waoaayojl
b&ol odorc od baixal 71.niv.0F . ioxddf>'i.iL 'reiidcrrij ax xnxrd ^ jO.'-'ad
3C2finViU» orld ^ni'yjaX lo orrwlwco'iq oaiwaa erid goFid orf, od \^XX«r-iVloI!
"lOdddci £ivxD orf'! ” dtroef* odXxid od a*iedqjarfo *iool ±)con odd ’xul Ljxp ’^dx/L /xoqu
o.ufAnoxf.'vitx adi
*
xX-ajoiLiTiLxti lo aJbooxi oxfd XXn *rovo aLCorf dr tioir.v: yno&aB<ti odd,
i£;o 'id adiR oxid dfi/fu^ .loci; si nor atemiq^s od"!' , Cli/x fHdiXOx&vos ol'die.tvx.L'ii Lfoa
CliAT loedriv^ca fijtrfd I’o/tiir TToLeail ori& aoqsj JL«i-fd 'to/idBa
,
^"xadirfonr edi lo doooxa
xta ^:c^ boowboidnl- r.i .craividoo CXoo lo obid rarxXo oi/iT .ododa offd rnr'*il jriedfJd
n >0,
,




ominous threat to the pre-established liberty of the natural man.
Afin done que le pacte social ne soit pas un vain formulaire, il
renferme tacitement cet engagement, qui seul peut donner de la force
aux autres, que quiconque refusera d’ob^ir b. la volont4 g^n4rale y
I sera contraint par tout le Corps • • •
And Rousseau hastens to add, ”ce qui ne signifie autre chose sinon qu’on le
Aforcera d’etre libre* Let us make no mistake about the measure of con-
straint, for in this matter Rousseau does nothing by halves. A little fur-
ther on he says, "Comme la nature donne h. chaque homme un pouvoir absolu sur
tous ses membres, le pacte social donne au Corps politique un pouvoir absolu
sur tous les siens."* This absolute power which belongs to sovereignty is
both indivisible and inalienable; it is exercised without benefit of consti-
tutional restraints or the restraints of checks and balances through a
division of powers. It is beyond the reach of partial associations. It
stands for a constraint -vdiich is limited by nothing except the wills of those
•2
wiio wield it. It is "absolute, sacred, inviolable."
How could Rousseau, individualist and romantic, ever have made a
place for a constraint of such formidable proportions. The answer is ready
and clear; He specified that this sovereign power must always be the expres-
sion of the volonte g^n^rale
,
and he intended that the volonte gen^rale
should be "always right." He held that if the individual did not voluntarily
surrender himself to that -which is morally right, then no real harm could be
done such an individual by forcing him to surrender. It would only be com-
pelling him to do his duty, -which, if he were a moral man, he would do -with-
out constraint. No one is ever injured by doing -what is right. Consequently,
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if the individual, for the moment, -was opposed to submission to the sovereig^
power, his momentary feeling could not represent his "real -will," for a moral
maxi cannot "really" be opposed to doing his moral duty. Hence, the con-
straint is a favor to hin^ it means only that he is being "forced to be free.'
Freedom for Rousseau then consists, as Herr Ernst Cassirer points out, not in
capricious action (Willldir),. but in "a powerful and unbreakable law -which
the individual sets over himself." Liberty, said Rousseau, is "obedience
to the law -which -we prescribe for ourselves." Thus Professor Wright raises
the question of whether a people under law can be free, and he ans-wers, inter-
preting Rousseau, "Yes, in exact proportion to their obedience to the law.
It is their o-wn -will, and whoever obeys his -will is free.""^
At this point we encounter the moral orientation of Rousseau’s politi-
cal philosophy and his teaching that through the state man acquires "moral
liberty," by which he becomes "master of himself."^ As contrsisted -with Locke
1. Thus Bernard Bosanquet, giving a metaphysical interpretation of the
(general will, contends that we find liberty in submission to it because "lib-
erty, as the condition of being ourselves, cannot simply be something -vdiich
w© have, still less something -which -we have al-ways had—a status quo to be
maintained. It must be a condition relevant to ovir continued struggle to
assert the control of . . . our real self. ... Thus it is that -we can speak
without contradiction, of being forced to be free" (PTS, 118-19).
Had Rousseau been content to give only a metaphysical account of the gen-
eral -will, Bosanquet *s interpretation might well stand as an interpretation
of Rousseau also. But Rousseau was impatient of metaphysical speculations
and -bhe general will became, much to the embarrassment of his system, some-
thing more concrete than a metaphysical principle.
2. Cassirer, Art. 1, 192.
i
3. CS, I, TOI, in Vaughan, PVJR, II, 37.
I
4. Wright, MR, 79.
5. CS, I, VIII, in Vaughan, PV®, II, 36-37.
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•who held that politics is entirely divorced from morals, Rousseau believed
in the moral character of the ci-vil state, a belief -vdaich, in the judgment of
Professor Vaughan, presents ’’nothing less th^n a revolution in political
speculation."^
But it is necessary to notice that the sovereign -will of the state is
not only an ideal moral -will viiich directs the state al-wa3/-s to justice and
the common good, but it is also the •will "which proceeds from the members of
the state. Any state in -wiiich a -will external to the citizens is imposed
upon the citizens is a state vhich has no basis in right. Rousseau was
enough of a romantic still to decree that sovereignty must be related to con-
sent. But this must not be taken as meaning that Rousseau is still operating
•with romantic notions and grounding obligation in the free consent of natural
men. There is a new tone in the chapter on "The Ci'vil State." The natural
man undergoes a transformation, ^uty takes the place of instinct and
appetite, and the indi-vldual is forced to consult his reason before listening
to his inclinations. Civil association makes him an intelligent being "and
a man." There is no mention here of the "absolutely independent existence"
I
i"which he enjo^/^ed "before." One may say that the indi-vldualism presupposed
Iby this chapter is not the individualism of 1 ' homme nature! but that of
I’homme "vraiment libre, the type of individualism in "wliich society is inter-
nal rather than external to the nature of man. Had the conceptions of this
chapter been made basic in the Contrat social
,
Rousseau could have been credi'
ted "vri-th a consistent development of his revolutionary insight into the moral
character of the ci"vil state.
1. Vaughan, PViR, I, 40.
2. Ibid., 41.




' oi *’ ‘:.i!otT j'loif oift-
f'vx'.> '-.a;/ ••' :' o Xx? lOj
:vr'-Xor^" >*V •VO’: '?
f»iXc 1 ';' f^-T'r^Yoa OA:r , .m:'- o' v'txJ'i-: 0
.iW
; Y.; Ti(Y
f ) * rT A, jT o r
Yrc!:-"*;
'
-.i-tl ^oocooo" rviXfif’- 3v :5-J ' fto .roo o.'
•• '
T- Y-'jsx i' '"o ivf!d o:- 1 X.'
'VV ’f;'--.- f-.
-r-
:rX o.'f .??;•. .['vO'," •o./iJi'-a X ::i; srre.v/'X/o yuc-f
r 'ir.' lOiO'/ Jisi’d' <' ; • r:t rwx'''~x_ 'jo
'
'' ':• ;-,n' oH 'rx/r-:i I'orn'F a xArs' d'wd . :" 3 ;j'X-A' 0 YO






’ r'lri" ;;o 0 - ‘ w-'H- I-; o:;--rr -.iort : -' ' ' •i, ;
'
-joi' -.'j jx'ict oe-Wi>.d yJr;/ , x«»i jrti»tYc'';s.frj8 '.'X js 'ji‘oC"'YOY r u
;Xr' 'O’^ifTOo' >.d- •'0 0*1 of r •.•'.' ''ir i .-frtd- X-.. , ‘'.i.-iiY.a
j. Jiv fXj( arxX .'•. ..f 't- J.roJ'o l'’‘X') ,a' a/;-' o'-
'
.•r'jrY.Y % ' -nfd ‘N’ 9 ’t^ .1 i': 0 £-''c^nt v;. ?,j y-jo, ,•/• o
.Aibr: r?rld <; .,- o xc' \ md " -i;- lioi.is/
f '• r-'O^'-tYx V r.'.x ' '••' Torr x’ •
-qijfio c;.‘
:ri oXXaixi'^;y iX " >0‘'X •- ' » •• XI ^0''::r ';'r. »-
. j;.XY 'L'' .>'•'• •v;f<t-*a/cr- '»o' . . -Tjsa ?o or-iJ- o.- tXvAieJ^a
.o'j'io '[ xt'
,
'-foco d'x'ootoo'J' jO:. - oo-: - 'T'O'f • •i-oj'rfc;
eiiq -ofA' J
,
.• rc fo. f'': ri.fr; *• ,; -.fon^.oX rtrr oda x oroo n : o-^jY
->.rrcta C.'/’o .).'‘r!






We have noticed how the individualism of I’horame naturel intrudes and
nullifies the romantic emphasis in idea of the social pact. It must be
noticed now that this same individualism nullifies also the emphasis upon the
m.oral character of the civil state. It is not to be supposed that because
there are remnants of the individualism of I’homme vraiment libre in the
chapter on "The Civil State" that this t;'/pe of individualism, therefore, be-
comes basic to the remainder of the writing. Having written the chapter on
"The Civil State," Rousseau then proceeds, five chapters later to annihilate
his more consistent approach to society by making another parade of those
romantic elements which he brought forth in the consideration of the social
pact. In this chapter,^ wiiich is entitled "The Limits of the Sovereign
Power,” the conflict is, if possible, more violent than before. Individual-
ism and collectivism stand in the relation of open vrarfare.
The first reference in this chapter is to the state and "the universal
and compelling force" vhich attaches to its sovereignty. But the next para-
graph refers to the individuals canposing the state, individuals "whose life
and liberty are naturally independent of it." Then follows a mystifying
explanation of how justice originates "in the preference each man gives to
himself," and how it is that the general will is always right and how "all
continually will the happiness of each one," because "there is not a man who
does not think of ’each’ as meaning him, and consider himself in voting for
all." Here we encounter again the ideas made familiar under the heading of
Rousseau’s social romanticism, the identity of interest and justice, the idea
that although the sovereign pov/er is "absolute, sacred, and inviolable" there
- --------
II 1. CS, II, IV in Vaughan, PVJR, II, 43-46.
2. Vaughan, PWR, II, 43-44. Italics mine.
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is no "real remmciation" on the part of the individual when he submits to
it, and the idea that justice can be based upon the "preference each man
gives to himself." The notion of equality is again appealed to as a reason
for submission to the sovereign po^Arer. "... Every authentic act of the
general will binds or favors all the citizens equally."! Equality of right
creates the idea of justice. Apart from the context, these ideas on equalit 3'‘
have their proper validity, but Rousseau presents them as "proving" that
obligations are binding "only because they are mutual."*^ Logically this
contention is on all fours with the previous argument that because all the
associates equally alienate themselves under the pact there is, therefore, no
real alienation.
Faguet calls this "the most xmsolvable chapter" of the book,^ and
Schinz deplores it as "a chapter of excuses or e;jq)lications."^ The incom-
patibility between the omnipotent power of the state and the original free-
dom of the individual, which this power is alleged to conserve, is too
obvious to need comment. Schinz concludes that Rousseau "pretend du com-
mencement k la fin parler d’un contrat de liberty et il d^finit constamment
5
un, contrat de constrainte."
The termination in constraint is not a surprising outcome for a pact
Wiich was intended to lead to freedom if we remember that the individxials who
are the contracting parties are conceived by Rousseau as being individuals
who are themselves unfit for society by their very nature. The romantic
1. Vaughan, PV<R, II, 45.
2. Ibid., 44s "...He sont obligatoires que parce qu’ils sont mutuels."
3. Faguet, LIRV, 21.
4. Schinz, LPR, II, 393.
5. Ibid., 392-93.
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attempt to present social o'blip;ation as the free choice of individuals goes
to pieces on the fiction of the natural man, according to which individuals
are primarily interested in their private advantage
The grain of truth which underlies this confused and confusing chapter
four is the fact the formaticn of a society is a matter with vhich the
interest of each associate coincides, inasmuch as continued existence in the
state of nature has become, ex hypothe si, impossible any longer. But to
assume that since interest coincides in this one particular, it, therefore,
coincides in all is plainly illogical and it is especially so in this case
because the nature of the associates in question is atomistic rather than
organic. "This admirable agreement between interest and justice"^ is thus
established by a tour de force.
may conclude, therefore, that Rousseau’s romantic attempt to solve
the problem of liberty ends in failure. The reason for this is simples The
problem as he formulated it is insolvable. It is impossible to find a form
of political association vhere an individual "may still obey himself alone
and remain as free as before."^ The impossibility is due to the fact that
the freedom Mch the individual had before is a freedom vhich is incompatible
with civil society and political e.ssoctation. Rousseau, however, spared no
consideration which -would in anyway aid him establishing this contention.
The obligation to accomplish this was laid upon him by his firm conviction
freedom cannot be preserved unless the conditions of civil life are those to
•which the indi-vidual can freely consent; the sovereip:n -will must bear a rela-
tion internal to the -will of the citizens. In so far he was right, and no
1. CS
,
II, IV in Vaughan, F\i'<R, II, 45.
2. CS, I, VI in Vaughan, FvTO, II, 32.
J,
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political philosophy ought to take lightly this basic insight, ^he develop-
ment of this truth, however, terminated in an impasse for Rousseau because
he coult not free himself of the persistent fiction of the natural indepen-
dence of man. His first thought was to make this fiction serve a social
purpose, to establish the romantic proposition that the natural man in
obeying himself fulfils thereby his social obligations. This romantic solu-
tion undergoes a two-fold development, in inhich, first, the social pact, and
after it the volonte'^ generale are presented as the will of the individual.
Both lines of development rest upon a supposed identity between justice and
I
|interest, and both are contradicted by the supposed character of the natural
man, as a result of vdiich such an identity becomes impossible. The romantic
approach to the problem, therefore, ends in failure, and Rousseau is faced
with the prospect of a society which is constantly under the pressure of
flying apart into the original atoms of #iich it is composed.
Rousseau himself is more than dimly aware of this failure, for we
detect the use of at least two ideas v.hich would be useless and \ninecessary
I
additions to the theory if the ronantic contentions were really valid. The
fact that Rousseau turned to these ideas lends some support to the belief tha"
he himself was dissatisfied with his first attempt to reconcile liberty and
I
constraint. The first of these ideas is that of the Legislator; the other is
the preference shown for aristocracy as a means of salvation from the rule
of the mob. Both ideas are resorted to in order to escape the blindness and
;the partiality of particular wills within the state. They are a dike against
;the flood of individualism which a collection of natural men v/ould inevitably
i
release. Both are a tacit confession that a civil society cannot be formed
lout of natural men.
These devices lead one to agree Trith Schinz, wi^io declares that Rousse
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"despaired of the generous folly of reconciling an absolute romanticism of
nan -with an organized social state. He did precisely that in the chapter
which immediately precedes the one on the legislator. He was there speaking
of the high office of the Law as an act of the general will and repeating
the notion that we can be both free and subject to laws because they "are
but registers of our wills." That is the romanticism which we found embodied
in the volont^ g^nerale. But Rousseau did not leave the matter there. With
disarming candor he raises the following question:
Comment une multitude aveugle, qui souvent ne sait ce qu’elle veut, parce
!
qu*elle sait rarement ce qui lui est bon, ex4cuterait-el]e d’ elle-mirae
une entreprise aussi grande, aussi difficile qu’un syst^me de legisla-
tion? De lui-m^e le peuple veut toujours le bien, mais de lui-irt^me il




Then he speaks of the "seductive influence of individual -wills." Thus arises
the need for a Legislator.
The Legislator, that divine but enigmatic character, is eulogized by
Rousseau as a "superior intelligence beholding all the passions of men with-
2
out experiencing any of them." He is the kind of person -who could best wri-fc
the laws of the state. Like-wise the "best and most natural" form of govern-
ment is that in -which the -wisest govern the many. One cannot miss noticing
that in the devices of the lawgiver and the preference for aristocracy
Rousseau is far removed from the romantic notion of a general -will -which
"can always direct -bhe force of the state toward the common good."
1. Schinz, LPR, II, 408.
2. CS, II, VI in Vaughan, PT/R, II, 50.
3. Vaughan, P7«R, II, 51. Gaspard Valletta, who concentrates upon the
Genevan traits in the character and thought of Rousseau, sees in the Legisla-
tor a recollection of Cal-vln. Other marks of Geneva upon the Contrat social
are set forth by him (JJR, II, III).
4. CS, III, V in Vaughan, PVTO, II, 75. Preference for aristocracy is
another Genevan trait, according to Vallette.
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Professor Schinz points out that here, as in the Economie politique, the
state is arranged against the individual.^ This must necessarily be the case
since, on Rousseau’s principles, there is opposition between the state and
the individual. This is evident in the chapter on "The Legislator," where
lousseau points out that the legislator "ought to feel himself capable, so
to speak, of changing human nature, of transforming each individual, who
is by himself a complete and solitary whole • • •" He must be capable of
"altering man’s constitution" giving him new resources Wiich are "alien to
him."
Celui qui ose entreprendre d’instituer un peuple doit se sentir en
^tat de changer pour ainsi dire la nature humaine, de transformer chaque
individu, qui par lui-m^me est un tout parfait et solitaire, en partie
d’un plus grand tout, dont cet individu receive en quelque sorte sa vie
et son ^tre; d’alt^rer la constitution de I’homme pour la renforcerj de
substituer une existence partielle et morale h. 1’ existence physique
et ind^pendante que nous avons tous rejue de la nature. II faut, en un
mot, qu’il ^e ^ I’homme ses forces propres pour lui en donner qui lui
soient dtrangeres. . .2
In this chapter, therefore, we meet again that ubiquitous fiction,
I’homme natural. Rousseau is still conceiving the individual in terms which
render him unfit for society. Apparently neither the social pact nor the
j




jiimself had thought that either had achieved its purpose, why should he have
j
appealed to the legislator? TiThy should he have resorted to aristocracy?
Another factor is present to indicate Rousseau’s "despair" with
|
romanticism, namely, the intrusion of a new element heretofore explicitly
excluded, namely, religion. The legislator, as Rousseau described hin^ was
the possessor of divine characteristics. He was one who "must have recourse
1. Schinz, LPR, II, 408.
2. CS, II, VII in Vaughan, PVHl, II, 51-52.
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to divine intervention and credit the g;ods -with (his) o-wn vdsdom, in order
that the peoples submitting to the laws of the State • • • might obey freely,
and bear with docility the yoke of the public happiness."^ "Might obey
freely"~that is the problem with which Rousseau had wrestled up to this
point. The social pact was supposed to give the answer, but it didn’t.
Neither did the volont^ gdh^rale when it was conceived as being the actual
will of the individuals as well as the ideal will in the state. In other
words, the elaborate attempt to unite obedience and freedom romantically,
the attempt to present the issue so that it appeared that the individual
freely consented to obey because it was in his interest to do so, was now
quite frankly abandoned. A new answer to the problem of obedience was now
forthcoming—new at least in Rousseau’s system, because hitherto he had
set himself against a religious or theological answer to his problem. This
new answer was the last and the best he was able to give. The individual
must consent to obey the laws because the laws embody a religious ssinction.
"The Civil Religion^’ therefore, and at long last, provides the answer for
which he searched.
"Vfithout religion, no civil society can be maintained," Pufendorf had
written. Montesquieu had expressed agreement, and, says Professor Hendel,
2
"Rousseau was the disciple of both of them." In writing his first draft
of the Contrat
,
Rousseau had proposed to carry his problem away from the
court of religion to that of philosophy.
Lassons done ^ part les pr^ceptes saerds des religions divers, dont
I’abus cause autant de crimes que leur usage en peut e'pargnerj et ren-
dons au philosophe I’examen d’une question que le th4ologien n’ a jamais
trait^e qu’au prejudice du genre humain.^
1. Vaughan, PVvR, II, 53.
2. Hendel, RM, II, 229.
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One hardly believes, however, that this exclusion of religion represented
his own inner conviction, for despite his heterodoxy he was ever religious.^
The exclusion of religion from political theory was more probably a necessity
which he came to accept as a result of his contacts with the naturalists,
Diderot, Voltaire, and others at Paris. He began his political treatise
with a criticism of Diderot’s theory and doubtless thought it wise to attack
Diderot with his OT,vn weapons, #iich committed him to a philosophical rather
them a religious treatment of his problem. Moreover, as the first draft
reveals, he thought he had an adequate philosophical principle in the volonte
gelierale . Rousseau was not able, however, to make the exclusion of religioi
final, vhich may account for the fact that hurriedly sketched on the backs
of some of tlie pages of the Geneva MS. is the material -w^ich forms the first
draft of the chapter on "The Civil Religion." There is no explicit chapter
3
under this title in the Geneva MS.
Vifith the failure of the romantic approach, the need for religion be-
came pressing. As the chapter on the legislator admits, some force had to
supervene in order to modify the nature of the natural man and give him a
character compatible with civil society. The "Civil Religion" was, in the
end, this force, and on this account Professor Schinz regards this final
chapter of the Contrat s ocial as the "key of the arch" in his political
1. "I have always said to (unbelievers) that I did not know how to
combat them, but that I would not believe them," he wrote to Vernes (Feb. 18,
I No. 474, cited in Hendel, RM,II,4). The optimism of his Letter to Voltaire
1 left this famous philosopher without an answer for a time"! Voltaire "hided
his time in order to plan out his Candide, as a retort to such optimism"
(Hendel, RIJ,I,240).
2. Cf. Vaughan, PWR, I, 452.
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thought.^ The return to religion is taken by Professor Schinz to indicate
a gradual drift away from romantic principles tov/ard Roman virtues. In the
/
Rmile and the Contrat social , Schinz holds, Rousseau gave up the hope of
happiness, and opposed reason to romanticism, coming out dogmatically for a
2
return to religion as an absolute guarantee.
"What then of the fortunes of liberty? So far as the chapter on "The
Civil Religion" is concerned, one may say with Hendel that the practical in-
tention was "to exclude intolerance and to establish religious liberty."
The animus of the chapter is against that form of orthodoxy which dares to
say, "Outside the Church is no salvation." Such orthodoxy ought to be "driver,
from the state. Rousseau had written in Julie that a professing Christian
who persecutes others belies his faith and that if he "were a magistrate in
a State vhere atheism was punished by death he would ’burn the first informer
who forced him to put such a law into execution.’" Intolerance is "the
warfare of humanity,"® he wrote in the Geneva MS, and the maxim that "It is
necessary to think as I do to be saved" he described as an "infernal dogma"
1. Schinz, LPR, II, chapter V, esp. pp. 365 and 376; also Art. 1.
U. Rodet agrees that the "Civil Religion" is not an accidental addition to a
work already finished but is an integral part of Rousseau’s system, "the last
stone in the edifice." His reason for this, however, is different from that
of Schinz. Rodet holds that the purpose of the chapter was to guarantee
that the sovereign power should always be "rigorouslj^ inspired by the desire
for absolute justice" (LCS ,99-100 ) . C. W. Hendel, on the other hand, refers
to the chapter as "hastily added ... a piece ivTitten ambiguously" (Hendel,
•
I
2. Schinz, LPR, II, 510.
3. Hendel, RM, II, 243.
4. Vaughan, PV®, II, 134.
5. Hendel, RM, II, 241.
6. Vaughan, PWiR, I, 507. i
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v^iich, for the saJce of the peace of the world ought to be taken out of the
1
city.
Regardless, however, of Rousseau's eloquence on behalf of tolerance
2
it is to be noted that this chapter prescribes certain positive dogmas and
the state may banish whomever does not believe them. If anyone having pub-
licly professed these dogmas later behaves as if he did not believe them, he
commits the crim.e of lying before the law and may be punished by death.
Aside from the few specific dogmas of the civil religion a person is to be
free to believe Tshat he chooses. But the prescription of the positive dog-
mas leads one to conclude that this chapter terminates in an intolerance not
very different from that vihich it was intended to avoid. Freedom to question
doubt, or disbelieve these dogmas is not open to the citizen. The state
speaks and the individual must listen. It is "the state against the indi-
vidual," as Professor Schinz has phrased it.
V/hat may be said now of the fate of liberty in Rousseau's system?
Schinz' s survey of Rousseau's politics leads him to concludes ". . .La vie
politique (comme la vie sociale o\!i I'homme veut r^aliser le bonheur) est
une vie de contrainte et non de liberty. . ."^ Herr Ernst Cassirer declares
that "Der _jPontrat social" verkiindigt und verherrlidvt einen schlechthin unge-
4
bundenen Absolutismus des Staatswi liens." M. Rodet concludes that in the
5
end Rousseau effaced the last vestiges of individual liberty. These
1. Vaughan, P7*R, I, 507.
2. A matter udiich he later admitted might have been an "error in poli-
tics" ( Lettres de la Montagne , I in Oeuvres , III, 131).
3. Schinz, LPR, II, 399.
4. Cassirer, Art. 1, 190.
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conclusions are in agreement vath those persistently voiced"by Faguet.
His comparative study of the politics of Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Voltaire
leads him to the conclusion that "Rousseau est le theoricien du despotism.e
populaire • • and the Contrat social is "la Bible du despotisme democra-
tique," Rousseau, he contends, rests his case upon a "sophism" -which
Montesquieu had refuted before him:
Rousseau est . . . le fondateur de la R^publique despotique et
I’inventeur prdcis^ment de cette doctrine, que Montesquieu avait r^fut^e
d’avance, que quand le peuple est libre il est impossible que le citoyen
ne le soit pas, puisqu’il n’ob^it qu’^ une volont^ qpi, en definitive,
est la sienne. Ce sophisme^emplit tout le Contrat Social, s’il n’est
le Contrat Social lui-m4me.^
Faguet finds that in the eighteenth century Montesquieu -was the defender of
the liberal doctrine, Rousseau vms the defender of the doctrine of democratic
4despotism, and voltaire was the defender of the doctrine of royal despotism.
So far as political liberty is concerned, -we are obliged to concur
in these conclusions and assert that the practical outcome of Rousseau’s
theory -would be to destroy such liberty. When Faguet declares, "II n’y a
pas un atome ni de liberty ni de s^curit^ dans son syst^me,"^ we may object
that this judgment does not do justice to Rousseau’s intent, or vre may say
that it does not take account of those elements -which he pro-vlded for the
constjruction of a liberal system, but we can hardly deny that, in the last
analysis, this -would be the outcome of Rousseau’s theory in practice.
1. Faguet, MRV, 59.
2. Ibid., 19.
3. Ibid., 17.
4. Ibid., 279. Schinz names the folio-wing as believers that Rousseau’
theory is an aid to despotism: Benjamin Constant, Royer-Collard, Lamartine,
Quinet, Taine, Scherer, Nourisson, Rodet, Dide, Faguet.
5. Faguet, DHS, 388.
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r«H« Green is quoted as saying that the practical result of Rousseau’s theory
is a "vague exaltation of the prerogatives of the sovereign people, without
any corresponding limitations of the conditions \mder which an act is to be
deemed that of the sovereign people . • The reason for the truth of
this view is the fact that on Rousseau’s terms the individual is required to
make a total alienation of himself to the state without receiving any effec-
tive guarantees that the state vrill not misuse its povrer. It is tnie that
Rousseau speaks of checks on the sovereign, but, as v/e have seen, they are
checks which come to nothing in practice* The state is not to exact anything,
not important for the public utility, but the state alone is the sole judge
of what is important* Partial associations are banned; the sovereign power
is not to be divided; and it cannot be alienated* Rousseau felt undisturbed
by this Staatsomnipotenz because, as Faguet’s analysis suggests, he believed
that if the people were free the individuals must be also* He took in-
sufficient account of the fact that if the people are sovereign collectively
they are subjects individually* He rested too securely in the romantic
notion that the sovereign will and the will of each individual could be
identified.
The degree of constraint in Rousseau’s system is intensified by the
conception of the individual with wiiich he operated. He sought to reconstruo:
in society the lost paradise of the state of nature in -which the individual
was free because he could do whatever he wanted to do; he "obeyed only him-
self*" One can trace in the Contrat social almost the degrees by -vhich
j
Rousseau came to the realization that state unity cannot be built out of
1. Cobban, RliS
,
128. Cobban, of course, holds that this is a "mis- i
interpretation of Rousseau." Cf. Laski’s criticism of the general will; 1
".
. . The -will of -the state is general -when the conditions of generality
are fulfilled. It does not tell us -when they are fulfilled. . *" (Art. 3, 53)*
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such material, bub the more Rousseau realized his predicament, the more
he talked about constraint. He did not consider the alternative of modifying
his conception of the individual, or rather he did not consider the alterna-
tive of making basic the other conception of the individual which he had
formulated. The final flight to religion was occasioned by the same neces-
sity which prompted his appeal to the legislator: He had to find some means
to "make” the individual love his duty. The Civil Religion was erected upon
the belief that religicn matters to the community because it is that which
will make the citizen love his dutjr. ”0r, il imports bien &, I’^tat que
chaque citoyen ait une religion qui lui fasse aimer ses devoirs."^ The
state is against the individual in the last analysis because the individual
is against the state in the beginning. He is the kind of individual who has
to be "denatured” and given a character "alien” to himself; he has to be
"made to love his duties.”
If the idea of l*homme naturel
,
the sworn foe of society and the civ-
il state, was the idea, tlie first contemplation of which plunged Rousseau
into an ecstacy and the later contemplation of wiaich lifted his soul to the
divine, it is also the idea viiich reduces his political theory to inconsis-
tency and prevents him from attaining that rational synthesis between the
individual and the state at wiiich he aimed. The fiction of the state of
nature and the natural man is the central theme of just about everything
Rousseau wrote outside of the Contrat social and the ^conomie politique . The
thought of the first two Discourses revolves around this fiction. It was
thrown at the world in the defiant manner of the first Discourse and reiter-
in the logical, argumentative manner of the second Discourse. The fiction
1. Vaughan, PVra, II, 132.
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Ireappears in the Lettre V Philopolis
,
-wMch immediately followed, and again
in the Preface de Narcisse
,
’’which is one of my best productions.”^ The
fiction is predominant in the 6nile
,
the opening pages of -which give us the
explicit description of I’homme na~burel . It was this fiction -which won him
fame and recognition in the eyes of the -world, and provided him with a basis
of attack against Hobbes and Diderot.
It would be expecting the impossible to suppose that an idea of such
magnitude should be absent from his political -writing, and, we believe, it is
not absent. The formulation of the problem in the Contrat and the attempt to
answer it on the basis of rmanticism are alike filled -with the fiction. In
|
jfact, it is our belief that -with the exception of the chapter on ’’The Civil
;
State,” the prevailing indi-vi dualism of the ^ontrat social is not the individ"
ualism which is canpatible -witii ci-vil society (as Cobban, for example, assumen
throughout)^ but it is the indi-vidualism of I’homme naturel who has been
forced into civil relations.
We may agree -with Vaughan and Cobban that ”A free citizen in a free
State—that, on the sum of the -whole matter, is the ideal of Rousseau.” But
we are compelled to add, ho-ivever, that it is an ideal -which Rousseau was
prohibited from realizing on account of the fact that he could not bring
himself to repudiate the fiction the logical -weakness of -which we have
reason to believe he v/e.s aware.




2. Cf. Cobban, RMS, esp. p. 245. Cf. also Durkheim, Art. 1, esp. pp.
129-31, 140, 143, 159-61. Durkheim finds the "perfect con-tinuity -which the
though-ts of Rousseau present” by refusing to make the indi-vidualism of the
natural man basic. But he is driven to admit that Rousseau ought to show
that collective life is not contrary to the natural order. He says, ho-wever,
that the points of attachment are so few that he does not see clearly how it
is possible (160).
3. Vaughan, I, 113.

IThe political -writing of Rousseau esdiibits a cross-play of two
irreconcilable tendencies; one represents the individualism of the natural
and the other represents the collectivism of the sovereign state.^ These
two stx*ands lie side by side throxighout -the Contrat social; they are ne-v^r
successfully united because -they cannot be united# It is, therefore, in-
correct, in our opinion, -fco represent the -work of Rotisseau either as a
straight-line development fran individualism to its opposite, collectivism, or
as a consistent defence of individualism from start to finish. It is rather
an unsynthesized presentation of both individualism and collectivism.
A clear example of this conflict may be found in Book II, Chapter IV,
"Les bournes du pouvoir souverain." The chapter begins -with a paragraph
voicing organicism. The state is to have a "universal and compelling force"
in order to move each part to -the best advantage of the vhole# But the next
paragraph is just as unqualifiedly atomistic# Besides the state w© are
asked to consider the persons conposing it and these are "naturally indepen-
dent#" After this thesis and antithesis, the next paragraph pro-vides, not
a synthesis, but a conflict# Each man is to alienate only vhat it is impor-
tant for the state to control; but the state is the sole judge of -wliat is
important# It is this same chapter which tries -to show how ne work for
others by -working for oursel-ves# The association, on analysis, turns out
to be a mere collection of particulars which are external to each other.
The thesis and the antithesis are of such a kind that they cannot be trans-
muted into a higher synthesis# If social unity is to be obtained, therefore,
the thesis must annihilate the antithesis, and this, in -the end, takes place.
Collectivism overpowers individualism#
137
1# Joseph Homung (Art# 1, lBO-65) points to this dualism as grounded
in the personali-fcy of Rousseau himself.
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Those v.ho have attempted to unify the thought of Rousseau under
either the heading of collectivism or of individualism have usually had to
admit that such unification is incomplete. Vaughan, for example, admits thal;
Rousseau as ”a stern assertor of the State upon the one hand, a fiery champion
of the individual upon the other • • • could never bring himself vjholly to
sacrifice the one ideal to the other. Cobban too concedes that "the in-
completeness of his political thought is patent."^
The critic who seems to us to give the most accurate accomt of
Rousseau’s thought is Monsieur M. Bourguin, vA\o wrote in 1912 on "Les deux
3
tendances de Rousseau." He had been occupied with the study of Rousseau’s
politics since 1897, but he died before developing the idea expressed in
this article.^ He found that the individualistic spirit which is diffused
through the literary work of Rousseau contradicts the classic spirit of the
political writings. This latter spirit leads to the ancient conception of
the state as the sovereign master of the individual. In the Contrat social
the conciliation of these two tendencies, in so far as there is conciliation,
is made through the volont^ gdn^rale , which is always right "by definition."
In this ideal state "les vices de la nature hunaine sont supprim^s par
\ 5
hypoth^se ... I’opposition de I’dgoism et de I’altruisme disparait."
Professor Schinz’s scholarly two-volume work might be considered as
a further elaboration of the thesis of M. Bourguin, for Schinz represents
1. Vaughan, PViR, II, 141-42.
2. Cobban, Ri;.S, 214.
3. Rev. de met. 20(l912), 353-369.
4. Schinz, LPR, I, 47.
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the thought of Rousseau as a cross-play of "romantic” vs. "Roman" traits.^
Schinz concludes that the real Rousseau is not the romantic Rousseau of the
nanuels of literature; the real Rousseau is a pragmatist who searches for a
formula to reconcile romanticism in man with the necessity of disciplining
3
human nature. Hence, the alternation bet-ween the romantic and the Roman
emphasis in his writing. The Roman Rousseau, Schinz concludes, carries away
more and more the romantic and sentimental Rousseau.^
The presence of contradictory strains in Rousseau’s thought is, of
course, not a new discovery. As early as 1890, and doubtless before, it was
/
heralded by the able scholar, Emile Faguet. Comparing the Contrat social
with the other works, he concluded, "Les id^es politiques de Rousseau me
paraissent, je le dis franchement, ne pas tenir K I’ensemble de ses id^es."^
Paguet takes account of the critics who try to reduce the inconsistency of
Rousseau by discounting the anti-social utterances of some of the writings
and by taking the Social Contract as the one writing -vdiich it is necessary to
read. Faguet replies: "If there was only the Inequality on the one side and
the Contract on the other, I should say that Rousseau had had two general
ideas so different that they are contradictory ( contraires)
,
and I should
1. Volume I deals with the social and psychological conditions of the
time. Volume II deals with the philosophic work of Rousseau, attempting to
determine the nature of the lack of philosophical cohesion therein.
2o Cf. his Jean Jacques Rousseau: A Forerunner of Pragmatism.
3. Cf. Emile Boutroux: On ne saurait trop insister sur la n4cessib<< de
croire avec Rousseau, que le probl^me ne peut Stre judicieusement rdsolu par
1’ anihilation pure et simple de I’une de ces puissances au profit de 1' autre.'
The two povrers mentioned are sentiment and reason. Art. 1, 270.
4. Schinz, LFR, II, 506-14. H. H. Clark reports: "... Rousseau con-
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stop there .’’I If the analjrsis of this dissertation is correct, we may go
further and say that it is not necessary to place the C ontrat against the
second Discourse in order to find a conflict between individualism an.d collec
2
tivism; it can be fomd within the Contrat itself.
!Tot all scholars, however, are agreed on the lack of unity in Rousseau*^
work, just as they are not agreed about a great many other matters pertaining
to him. Gustave Lanson, for example, takes exception to the interpretations
A
made by Faguet, Lemaitre, and Espinas, who find Rousseau all contradiction
and incoherence an.d make him by turns an "exasperated individualist" and an
"6,uthoritarian socialist." In the case of M. Espinas, and perhaps of
Lemaitre also, the criticism is doubtless justified since both tend to be
abiisive.^ Lanson’ s contention, however, is that the critics reduce the works
of Rousseau to an abstract formula and then evaluate him in terns of the
5
formula which is substibuted for his works. Moreover, the method appropriate
to the interpretation of Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Kant or Hegel is
inappropriate for the interpretation of Rousseau, for his thought does not
form an abstract system; it is a "living thought" developed under the
1. Faguet, DHS, 384.
I
2. Gaspard Vallette has remarked that this vrork, although it glorifies
Genevan institutions, often presents theories contrary to the personal temper
ament of Rousseau and to the general tendency of his individualist spirit.
"Souvent, en lisant le Contrat social, on a I’impression p^nible qi;e Rousseau
s’efforce d’ exprimer et de marquer fortement les iddes d’un autre bten plutot
que les siennes. De 1^ 1’ incoherence, 1’ incertitude, les contradictions
irreductibles d’un livre, qui n’est rigidement logique que d’apparence et de
ton" (JJR,209).
3. Lanson, Art. 1, 1-2.
4. Espinas finds Rousseau "incoherent to the point of impertinence"
(Art. 1,436).
5. Lanson, Art. 1, 3,
l^d

conditions of his Pass from logic to life and the contradictions dis
2
appear is Lanson's thesis in general. One may admit that there is a close
unity existing between Rousseau’s thought and his life^ but one hardly sees
how that fact should either establish a logical unity among his thoughts or
diminish in any way the inconsistencies which may be found there. Moreover,
we may grant that Rousseau was not a builder of systems, but does that mean
that his ideas are, therefore, exempt from systematic appraisal? One is
reluctant to attribute such a meaning to Monsieur Lanson, for he also finds
a possible inconsistency in Rousseau’s having proposed individualism in two
senses very different.^ The inconsistencies may perhaps extend further.
M. Georges Beaulavon finds the unity of Rousseau’ s doctrine to lie
in the central preoccupation of Rousseau, which is above all a moral pre-
occupation.^ Professor Schinz speaks of ’’the Utopian loftiness of his moral
gideals, and . . • his hopeless inconsistencies . • Monsieur L.
Delaruelle declares, in a similar vein, that among. the sources of Rousseau’s
ideas for the first Discourse are those moderns who subordinate everything
n
to the observance of the elementary rules of morality.
It is undoubtedly possible to find the work of Rousseau exhibiting
1. Lanson, Art. 1, 7.
2. Cf. also Lanson, HLF, 775.
3. Cassirer says that Rousseau found his picture of hxman nature "in
seinem eigenen Herzen" (Art. 1, 189)
4. Lanson, KLF, 783.
5. Beaulavon, Art. 1, 168. Cf. also Rodet, LCS , 424-25; and Hendel’s
two-vol<jme vrork, Rousseau Moralist .*
6. Schinz, RFP, Foreword.
7. Delaruelle, Art. 1, 269-70.
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certain general characteristics. It exhibits the character of e. moralist.
Etr also exhibits the clmracter of a Genevan, as Monsieur Vallette has shown.
[n certain respects it exhibits the character of a rationalist, or again of
a. pragmatist, as Professor Schinz has shoivn. Our concern, however, has been,
aot so much to discover the general characteristics of Rousseau’s work as a
whole, blit rather to test the consistency and coherence of his political
ideals as they bear especially on the problem of liberty. The arguments fron
the general character of the writings or from the relation of the writings to
the life of the writer do not touch the question of consistency of ideas and
these arguments, therefore, would not call for any change to be made in the
original conclusion that there is conflict and incoherence between the basic
ideas embodied in the political writing of Rousseau. The author himself
seemed aware of the lack of unity in his work, if one may judge by his famous
word to Dusaulxs ’’Quant au Contrat social, ceux qui se vanteront de I’entendre^
tout entier, sont plus habile que moi. C’est un livre k refaire; mais je n’eii
ai plus ni la force, ni le temps
The result of this conflict in his writing is that the liberty of the
individual, which Rousseau had pledged himself to preserve, steadily gives
way before the power of collective constraint* Rousseau, late in the
treatise, seems aware of the misfortunes of liberty, for he writes a
passage -vdiich reveals impatience with the logical outcome of his theory. He
I
jraises the question of how a man can be both free and forced to conform to
Iwills that are not his own. The question itself reveals an awareness on his
part of the logical impasse into which his theory had lead. The answer #iichj
I
I
1. Dusaulx, RAR, 102.
2. GS, Book IV, Chapter II.
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he gives reveals his impatience with the sitmtion*
Je r^ponds que la question est mal pos^e. Le citoyen consent ^ toutes
les lois, m#me k celles qu’on passe malgr^ lui, et m^e k celles qui le
punissent quand il ose en violer quelqu’une.^
He goes on to add that viien an opinion contrary to xny own prevails it proves
that I was mistaken and that what I thought was the general will was not so.
Even at the end, Rousseau tried to present constraint so that it looked like
consent. But the reader is not readily convinced that the individual is
following his own will vhen he submits to constraints to -which his vote had
registered him as opposed. It -wrill look like constraint to the reader, just
as it -would feel like constraint to the citizen.
Thus, we conclude that the liberty of the individual, of v/hich
Rousseau reamined the champion in spite of himself, is cancelled by a
possible tyranny of the majority. Vfe conclude that Rousseau failed to attain
a rational synthesis between the individual and the group, and that the
main factor in this failure and in this cancellation of liberty is the concept
tion of individualism with vhich the -writer operated, namely, the individual-
ism of I’horame naturel.
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/CHAPTER YI
RECONSTHJCTION OF THE COHCEPT OF LIBERTY
If one were to draw the lines of a possible solution to the problem
of political liberty he could do no better, we believe, than to begin -sdiere
Rousseau began, that is, with the individual* In the solution of any philo-
sophical problem it i s wise to begin with what is given, and in the case of
anyone what is given is one’s own experience. The individual is thus prior
I
to the state both logically and chronologically. If there were no individuals
i
there could be no state; every person is an individual before he is a citi-
zen. This may be taken as the grain of truth embodied in the fiction of the
state of nature, but political philosophy does well if it remains unentangled
vdth that fiction.
Starting with tiie individual, then, the significant thing to note is
the will of the individual, or the character vMch the individual exhibits
in the pursuit of his ovn desires and the satisfaction of his own needs. It
is not necessary to raise the question of whether there ever was a time when
|
individuals were free to pursue their own desires without interference, and
j
thereby to obey only than selves. Such a question is irrelevant to the prob-
|
lem. The fact is that
^
there are individuals and that their character is to
I
pursue their owi ends.
I
Some may object at this point that we are ficoing too fast to be
proceeding in a strictly logical fashion for we are now speaking of "indi-
j
viduals” when only the "individual" is given. ^ The question of the proof i
1. Strtctly speaking, not even the individual is given but only the
immediate consciousness of any given moment. The individual or whole self
is an inference from this given, made on the basis of linkages, past and
futvure, within it.
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of the existence of other persons is a proper philosophical question, hut it
is, however, a metaphysical rather than a political question and the consider^-
ation of it does not, therefore, fall within social philosophy. All questioiB
in the end are related, btrt one need not address himself to the considera-
tion of all questions before he ventures upon a consideration of those directs
ly before him* "Whatever conclusions the metaphysicians may reach about the
existence of other persons, it is sufficient to say that any social philos-
ophy must start with the assumption that there are other persons, and tha.t
their desires and experiences are similar to our own*
If we vsre to frame a conception of liberty with the materials now
before us, it would be the liberty vAiich Rousseau believed prevailed in the
state of nature* It would be that liberty in -vihich each individual does
precisely as he pleases* Following his own will, the individual vrould do
everything he wished, and would be constrained to do nothing he did not wish
to do* But strictly speaking such a liberty would be impossible even in a
state of nature* If there v/ere only one individual on earth, and if he vrere
responsible to none but himself he would find it impossible to do everything
he vnshed. The character of desire is that it is chaotic and contradictory
so that our wish at any moment is often contradicted by another wish of the
opposite kind* It is not impossible to imagine that Rousseau’s man in a
state of nature should wish himself well fed and at the same time wish him-
self free from the work of obtaining his food. The individual wiio regards
liberty as the absence of any restraint upon the will is likely to find him-
self in bondage to false values, and may discover that he has exlianged a
greater good, vhich discipline and constraint would have made possible, for
a lesser good -which he obtained -without constraint* The conclusion from
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if the definition were held to apply to the individual alone and not to the
individual as a memher of society.
Despite the difficulties arising from defining liberty as "the absence
of restraint," some writers show a liking for the clean-cut, unqualified
itenns of this definition* Thus Mr* Horace M* Kallen writes that "speaking
and eating and drinking are not freedoms until someone tries to prevent their




Positively, Freedom seems to involve the way you feel when you are
let go * * • and as feeling is alwa;;^/s an individual experience, the
social definition of Freedom involves prohibiting interference, forbidding
or removing obstruction or restraint, rather than characterizing a feel-
ing.2
But the freedom to do as one pleases has been properly called the
"freedom of the wild ass*"^ However attractive it may be as a romantic ideal,
as a practical principle it is a snare and a delusion, for even the wild ass
is not free vithoTist qualification, for he i s constrained by those conditions
which are a necessary pao*t of the nature of things. This definition repre-
sents an extreme ideal, vhich is especially impossible of application in a
social context. With respect to it, the advice of Max Eastman is appropriate
and timely. He advises that extreme idealists "go out and find some other




This romantic definition, however, suggests a truth which is importan't*
If the individual cannot find freedom by the simple method of removing
1* Kallen, Art* 1, 2*
2* Ibid., 3* Cf* Clarence Darrove "Liberty only means having the
chance to do what you want to do" (Art* 1, 117).
3* Hamilton, Art. 1, 31.
4* Eastman, Art* 1, 180.
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restraints, it is equally true that he cannot find freedom in obedience to
a will which is not his own. A constraint imposed upon the individual in
defiance of his rational will is slavery. The notion of consent is basic in
a philosophy of liberty, and although Rousseau’s particular treatment of
|! consent is faulty, what he implied about the importance of the relation be-
j tween consent and liberty may be taken as true. The Kantian idea of auton-
j
omy, which Rousseau did so much to inspire,^ is the idea which embodies the
'importance of consent. According to this idea the individual places over
his conduct a law to vhich he must conform. The law, it must be noted, pro-
ceeds from the individual; it is self-prescribed Kant expresses his idea
as follows:
Autonomie des Willens istdie Beschaffenheit des Willens, dadurch
derselbe ihm selbst (unabhHngig von aller Beschaffenheit der Gegen-
st&nde des Wollens) ein Gesetz ist. Das Prinzip der Autonomie ist also:
nicht anders zu wfihlen als so, dass die Maximen seiner Wahl in demselben
Vfollen zugleich als allgem.eines Gesetz mit begriffen seien.^
Autonomy is that character of the will by which it is a law unto itself; its
restraints must be self-imposed. Conduct in accordance with a self-imposed
law was the Kantian formula for the morality of free beings. Obedience to
a self-imposed law was Rousseau’s formula for the conduct of free citizens.
The truth represented by both ideas is the point fron yhich any philosophy




At this point it is necessary to make a departure from the thought
of Rousseau. He held that by the terms of the social contract the individual.
1. Cf. Delbos, Art. 1.
2. Kant, GMS, 67.
3. Cf. Martin, LIB, 45 and 123 where autonomy is cited as the con-
tribution of Christianity, the Reformation in particular, to liberty.
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makes a total alienation of himself# From a moral point of view, the indi-
I
i
vidual cajinot make a total alienation of himself and remain a responsible
moral agent# If he surrenders his will to another, whether it be a personal
sovereign or the majority, he no longer remains an autonomous individual; he
becomes an automaton, and a collection of automata, although they make an
army cannot make a civil society# Rousseau was deeply contemptuous of
Hobbes’s notion of the surrender of the individual’s v/ill to that of the
sovereign, but his own demands for total alienation are hardly more commend-
able#
Some allowance must be made at this point, however, because Rousseau
sought to make the sovereign will identical with the individual’s will, and
great credit is due him, as Professor Hendel has pointed out, for phrasing
the -problem in new terms: "It is not a question," said Rousseau, "of a
power we are forced to obey, but only one we are obliged to recognize#’
This formulation of the problem does not imply a surrender of the individual’s
autonomy; it rather implies that political obligation is, in a rational view,
a part of that autonomy#
This is the principle which Rousseau aimed to establish b\it which he
was prevented from establishing because of the fiction of the natural man#
The absolute independence of the natural man leaves no place in his nature
for political obligation# This structural error in Rousseau’ s thought is
fair warning against making the concept of nature basic to political philos-
ophy# The ambiguity of this concept is an unfailing source of confusion.
"Man is by nature independent and egoistic#" Yes, but man is also "by na-
ture" altruistic and sociable# How could society exist and how could
til
1# Hendel, MO, 265, quoted from Rousseau’s first version of the
Contrat social in Vaughan, PV/R, I, 470#
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Ialtruistic acts ever be performed if man had no natural capacity for these
things? "Nature” comes to mean, therefore, whatever the author thinks sig-
nificant,^ If the author is an individualist and a rebel against restraint,
then the "natural" man bears the characteristics iidiich Rousseau attributed
to him. If, however, the author prizes other virtues, the "natural" man
bears different characteristics, Locke’s natural man, for example, is one
p
who had "pored himself pale over the Sermon on the Mount," as Vaughan says.
The state of nature for Locke, consequently had the characteristics of a
Christian society. It was quite otherwise with Hobbes, who wrote of a natur-
al "bellum omnium contra omnes," In the exchange of political thought, there-
fore, the concept of nature is a deceptive coin; its value is never the same,
A concept which can mean everything means nothing. It is better to outlaw ito
But how is one to get man into society? If man is an individual be-
fore he is a citizen, by vhat artifice does he become a citizen? The answer
is: By no "artifice," A part of his individuality is his need for society.
As Aristotle said, "Man is a political animal," But is this not the same
as saying that man is "by nature" sociable, and are we not, therefore, in
the predicament of resorting to a form of the fiction which we have out-
lawed? Not precisely, because Aristotle’s dictum need not be interpreted
as a judgment about what all men by nature are, in vhich case we should have
to conclude that all men are pre-determined by nature to become civil beings
and any who exhibit emti-social or a-social characteristics are, therefore,
monstrosities, deserving, as Diderot said, to be stifled. In order to
1, This judgment is to be taken as applying to the concept of nature
in seventeenth and eighteenth-century political thought rather than to the
modem problem of natural tendencies or instincts. In view of the vagaries
of the instinct theory, however, it may have some application there.
2, PWR, I, 16
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obtain the social order it is not necessary to resort to the determinism
implied in the ccncept of nature,
Aristotle^ s dictvun may be taken as an hypothesis or postulate, •vdiich,
{
I
•while it is not open to conclusive proof, is nevertheless open to some -veri-
that
fication. It is, in any event, not capable of disproof. The fact^there are
I
and have been societies is sufficient evidence to verify the assumption that
there is a social reference in the notion of indi-vriduality. This assvimption,
moreover, continues to be verified, when acted upon, in the majority of
instances. That is to say, if we assume that individuals are meant for soci-
ety and if -we direct the development of individuality in the direction of
society, the usual outcome is that individuals find their best interests
preserved by a life -within society rather than in a life apart from it.
No more is needed to support the notion of a social reference -within indi-
I
-viduality.
In this supposition -we are appealing to a neglected strain in the
thought of Romsseau, that which -we have noted as 1 * homme -yraiment libre .
Under this heading Rousseau gives us the picture of the indi-vidual as one who
finds his fulfilment in the life of society; he is the one for -whom civil
!
existence, rather than existence in the state of nature, is congenial. He
j
is amenable to social cultivation. This is the conception of the individual
j
which it is necessary to make basic and not the conception of 1* homme naturel
.
We have, therefor^ up to this point, -two elements necessary for a
philosophy of liberty; (l) The principle of autonomy, or the primacy of the '
indi-vidual, (2) the principle of a social reference vdthin indi-vlduality.
It is necessary to appeal now to another neglected strain in the
thought of Rousseau, that in -which common advantage is made the basis of the
state. This is the emphasis of the first -version of the Contrat social and
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remnants of the view remain in the definitive text in the chapter on "The
1 2Civil State," and in the first chapter of the second hook. The latter
reference informs us that it is "the agreement of particular interests" iwhich
makes society possible and that "the common element in these different inter-
ests forms the social tie#" The unruly individualism of Rousseau unfortu-
nately intrudes immediately, spoiling -what might have been developed into a
basic principle# He contends that it is almost impossible for a particular
vd-ll to remain in agreement with the general will; "it is at least impossible
for the agreement to be lasting and constant#" Perhaps under the terms of
his definition of a "particular will" the contention is true, but the main
embarrassment to hi s theory is that very definition by which the particulars
in society are repugnant to society# HVhy not abide by the assertion that
society represents an area of experience in which there is an agreement of
interest among particulars, that particulars are not forever recalcitrant
to the group but are bound to it, the tie being the conmon element in their
different interests? No theory of political liberty can be constructed on
the basis of an atomism which renders society itself impossible#
We find, then, in this neglected strain a third element necessary
for the construction of a society of free beings# ViTe may call that element
the common advantage or the common good, understanding by this term vixat
Rousseau spoke of as the element vhich is common to particular interests#
Professor Hendel, following Rousseau, has given a very acceptable definition
of the conmon good as "that in respect to vhich the interests of men are no
1# CS, I, VIII.
2# "That Sovereignty is Inalienable#"
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We have, therefore, these elements with -which to begin a solution of
I
I




[pf the social reference within individuality, (3) common advantage as the
basis of -the state. The relations between -these elements remains to be con-
sidered •
We have noticed that the idea of autonomy dictated Rousseau’s defini-
tion of liberty* "Obedience to a self-prescribed law." We have contended
that this is the place where it is necessary to begin in any philosophy of
liberty. The question now iss Is it possible to stop here? Can it be sup-
posed, as Rousseau sometimes seems -bo suppose, that the exercise of autonomy
leads always to -tdie conmon good? Can -we suppose that individuals, by obey-
ing the law which they prescribe for themselves, -will also conform to the
law wiiich guides the state to the general welfare? This presupposition -would
be reasonable only if we could rely upon indi-vlduals to possess the insight
and the good v/ill bo-fch to see and to submit to the requirements of the com-
mon good as a part of the law -sdiich they prescribe for -themselves. If we
could rely upon this double necessity, Rousseau’s definition of liberty could
stand as satisfactory for individuals in a social relationship.
From the standpoint of both theory and practice, ho-wever, it would
be safer -to assinne -that indi-vlduals do not infallibly see nor freely submit
to the restraints imposed by the common good. The experience of almost any
society will support Rousseau’s contention about the na-ture of particular
interests. Allo-wance, therefore, must be made for this troublesome fact.
The principle of autonomy has al-ways produced dissenters and among them there
1. Hendel, RM, II, 189
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y^ve been both good and bad. Dissenters against civil obedience range all
the "way from the criminal vAio refuses to comoly -with the constraints -which
good citizens voluntarily adopt, to conscientious objectors -who refuse to
obey cn the gro\md that obedience is detrimental to the best interests of
society. These latter are usually a very small minority -who disagree vdth
the majority as to -what constitutes the best definition of the common advan-
tage; they disobey for no private advantage -wAiich is likely to come to them. !
Criminals, on the other hand, and others -whose conduct is like their in
!
principle, place their private advantage above the common -welfare for the
sake of a gain -which is likely to come to themselves.
In a sense, the conduct of all civil dissenters may be described as
"autonomous," because they are obedient to a lav/ which they prescribe to them-
I
selves. This -would apply to criminals and self-interested indi-viduals, as
I
-wrell as to conscien-biou s objectors. But in the case of the former it could
j
not be said that -their conduct was autonomous in a moral sense, nor could it
|
be said that it was autonomous in -the sense intended by Keint, for he stipu-
lated -that the agent should test his conduct by the rule of universality, and
obey those maxims only -which could be made universal la-ws for all men.
Careful analysis, therefore, calls for a distinction to be drawn
betv/een oi-vll dissenters -sho oppose constraint on moral grounds and those who
oppose it on grounds of self-interest. Here we come upon the first relation
be-tween the principle of autonomy and that of the common good, namely that
in vrhich society overrides the autonomy of the individual.
Societies have universally assumed the right to constrain, subdue, or.
in some cases, destroy the criminal who sets his own advantage up against
the common advantage. Such constraint may be said to have a basis in right
if the activity of the indi-^ldual is clearly incompatible with or destructive
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of the common life of the group. To deny this right of society wuld be to
give a lesser good precedence over a greater good and to inaugurate a prin-
ciple -which -would destroy the life of society itself. Those properties vdiich
the lives of indi-viduals exhibit in their collective aspect have a claim
over the conduct of the indi-viduals -who constitute the group. The reason for
biiis is the fact that these properties represent -values vinich are real in the
lives of the individuals themselves. Just as there is no justification, fron
a moral point of view, for the individual’s allo-wing a lesser value-claim to
dominate a greater value-claim, so there is no justification, from a politiceCL
point of -view, for the particular claims of an individual to take precedence
over the common claims in -which the remainder of the group have an interest.
The basic needs of indi-viduals and the basic desires of individuals are the
same. Society serves -the purpose of being an instrument by means of -vhich
these baid-c needs and desires can be satisfied. The satisfaction of these
needs is a desire which is common to all members of the social group. "When,
therefore, the action of one member of the group places in jeopardy a desire
•which is common to all the other members of the group, that member may be
rightfully constrained.^
But is not such constraint a -violation of the principle of autonomy
already adopted? The answwer depends upon whether "autonomy” is defined
loosely or strictly. If "autonomous" is to mean merely "independent" or
"self-governing" -without respect to the nature of the independence or the
principle of self-government, then such constraint is a violation of the
autonomy of the indi-vidual. And, by the same token, it is a violation of
1. For this reason it cannot be admitted that consent is the only
or even the central eleTOsnt in a philosophy of liberty. The properties of
of ci-vil life and social organization, by -wiiich the behavior of civil beings
is determined, remain -wwhat they are independent of the consent of individuals.
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liberty also, if liberty means only obedience one’ s o-wn -will. But if auton-
omy is defined more strictly, if it is taken in a moral sense, then there is
no violation of autonomy, for the conduct of criminals is not the kind of
conduct a moral man could approve or vrould choose in any event. If, there-
fore, we are to speak intelligently about liberty and autonomy we must under
stand tliLTOughout that autonomous beings are moral beings.
From the standpoint of political theory, the moral man is any indi-
vidual -vdio is willing to subject his own desires to reason. This means mere-
ly that he will eliminate those rebellious preferences which are incompatible
wi-yi a rational system of desire* This rational system of desire, from the
standpoint of political theory, must be understood to include among the data
to be synthesized by reason, not only ihe desires of the individual, but also
the desires of other individuals in the group. The moral man, therefore,
from this point of view, is one -viaose conduct is subservient to the common
good, for the common good is the rational synthesis of individuals’ desires
in their social aspect.
We may now formulate a principle, viiich, for the sake of convenience
we shall call the principle of just constraint. The principle may be stated
as follows: It is the ri§^t of society to constrain the individual when the
conduct of the individual conflicts with the common good. Such constraint
is only a guarantee of the continued existence of a society of free moral
beings.
It may be seen from this that everything depends upon what is under-
stood by the "common good." It is probably no exaggeration to say that the
liberty of a people depends, in the last analysis, upon the sagacity with
which they interpret the idea of the common good and the diligence with
•which they pursue it. It is not unusual in politics to find prejudices of
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!the most rancid kind masquerading as the common good, as, for example, -when
private and pov/erful interests defend states’ rights or the freedom of con-
tract as necessary to the common good.^ It is not possible to define the
content of this concept of the common good with a precision which will meet
all problems and adjust all conflicts in advance. It is a concept, the con-
tent of which necessarily varies with different cultures, but whatever the
content, it may be described as those things in wliich the insterests of indi-
viduals are no longer opposed but agreed. A part of the content of this
concept, however, is relatively fixed as, for example, the interest vhich all
have in obtaining the basic necessities for the maintenance of life or the
elementary instruments necessary for the self-realization of individuals.
The common good in any society vould imply the opportunity for receiving
these necessities and instruments by all the members on terms equitable for
all.
But economic considerations do not exhaust the content of the common
good. Culture, as well as economics, impinges upon the common good. For
this reason, the formula, "economic regimentation with cultural freedom,” may
be found open to criticism as a formula for establishing the limits of social
constraint. Such a principle would vindoubtedly be a great improvement over
the economic anarchy of laissez-faire practice which delivers multitudes into
the bondage of unemployment and wage slavery. But if "cultural freedom”
means immunity from constraint in matters of morals, or religion, or other
cultural pursuits, then we must say that, while this is a wise policy as a
general rule, it must not be supposed that the principle of cultural freedom
shall take precedence over the principle of the common good. The latter is.
1. For an excellent study of this pernicious phenomenon in American
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in all cases, the master principle. An example will clarify the meaning.
Many persons, on religious grounds, have scruples against seeking the ser-
vices of a physician in sickness, or against educating their children, or
they are prompted to other forms of activity equally fantastic or fanatical.
So long as such whimsies are not any more disastrous than the refusal to eat
pork or tlie desire to go without clothes, such people may he left to their
own devices in the pursuit of tlieir ccnvictions. But if their activity
should lead to the spreading of a coontagious disease, or to the denial to
children of their right to self-development, then the acvitivy of such per-
sons might rightly be constrained at the point where it is harmful to others
and the principle of such constraint would be the principle of the common
good.
S
Under the heading of the relation between autonomy and the common good
we have thus far been speaking of the restraint -which the group has a right
to impose upon the individual. It is necessary now to speak of the guarantee
which the individual has a ri ^t to expect from the group. Liberty is a t-wo-
sided problem. If it is necessary to protect the free society from the en-
croachment of particular interests, it is also necessary to protect the
particulars from the encroachment of an omnipotent sovereignty.
The principle -which governs this side of the relationship may be
stated as followrss The sovereign po-wer must be such that a moral man can obey
it. We are now at the heart of Rousseau’s contribution to political theory,
for -this principle may be said to summarize the most important element in
his political philosophy. It is the conclusion to-ward vMch he pointed -when
he fonnulated his problem as a question of a power ”-we are obliged to recog-
nize,” and Wien he called his treatise a -work on the "principles of political
right,” Jules Lemaitre exhibits a singular immunity to the essentials of
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Rousseau^ s thought vtoen he dismisses the idea of the moral importance of the
civil state as "Calvinistic confusion of politics and morals*"^ C#E. Vaughan
is nearer the truth of the matter -when he hails the moral reference in poli-
p
tics as constituting "a revolution in political speculation*”
The reasons for insisting upon the moral character of the civil state
are not difficult to discover* If the individual is to remain a free moral
being, the maxims of his choice must be self-imposed; that is -what it means
to be a free moral being. It follows from this that any power outside the
individual yhich the individual recognizes must be one yhich the free, ration
al choice of the individual can approve. Otherwise his autonomy is violated
when he is compelled to obey it. The moral character of the civil state is
thus an implication of the autonomy of the indi"vidual.
This account differs from Rousseau’s in one respect. Rousseau held
that the individual derives his character as a moral being from the fact that
he enters society; apart from society he is not a moral being, for moral
4distinctions are bom of -fche social order. The notion that society creates
morality is, happily, not essential "bo the main thesis regarding the moral
character of the civil state; it is one -viiich -we can, and must, reject, but
the rejection does not impair the basic contention that the sovereign po-wer
must be such that a moral man can obey it.
A clarification of terminology is necessary at this point. When it
226.
2. Vaughan, PVfil, I, 41.
3. Hendel describes Rousseau’s theory thus: ”Law and obligation were
being conceived (by Rousseau) not as an effect of the will of a superior, but
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is said t’nat the sovereign power must be moral, that statement is not to be
interpreted as meaning that the sovereign must be committed to any specific
form of moral theory. It is both unnecessary and dangerous to liberty to
suppose that the sovereign must be committed to hedonism or Puritan ethics
or any other specific ethical theory as the one by which subjects are to be
judged. Subjects are to be left free tojvuork out their own ethical theory
and their own forms of ethical behavior in accordance with the dictates of
their own reasons and subject only to the constrsdnt which we have noted
before as attaching to cultural freedom. The prevailing culture of a commun-
ity may provide idle detail of the ethical orientation of the subjects. This
culture may be uniform or it may be a patchwork of various or even contradic-
tory ethical theories. Neither state of affairs is necessarily a challenge
to liberty, but it is vorth noting that difference of opinion among subjects
does not necessarily mean disunity within the state and it is more often an
asset than a liability.^
The moral character of the civil state means that if the moral man is
one who is obedient to the common good, then the moral society is one in
which all constraint is from the principle of the common good. The laws,
2
said Rousseau, are "only the conditions of civil association." Translated
into the language of the present exposition this truth would read, "The laws
1. Contrast Rousseau’s (and Plato’s) preference for unanimity as
e:rfiibited in Rousseau’s chapters on "The Censorship" and "Voting" and in
his Letter to M. D’Alembert. Totalitarian states, in the interest of unanim-
ity,""resortnEcTTeglmintat’ion of ideas by means of force and propaganda. Such
practice can be viewed only as threat to autonomy or, if it is successful, a
cancellation of individuality. It represents the imposition of the -vAll of
those in power upon the vhole grovp; it is domination by a partial society
through means which sure repulsive to free beings. Professor Hocking has
observed that Italian fascism makes the citizenry "the tail of the state
kite" (LEI, 148).
2. CS, II, VI in Vaughan, PVTO, II, 50.
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are only the enabling provisions for the realization of the common good,”
|1?his is the idea at which any society must aim if its power is to be one
I
iriiich subjects are "obliged to recognize." The common good thus becomes, not
only the principle by which constraint may justly be imposed upon the indi-
'vidual, but also the principle by which that constraint is limited. We may
claim for it what Rousseau claimed for his principle of the social contract:
It is the principle by vhich liberty may be preserved.
The principle vhich governs the limits of the sovereign power, is not
essentially different from that which Rousseau proclaimed -vriien he wrote that
the individual 3aelds to the group only in those matters -vhich are "important
for the community,"^ In the matter of both theory and practice, however, it
is necessary to diverge sharply from Rousseau’s further teaching that the
sovereign is "the sole judge of -vdiat is important," The problem, if liberty
is to be saved, is to get the common good defined as it really is, and not
as -the sovereign sees it, for the two may be quite different. For a true
description of the common good, the insights of a single indi-vidual may be
more valuable tlian the conclusions of the sovereign. The free society must
be so organized that such insights can come to expression and finally be
incorporated in the laws passed by the sovereign. The final appeal in every
case is to reason and justice and there is no ground for supposing that the
sovereign has a monopoly on these.
For the purpose of defining the common good objectively, a tradition
of respect for the autonomy of indi-viduals is essential. No one can so
quickly detect -the e-vils of unjust constraint as he who -will have to bear
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them. As a matter of political practice, therefore, feasible methods must
be devised -whereby the judgment of individuals upon acts of sovereignty can
be made knowm to the ear of the sovereign. For this reason, Rousseau’s
proscription of partis associations must be avoided as the first instrument
of tyranny.^ The freedom of assemblage is a practice of the greatest impor-
tance. Along wdih it, and equally important, may be ranked the other basic
freedoms, freedom of the press, of thous^t, of speech, and of religious
wiorship. These rules of practice are significant as means for realizing
the principle of autonomy, and -this principle, in turn, serves as a check
upon an irresponsible definition of the common good at the hands of the
sovereign.
It is not to be supposed, however, tliat a perfect haimiony can be
achieved between the principle of the common good and that of autonomy. It
might be achieved if the reason which guides the sovereign and the reason
which guides the subject were alike infinite. All possible consequences
and ccnnections, and all relevant data would then be included in every judg-
ment upon the common good. But reason is finite, whether in the so-vareign
or in the subject and on that account genuine conflicts between autonomy
and the common good may arise. A person who objects to military service on
religious grounds might conceivably be at the same time the citizen of a
coimtry suffering from an unprovoked invasion by an aggressor power. His
government would call upon him to fight; his conscience would call upon him
to resist. As a moral man he could not do otheirwise than obey the law which
I
1. Rousseau resorted to this extreme measure partly because he ob-
served the injustice arising from the liaison between the state and one
dominant partial association, the Chureh. Setter than proscribing all
partial associations, however, would have been the alternative of providing
a way whereby small minorities opposed to such domination could arise and
make their influence felt.
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his reason and conscience dictate, mth the result that an irreconcilable
conflict arises between what the law prescribes and what autonomy requires.
It seems that in sudi situations one is compelled to say that liberty must
be sacrificed. It is the penalty of finitude. It is the result brought abou
by the inability and failure of either the sovereign or the subject or both
to see clearly what the common good is. But for finitude there is no ready
cure, in spite of the fact that its consequences are disastrous.
If, however, liberty in such a situation must be sacrificed, it must
be sacrificed ever so cautiously. If the state, in the interest of its own
safety, is ccmpelled to curb the individual it may well remember that it
need not stifle him. If it is necessary to withdraw some of his rights it
is not necessary to destroy him. The reason for such caution is two-fold.
In the first place, the state is not omniscient, which is proof of the pos-
sibility of an error in judgment on its part. The fault which gives rise to
the irreconcilable conflict may lie in the state itself. Secondly, in vio-
lating the principle of autonomy, the state is laying heavy hands upon a
comer stone in its own structure. No state can lay any claim to existence
by right if it is a state which disregards the principle of autonomy. Moder-
ation, circumspection, and caution are, therefore, minimum requirements for
the exercise of constraint in cases of such conflict.
We may now sxmmiarize the principles thus far enunciated as those
necessary for the control of the relations between the individuals and the
group in a society of free beings. There is, first, the basic principle of
individuality with the corollary of autonomy and the postulate of a social
reference within individuality. By this principle, the will which comes to
expression in the state is the v/ill which proceeds froDi the individuals
within the state. Secondly, there is the principle of the common good, on
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Ithe basis of v^ich, the sovereign, on the one hand, may exact obedience from
I
the subject, and the subject, on the other hand, may expect a moral exercise
of sovereignty.
On the basis of these principles and their exposition let us now see
whether a definition of liberty can be framed. As an approach to such a
definition, let us first consider vhat purports to be a common definition of
political liberty, one which is thoughtful as well as simple. The extremely
simple definition of liberty as the absence of restraint we have already
found inadequate for social or political purposes. Careful thinkers have
taken pains to avoid this oversimplification and vhen they have made the
idea of this simple definition in any way basic to their ovoa definition they
have taken the pains to add at least one further element, namely, the right
of constraint by society when the liberty of one individual infringes upon
the ri^ts of other individuals. Thus J.S. Mill in his brilliantessay,
"On Liberty," observes that "all restraint qua restraint, is an evil," and
he defines liberty as "doing what one desires."^ But he adds that "for such
actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is
accountable." 2 The common notion of liberty embodies these ideas of Mill
for the ccmmon notion is that an individual is permitted to do what he wishes
so long as no other individual suffers harm as the result of his acts.
Immanuel Kant found fault with this notion of liberty, because, on his
shewing, it is tautological. He says, "Rechtliche (mithin Hus sere) Freiheit
kann nicht, wie man wohl zu tun pflegt, durch dicBefugnis definiert werden:
alles zu tun, was man will, wenn man nur keinem unrecht tut." The reason
1. Mill, LIB, 168, 170.
2. Ibid., 167.





he does no e-vil is that it is tautological and the tautology arises because
permission (‘Befugnis) means "the possibility of en act in so far e.s one does
by it no injury."^ Kant suggests an alternative definition of "legal free-
dan": ". • • Sie ist die Befugnis, keinen liusseren Gesetzen zu gehorchen,
p
als zu denen ich meine Beistiirammg habe geben kbnnen."'^ This definition,
like Rousseau’s, bears a marked relation to the notion of autonomy or consent,
and, like his, suffers from the lack of consideration for those properties cf
social organization -vihich are independent of consent.
Aside frcsn Kant's criticism of the common definition of liberty, there
is another fault -which it embodiess It is too negative, and too atomistic.
It is not oriented wdth respect to the common good completely enough. It is
attentive to the restraints which must be removed, but not to the positive
conditions which must be pro-vlded before indi-viduals can be free beings.
If society says to the prince and to the pauper alike, "You are free to do ,
as you wi sh provided you harm no man," has society said anything very sig-
nificant -bo the pauper? Freedom means nothing to an indi-wldual from whom
the means of exercising his freedon are wj-ithheld. Some reference, therefore,
must be made to the positive ccnditions necessary in society for the exer-
cise of freedom. The state is obliged, not only to remove the restraints
which may prevent the realization of the good life, but it is obliged also
to pro-vlde, up to the limit of what is possible eind upon terms which are
equitable, the conditions or the opportunities necessary for the realization
>2
of the good life. This, of course, is a part of the concept of the common
1. Kant, ZeF, 435.
2. Loc. oit.
3. This assertion may arouse the question of whether it is the proper
business of the state to promote morality. V/e should have to reply that the
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good. A more satisfactory definition may "be had by making the coimiion^ good
,
lather 131811 the absence of restraint, the central conception.
The follo?ring may serve as a definition from 1iiis point of view
Political liberty is the right of the individual to self-expression or
self-realization in relation to other individusils -who are organized as a
society and yjio both permit and provide for such self-expression subject
to the restraints imposed by the common good and by the recognition of
the same right and restraints as extended to all the members of the group<.
This definition begins with the individual, but not with the iiKlividual con-
ceived as naturally independent of society. The individual is regarded as
one T^iose life depends upon society and is internal to society. Hence, the
need for recognizing both the obligation which the individual owes society
[and the obligation wlich society owes the individual. This double obligation
jreflects the common advantage as the principle of social life. The defi-
f
jnition further recognizes the common good as the limiting principle by -nhieh
i!a boundary is placed aro\md the self-e;q)ression of the individual, on the
I one hand, and around the expansion of sovereign power, on the other. This
I
limit upon the sovereign power is the provision which is intended to guaran-
tee that sovereignty shall be exercised within moral limits. The definition
promotion of morality among its citizens is not the business of the state.
Two reasons may be suggested for this view (1) A state morality (or religion i
would necessitate interference with the self-expression of the individual in
a realm outside that of the common welfare for the most part. An individual* !
moral practices may, of course, have a bearing on the common welfare and in
so far, but only in so far, is the state justified in interfering. (2) Mo-
rality (and religion) are such that by their nature they cannot be prescribed
,
but it is difficult to see how a state morality or religion could be incul-
cated without prescription, either by force or by propaganda--both of vhich
defeat the ideal aims of morality and religion alike. To make the state the
custodian of morality and religion, therefore, is opening the way for the
'
> demise of liberty. For a very discerning article on this question, see
i
A.K. Rogers, Art. 1. His solution stipulates that the state shall provide
[the conditions of the gjod life for all alike, leaving ”the individual man
I to take advantage of these in the degree to which his own inclinations may
prompt him" (466). Promotion of morality to this extent is not only per-
mitted but required. This is qjite a different thing, of course, from a
systematic state morality. i
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closes Tfith a provision not hitherto stressed explicitly, the requirement
for an equitable exercise of privilege and constraint. The idea of impar-
tiality is implicit in the notion of the common good, but it seems wise to
make it esq^licit since this is one predicate of the common good which remains
constant.
It may be noticed that the appeal to impartiality or equality is an
appropriation of another idea from Rousseau,^ but reference to equality in
the definition is vddely different from the romantic account of equality
given by Rousseau in the final version of the Cent
r
at social. The idea of
equality given in the definition is that of impartiality or equality before
the law.
Yle may summarize ihe teaching of the present chapter, therefore, by
saying that it provides a definition of liberty vhich is intended as a syn-
thesis of the follomng elements: (l) The notion of individuality, vhich in-
cludes (a) the idea of autonomy and (b) the postulate of a social reference;
(2) the notion of the common good, vhich includes (a) the principle of just
constraint and (b) the limitation of sovereignty to a moral exercise of the
same and (c) the idea of equality or impartiality in both privilege and con-
straint.
1. ”Si l*on recherche en quoi consiste pr^is^ent ce plus grand bien
de tous, qui doit ^tre la base de tout syateme de legislation, on trouvera
qu’il se reduit a ces deux objects principaux. la liberte et I’egalite. La
libert/, parce que toute dependence particuliere est autant de force 'Stee
au corps de I’^tat; I’^galit^, parce que la liberte^ ne peut subsister sans
elle" (premiere version du Contrat social, II, VI in Vaughan, FWR, I , 497.
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The philosophical problem of political liberty is that of discovering
the basic principles #iich govern the individual-group relation together
1
With the assumptions upon which these principles rest and the proof to which
I
they are amenable* A study of this problem in the political philosophy of
[
Rousseau, -therefore, takes the form of an inquiry into the relations between
|the individual and society* It is the study of individualism and collectivism
in the -writings of Rousseau*
I
I The earlier writings of Rousseau, the Disoours sur les Arts et Sciences





-which forms a unity with the -two preceding, is both indi-vldualis-
tic and collecti-Tlstic, although the prevailing emphasis is indi-vldualistic*
The l^oonomie politique and the Contrat social are predominantly colleotivistio,
although the individualistic elements of the earlier -writings can be found in
both.
The interpretation of Rousseau as a collecti-vist rests upon an affir-
mation of the collectivistic character of the later political -writings, €ind
upon a denial of the individualistic elements -which may be found in these same
-writings together with a denial of the political significance of the earlier
individuedistic Discourses . The affirmation csin bo maintained, but the
denials cannot* To deny the political significance of the Discourses is to
introduce a gap into -the work of Rousseau, a gap ?hich Rousseau himself
denied* To deny the significance of the indi-vldualistic ideas of contract
end the state of natiire in the later writings is to set aside ideas which
lie at the base of Rousseau* s system. The state of nature is a theme -nhioh
dominates the whole of his -writing, and the idea of contract, which is its
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oouxcberpart, is an idea iKhich Rousseau himself defended as basic to his
|
political philosophy* It is nob possible, therefore, to cancel the individ-
ualistic elements in the political vrritings even though these -writings are
predominantly collecti-vistic.
The interpretation of Rousseau as an individualist rests upon a dis-
paragement of the oollectivistic elements in his thought, and this is like-
wise a falsification of his thought as a liiole* This interpretation holds
that Rousseau allows partial associations the right to exist within the state^,
that he defines the general will as the rational will or the will to right,
that he introduces checks upon the general will in fa-vor of -bhe individual,
that he conceives the interests of the state to be identical irith those of
the individual, and that he does not regard ci-vil association on the analogy
of an organism* In ans-wer to these contentions, however, it may be pointed
out -that Rousseau acknowledges the existence of partial associations as a
fact but that he does not allow them an existence by right* ^e defines the
general will as the will to right but he also defines it as the -will of the
I majority and the attempt to unite the ideal and the actual characteristics
I
of the general will is contradictory* The proposed checks in favor of the
individual are checks which cone to nothing in practice* The identity of
interest between the individual and the state is an identity which is either
assximed as an automatic connection, or supported by €in argument from analogy
with the biological organism* The organic conception, therefore, is one -vihich
Rousseau both affirmed and denied*
A correct interpretation of Rousseau’s thought would have to begin
I
\
by ascertaining his true attitude toward society* The problem is almost
!
impossible of clear solution, because Rousseau both praises and condemns
j
society, and when he condemns society it is difficult to say idaether he is
i I' .
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ispeaking of contemporary soceity or society per se « In the systematic struc-
jbtire of Rousseau* s thought there are, hov/ever, two principles which amount to
a philosophical condemnation of society, namely, the materialistic principle
according to which society is conceived as the product of fortuitous cir-
jc\imstances external to the individuals composing society, and the principle
i
jof individuality called 1 » homme nature 1 according to which the individual is
I
Iconceived in terms which make his existence incompatible with civil life.
I
The fiction of the natural man pervades the -vhole of Rousseau’ s work and
renders his most mature political conceptions inconsistent. The social pact,
Ithe general will, and the romantic approach to liberty in the Contrat social
I
are all negated by the individualism of 1’ homme naturel which underlies these
conceptions. Rousseau’s writing, therefore, may best be described as ex-
hibiting a failure of synthesis between individualism and collectivism.
Society is the product of causes external to the individual and the individ-
ual is by nature recalcitrant to society.
!
This failure of synthesis between the individual and the group results
:in the fact that there are two conceptions of liberty in the philosophy of
I
'
'Rousseau. One is the liberty of man in a state of nature; the other is the
liberty of man in society. The liberty of the natural man is the freedom of
self-assertion which is limited only by the power of the individual. The
liberty of civil man is a liberty under law, a liberty which Rousseau
described as greater and better than the liberty of the natural state. In
the Contrat social the validation of this contention about the greater
liberty of the civil state is given in the first instance in romantic terms
in which Rousseau attempts to show that the individual fulfills his social
obligations by merely follomng his own nature. The m^n lines of this
romantic approach to liberty are revealed in the contention that the social
'
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pact and the volont^ g^n^rede are the extensions of the -vdlls of the indi-
Tiduals and -that in submitting to both they are in reality submitting only
to themselves# Duty and interest coincide and justice is the simple product
^ of the wills of the individuals# The idea of consent is prominent in this
romantic approach and the definition of liberty as "obedience to a self-pre-
scribed laV is based on this idea# The romantic approach embraces also the I
idea of equality^ on the basis of 'ehich Rousseau argues that there is no
loss of liberty fbr any one particular individual because all surrender
equally# The individual yields to all and yet to none, he obeys the law by
obeying only himself, and finds preserved in the civil state the freedom
#iich prevailed in the natural state#
This romantic approach, howver, is rendered inconsistent by the
fiction of the natural man and the state of nature# The freedom of the state
of nature cannot be preserved in the civil state because this freedom is
lawless# The natural man cannot fulfill the law by merely obeying his will
because his will is lawless* The romantic approach ends, therefore, in
contradicticn and the precise cause of the contradiction is the fiction of
l^hoiane naturel
,
tdiich underlies the approach*
There is in the Contrat social a second approach to liberty, namely,
liberty by the way of ccnstraint* The appeal to the legislator, the prefer-
ence for aristocracy, and the Civil Religion are the elements in the second
approach to liberty* The legislator 8uid artstooraoy are appealed to for the
purpose of deliverizig the state fron the prejudices of individual wills and
for the piarpose of transforming individuals who are by themselves "complete
and solitary# The Civil Religion serves the purpose of making the indi-
vidual love his duty*" Obedience to the laws, in the last analysis, is
obtained through a religious sanction and this fact, taken in connection
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the state is arrayed against the individual in the Contrat social
*
|
These two approaches to liberty in the Contrat social represent the
same cross-play of individualistic and collectivistic factors which was fo\md
to exist in the ^ile and in the ^conomie politique« The vhole writing of
Rousseau may be described as a mixture of these two factors without any final
synthesis between them* The cause of the failure of synthesis is the fiction
of the state of nature and the natural man, which gives rise to a kind of in-
dividualism that is inccmpatible with any form of collective life* If a
society is to be obtained, therefore, collectivism must ti*iuii^>h over indi-
vidualism, as it does* Liberty is sacrificed and the original freedom which
Rousseau set out to preserve is lost* What pvirported to be a pact for freedom
ends by beconing a pact for constraint*
Any philosophy of liberty must begin with vhat is given, and, as
Rousseau well saw, it is the individual vhich is given* The idea of autonon^
is a first principle of liberty* But individuality must contain, in addition
to autonomy, the postulate of a social reference* The individual must be
conceived as one whcse life is internal rather than external to the life of
society* The basis of the state is the ccnmon advantage, by vdiich is meant
that area of experience in which the needs and desires of individuals meet j:
and are congruent* It is the eurea of coincidence in the interests of par-
ticulars* The principle of the common good, therefore, becomes the central
principle in a philosophy of liberty, because this principle provides the
standard of just constraint which society may exercise over individuals and
it provides also the limit of constraint by which individuals may be pro-
tected from tmjust subordination by society* Positively, this principle
calls for the state to provide the conditicna and instruments necessary for
0^ afcjsni orf> *io &;iiaIr>t'Sii ikHvi
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Liberty, therefore, may be defined as the right of the individual to
I
self-expression and self-realization in relation to other individuals -who are
organized as a society and -who both permit and provide for such self-expres-
sion subject to the restraints imposed by the common good and by the recogni-
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THE CLASSICS ON LIBERTY
JUNIUS BRUTUS’S VINDICIA5 CONTRA TYRANNOS (1579)
Among the classics on liberty, few can be classed as discursive
analyses of the problem or the concept of liberty. One of those reviewed
here can be so described, that is. Mill’ s essay, "On Liberty." The others
are special pleas for particular liberties, but they are none the less impor-
tant on that account. Their particularity often serves to illuminate impor-
tant portions of the general problem.
As to the writings here selected to represent the classical productions
on libei*ty, it may be said that the list is not intended to be final. Others
may be inclined to make additicns or subtractions from the list. The only
claim made for tlie present selection is that it includes some of the more
important and influential pieces in the literature on the subject. J. F.
Stephen’s Liberty, Equality, Fraternity is included for the sake of showing
a common answer to Mill as well as fbr the sake of showing how an anti-liber-
al attack on liberty mis^t be formulated.
A list of the classics on liberty would doubtless include the
Vindiciae contra Tyrannos of Junius Brutus. This tract, written under the
pseudonym, Junius Brutus, was probably published in 1579 and the author is
generally believed to be one Philippe de Mornay (1549-1623), a French Pro-
2
testant leader, and counsellor to King Henry IV of France. The tract was
1. He was called "du Plessis-Momay" or "Duple s si s-Momay” as Laski
prefers to write it.
2. For the authorship and date of the writing Cf. Laski, Art. 1, 57-60.
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first -written in both Latin and French, then bein? translated into English
in many editions, the most available of -s\hich is the anonymous translation
which was published in London by Robert Baldvan in 1689,^ and reprinted under
the editorship of Harold Laski in 1924 under the title, "A Defence of Liberty
A.gainst Tyrants.”
Originally the tract was addressed to the Huguenots for the purpose of
encouraging them in their persecutions rather -than for the purpose of refut-
2ing their opponents* Its importance and influence may be measured by the
fact that the theory of the state upon iidiich it rests ’’determined the charac-
ter of political specula,tion from the end of the sixteenth century until the
*7
eidvent of Rousseau;” and also from the fact that through Locke its ideas
became the fotindation both of the political thought of Price and Priestley
and of the American Revolution.^ It belongs to the Monarchomachic tradition,
which is the liberal point of -view opposed to absolute monarchy, though not
opposed to monarchy itself.^ The contention of the Huguenots for the right
to v/orship God in their o-wti -wa;/- drew its intellectual strength from -fcv/o
viritings. One v/as the Pranco-Gallia of Hotman; the other vra.s the Vindioiae.
Although the latter is mainly a summary of ideas already in circulation, it
’’surpassed all other essays of the time in the -vlc-our and lucidity -with which
1. F. W. Coker finds t'us translation "crude,” but he derives assist-
ance from it "at some points" (RPP, 207n).
2* Laski, Art. 1, 59.
3. Ibid., 54.
4. Loc* cit.
5. "ilonarchomachs” is the name given by Barclay ( Pe Regno ) to those
vdio opposed unlimited royal povrer. Theodore Beza was among the first of this
group. His treatise. The Rights of Magistrate s Over Their Subj ects , advocates
popular sovereignty. CY.' "Las^iJ "Ar-fc * 1,
r' -rr:
dr. If.-'-t:'' be ’!?>».'’>' 'Ii ' ;.v rJio'i n-i j-tv Cy'Ti'ii'1'
I
riiffvr-'tvo/in o-^d" e / rfc 'rW ‘to dew , srTOid'ilio vrt?;: •'
r*
‘r >f'.ftjj f .*rTB rv n.nv6X.fl-'j d*ito-.':>.r( v>'' .x bnaj £x: i\=id& ['‘/Sifq estr doL'i"i
:r~LodfJ “Jo ©Dr‘>'"-eC' i' " end r^I;rrir i^2’c!C frx Mo7B'i 'io i7.U-'\7,o,Ti59 '3/'V
’*
, dxxi- T,: T :! o r: /.jbjiA
lo 3soq*'::7: <>rid wdorr'^tf’^;f.h od bfjaa«>7b>jft ei'/r do/ td r/ifd yx fiuri* • 7.!?
'lo mcq*tvq sfrid 70 'i rw'-y *jaiiJ;37. e^cx:/ ;o')^*x£>q ..tar/d rri J•’'^^^iv^ : ^i"-r7XJcoc|!
S
odd ro fWj/f2«o'x od ‘'xxt 0-^;r')f/I^JJXi cdl ,ndamioqqo t j'aid ®;xi;
a id f'3xt*iTtio:mf>" dd r.oitf:' Jo -^f ad^dt io;id 1 : '•'toa. d o :-d (xi d dxr.'i
'•••;:* \’7'd-^.>o rf.,'Taf» o-qd lo ii.:& jui xjoidjeXjJoaca !>‘.,-.:t q Ic 7od




y'^£daox 7‘I aoxT ! lo cifd lo ddo^ ffc/?dv*dni/a’’ :rid ‘ . ooc.'
1 7oJ:d.ifft>7d o.WiiWioii'y'tono!'-! a/{d nd . ernorod dr ,rtc tdvto'v ‘•2 rcr.o-' ’(^vpA a/-d ‘?o 'tl-t
dorc d; xodd ,v>w73*^a adxifof'rfX' od b0r>oqqo vrarr lo drrXoq LR^edxi ox d a .;
aHnr-i sdd aol ad orr.Oi/^ixH evr'd lo xroidtiwdftC'o oxiT yxfo^xjr.tom oq I-osQCffjo
o\’rd T-j'i" l2//dc jlXodfti sdt WG7& xt'O liodd me bo'> o^x.tok’ od
. '^.nir-xbx'iV xj^d a.r.7 -lorfda a d ;{t?i;idor lo ofuj*^ Oi'.d sa«r f-K," . a*^:rsi\?x*ryv
-
,
.^o ni yJSjjge^'xi e.'sabf lo y'lrrsr.oa x’. \jCaiftm aX lord/iX orf~ ro rr-rfdx’.A
fiod-''V rid^r '<'ifhroi'X OH"’ 7tro-'iT ai'l £t.f Oi.r'd oo'd Jo fvyasBO 70 'ido i'(j? Ir-t
”
-da/sajj RovJT^’b a/I dud fxoidxii'',r!‘ *id al. d abnil 7c»Iod , .1 . '
,
;xiYdS iH9yi) "is&rfXnq g*fn.os d£" dt nr-.^l goi/e
.. ‘^0
, i‘6 , psG ‘‘ .
^ico .oc^!
• OBodd od -Ic'iUjCvd cwv.^r v>;,,/jq ofii, vj! ''rt::2/*^f'/:'o7.i;!'.f>' " .6
nxdd lo da 7 J:l ai'.d ’.;.'ox 7 : «/nv fjsofi wiobo'^xl"' •.^gp-oo X/p:',’;o7 h 'dIi?Jf.rrL- .'V'ecwqo orfw
I >od,aoOT Jui 5 9do*.*i‘d>/'& 7^'j/.' ' 7ayO 5odjE‘7d3i*A?T "io sidd’ni.l ->;iT , id.3/'7v! nid . njC'i'g
• I j /. - -






The subject matter of the treatise may be * summarized under the four
questions -which the treatise discusses:
I. Whether Subjects are bound and ought to obey Princes, if they com-
mand that which is against the Law of God.
II. Whether it be laiivful to resist a Prince -which doth infring the
Law of God, or ruine the Church, by -whom, how, and how far it is la-wrful.
III. V/hether it be lawful to resist a Prince -which doth oppress or
ruine a publick State, and how far such resistance may be extended, by
vhom, how and by vhat Right, or Law it is permitted.
rv. Whether neighbour Princes or States may be, or are bound by Law,
to give succours to the Subjects of ther Princes, afflicted for the Cause
of true Religion, or oppressed by manifest Tyranny.
^
The first question is answered -wdth the contenticn that kings must be obeyed
"when they serve and obey God and not other -vways"^ for kings are under con-
tract to God as the people are under contract to the king and if kings "vio-
late their oath, and transgress the law, -we say that they have lost their
kingdom."^
The second question is ans-wered by saying that it is la-wful to resist
a king who would overthrow the law of God but resistance must come, not from
the people as a -wAiole, but from their representatives, the magistrates.®
Passive resistance or voluntary exile are the -vweapons recommended for use
by the people.® They may not as private men resist by arms unless coramanded
7by their magistrates. The use of arms, ho-wever, is not absolutely forbidden
1. Laski, Art. 1, 34.
2. From the facsimile title page to the edition of 1689 in Momay,
DLT, 61.










;)'’-S j. tij.'rTrj/o '/.v • •.; 'h'*'! d oif;< '^o '; ;;> :j
.'' KT fj/j
por ! b
.-/.i d;j.r :< '
-HJi
-^too ii ^vcio/ix-, '! vof/o nd -M-j-o hc'-j v) 'io>p::orbr ,'
•>
'*^' J a i: c'j . .. •
y,frl-:h^.l •;: or, dcxiw oor'-i-' .;
-'n/r,.-' nd- X/«'!v,?.l ,-d M .
ai d.r vro/’, fu:\^
^
-op
,_.;i: it- yd odd -jnxwV to
,
-
10 v-. 8 '^ira-o J^nb Jioitir 'iOitiy*-' daJ'diy od I/.'::rr.i' &' •>'
i'd v.'i.'n dopp




^! -^x w':, .'JAi 10. d-Biift' ':'j trfj • r
.
iT’c’ \ rj V: - o-dyd', 1C aoci.'.tii ir rdrrisc-.fi iMaV--' '
.
,.;f- 10’-: b^dodCiy, ^,,... vr. o.;d- lo edri od ei;;coo;«
..-vxx od
/'^:>sat^i({qo IC .ru.Jy'i-:' ->;"' " :j
b&\]€* iC od df'f.m pp^.ixu 'Jxr.'^ ' -.
.'...;r/co o:;.v / LtlWj"RAf< 8.‘ rtoidr.. Of.p ; r.' /
-•
.0 M1.5 f::jfriN icl ‘-''sYrr/ lo;fc^o don /rt? Iiof.' \:odo ocr ovio^ var^.: . .r:,^
?yt:.rd "t i bfp '^rr od.d o.! d.c.- v.'r oo 'r^oxtu ni.f^ .oXqooq su'd a;- ryo”' od' d' t-o-;
cIbcx ov3d vertd- doHd- oe.' C a.' rux^ •. ‘-n ;: ,ud
s "C0" od L:div;.ii sx di j-rod r . -. /'c -/ I- yiywarn a r ac i
' a ys>p door>'.;,
.,fi~
jT vi^ dctf
. or ^ o dsitt; FOi'^dalGoi :’ud' bob ‘j.p odd wc ii.Jiovo oLivv, oj-.v,
-it hi n
" V;;n 'T.'.. T : / Ml cfc-ff » oXofr.v J9 8B oTocoq oricf
3&X> 103 :w./.r-.,c ,.-,oc.v 3noqi?tm- o/id O— of i5- . '..^dn>jJ:ov lo oop/^JaXse-r ovfgsft^
riO;->n;3x.inc 0 :- "oln;./ aaio y<f c' .‘.''ii ooirj ecf iri'i'v; d<':ic r.m 'r'^dh 'r^o r' ' ^rJ




io v>au y I' . io.fi**rdiai"<Arr • 'o.'d vd
t .;!'cA , KfpA. ^ ,
.V^orTioJ fi ('.< '' r '->.'










The discussion of the third question yields the follomn,^ principles;
That kings “hold their povrer and sovereignty from the people"; ^ that "the
officers of the kingdom receive their authority from the people";^ that the
purpose of kings is "to procure and provide for the good of those "who are
committed to them"; ^ that the "king receives the laws from the people"; ^ and
g
the king himself is not above the law, nor may he pardon or condemn except
rr
in accordance with the law; ' that "kings are neither proprietors nor usufiruc-
p
tuaries of the royal patrimony, but only administrators." The good king
abides by these principles while the tyrant subverts them. If the tyrant
is one "without title," that is, if he is a usurper #io rules tyranically, th^
Q
proper method of dealing with him is tyrannicide. If, on the other hand,
the tyrant is not a usurper but a "tyrant by practice" and if methods of
wisdom and caution do not avail to turn him from the ruin of the state, then


















o’j r'-J'j^ry . •f./.'v.' rutrf ‘\o v.J p a:.-n?.i:ii oj{T
A
oi'U/'‘ '* j''f-',!]'.;o'^c-; orf-" n c’r'-l yrir.- .'^>'',..1^02 '''rcr. I'^fv/or' Morf" Rj^nj
•) '•:' v/Virr '*' ; "f'lqoF*''- re *il vc J’lv'u.
'
f v /^f.o-a'y • • 'f *Jo ?*
' i.'iv O 5 '.>''‘ o ^0 ,0oo'., ri/;.' :jI HT^r'xrj- lo 5
''rofiq 0i<r •i'>, Ctvef.I m-iJ r.:'vJoo,v. vMrf- ocf
:t’qoj2;o rrffpA>flco eo 01 '''i.eq ')<i v,';:;; v'-..- ; ,;i;i ,>-vC','i< .'•.o .-si' irM.'irj'-'
»»
-•of,.'/xi.a.u 'lO'': a-io j'O-i'rqO'iq u’rx- 33^.: ;i" ' -.Yii'' oxiJ ;• /.l'.,- o "
hoo*; or’T R'(Oc)x<"..ie.ir tnifij ,yr’Oflp:L*j"-i,eq f‘V{os •>.’:) 7o i-.
r^/f.e'ivj- «\{{:i ;,jl + gtfi^ olioV 30 1' ' r.'.ni'rc yc"







.rvx.-i:^ J ai; ciir: /idiw ia6 f^or{r' y::
lo 3?.’i i Brr,o '’fscijy.i'*:
;
yn '* je d'wo /t Jrxi oi ctrrrT
O-o c-rr- rjon.! ;r'.id rrv/.'' oJ' fl.'Vjs J01 ob
3XT.€f«;i •
.'.e'i fif'x ^isJ^siv 'lol" ^ 'ee.i-r o:> o.'!oOi?c IIx-.o o;^
•*
-i.-T • .*clCT • ^ itVO^;'; 9
- X 9
^
* C .1 «
t
-
« • ^ *«>«</ Cl«4> a



















have not power to persuade, there force and terror must be put in use to
compel."^ The initiative for action rests, however, not with the people but
2
with their representatives.
As to the last question, if a prince find a neighboring people op-
pressed by a tyrant he "ought to yield succour as freely and v/illingly to
the people, as he would do to the prince his brother if the people mutinied
against him.”
And to ccnclude this discourse in a word, piety commands that the law
and church of God be maintained. Justice requires that tyrants and
destroyers of the commonwealth be compelled to reason. Charity challen-
ges the right of relieving and restoring the oppressed. Those who make
no account of these things, do as much as in them lies to drive piety,
justice, and charity out of this world, that they may never more be
heard of.^
Regarding the final significance of this treatise one may say that
so far as the problem of liberty is concerned, it has greater historical
significance than philosophical. Its primary aim was to secure a limited
kind of religious freedom by means of principles vhich the writer had the
keenness to see might be applied to civil as well as to religious persecution*
But this application was incidental, if not accidental, as may be seen from
the fact that onljr one of the four questions of the treatise has a civil and
not a religious reference. The insistence upon an ethical basis for politics
is a commendable advance over the absolutism of Bodin’ s doctrine of sover-
eignty or the irresponsible despotism of Machiavelli' s The Prince
,
but the
ethical emphasis in the Vindiciae suffers the limitation of being deduced as







a corollary from a theological premise rather than beinp; derived from
principles internal to the nati^re of the state.
This TNork is a plea for freedom from "that ^'\^rich is against the Law
of God," hut there are no principles evolved which -would guarantee freedom
to those -who might differ -with the Huguenots on what the "Law of God" is,
should the Huguenots win their plea for freedom and come to power. Thus the
religious freedom sought is only a limited freedom, and there is no reason
to believe that this treatise is exempt from the criticism brought against
Iboth the Catholic and the Protestant Monarchomachs: "Each was at bottom
entirely indifferent to freedom."^
In the history of freedom, therefore, this classic has its importance;
in the philosophy of freedom, it has, more noticeably, its inadequacies.
MILTON’S JiREOPAGITICA (1644)
I
John Milton’s Areopagitica is a brilliant and noble plea for the free-
1
dom of unlicensed printing. It is a vn'iting addressed to Parliament in
criticism of the licencing ordinance which was to regulate printing so that
no publication could be printed unless approved by a licencing board. The
^argument points out that the origin of the practice of censorship is loath-
some, since it comes from the Inquisition; that men ought to be free to read
since knowledge cannot defile unless the conscience be defiled already; that,
moreover, error is of ser-vlce in knowing truth and evil in kno-wing good.
Censorship, in any event, is futile, since if effective it v/ould des-tasj;^
!all learning, but not the e-vll manners which can be learned without booksi
i
land, in order to be effective, it would have to be controlled by noble men.
1. Laski, Art. 1, 51
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but censorship is distasteful to noble men and -would, therefore, be left to
men of another kind. Finally, the result of censorship is al-ways to enhance
the demand for that -which is censored.
This remarkably able and modern plea for a free press closes -vd.th the
I challenging exclamation, ’’Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to
I 1
argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties.
LOCKE’S FOUR LETTERS OR TOLERATION (1685-1704)
Locke’s Four Letters on Toleration are, like the preceding -writings,
an extended plea for a particular liberty, the liberty to -worship in accord-
ance -with the dictates of one’s conscience.
Authorities differ as -to the date of publication of the first Letter
but it was either 1685 or 1689, Its publication precipitated a controversy
and the second and third Letters are long and tedious answers to the argu-
ments of opponents. The fourth Letter
,
much later than the others, is only
fragmentary, its composition having been interrupted by the death of the
author in 1704.
2
The first Letter has been called a "business-like piece of argument."
The thesis -which the argument supports is that "neither Pagan nor Mahometan,
nor Jew, oupjit to be excluded from the civil rights of the commonwealth,
3because of his religion." The Letter draws a sharp distinction between the
pro-vince of the state and that of the church. Such interests as life,
liberty, health, property, and "indolency of body"^ belong to the state
1. Milton, ARE, 58.
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while the chxjrch is concerned -virith "the salvation of souls" and the interests
of the Future Life. The jurisdiction of the mag:istrate does not extend to
this latter realm; the care of souls does not belong to him because it has
never been given to him; his jurisdiction is temporal, not eternal.^ Be-
t-ween the church and the state, and bet-ween branches of the church toleration
is to prevail. "No body, therefore, in fine, neither single persons,
nay nor even commonwealths, have any just title to invade the civil rights
and worldly goods of each other, upon pretence of religion." The magis-
trate may not interfere in the internal life of churches for the purpose of
regulating the forms of -worship or for the purpose of imposing penalties,
except so far as such penalties vrould be imposed for immorality or crime in
the regular course of civil life irrespective of religious connection.^
4
The magistrate may not suppress even idolatry.
Among the reasons for religious liberty, Locke gives first the one
already noted, the natural division of purpose between the church and the
state. Another, equally important, is the fact that truth cannot be revealed
or enforced by law so that the effort to impose "true religion" is self-
contradictory. "But if truth makes not her way into the understanding by
her own light, she will be but the weaker for any borrowed force violence
can add to her."^ These points form the core of the argument, although there
|
is the additional observation that intolerance is nowhere commanded in the
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New Testament, whereas tolerance is*^
This classic plea for religious liberty is brave, straightforward,
and cogent. It is tarnished, however, by the fact that its principles are
denied entirely to atheists and granted only grudgingly, if at all, to
Catholics. ’’Lastly, those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being
of God.”^ This, of course, is an ugly streak of intolerance, having nothing
stronger than a fallacious argument to support its ’’Promises, covenants,
and oaths, -which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an
atheist.”^
The attack on the Catholics is similarly/ illiberal, but it raises a
genuine problem. Locke’s objection to tolerating the Catholics vras that in
Joining the Catholic Church they had ipso facto delivered themselves up to
the protection and service of another prince and could, therefore, no longer
be loyal citizens. ^ The assumption cannot, of course, be granted, but it
raises the problem of how far, in the interest of liberty, the state mi^st
tolerate an association -which is dedicated to the overthrov/ of the state.
How far can intolerance be tolerated? Locke’s ans-wer was: Any group -which
does not teach the duty of toleration is not to be tolerated. This principle
5 ihas its limitations but it cannot be denied that Locke’s ans-wer is an attemps
at sol-ving one of the most difficult of all the problems connected -with the
task of making liberty real in practice. Locke’s critics, in pointing to his
I
1. Locke, FLT, 9.
2. Ibid., 31.
3. Loc . ext.
4. Loc. cit.
5. In cases of social conflict it is not toleration but reason -which
gives hope of a solution.
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illiberalism. have frequently overlooked this point.
183 .
THE TimiTIHGS OF THOMAS PAIHB (1776-1795)
The vnritings of Thomas Paine have plaj'ed a conspicuous part in the
historical struggle for liberty, having borne fruit in England, France, and
America. His Coinrnon Sense (1776), the Dissertations on Government (1786),
the Dissertation on the First Principle s of Government (1795), and The Rights
of Man (1791-92) are among his most significant works in this respect and
the first and last of these are probably more significant than the other two,
yhich, on account of their close similarity in the treatment of goveimment,
may be grouped together. In so far as these works deal with the problem of
liberty, they dea.l with it mainly in terms of the historical events of the
time and the exigencies of the moment. The basic argument is the same in
all; it is an argument in favor of representative government and against
monarchy. Certain principles of liberty are adopted as the basis of the
attack and these may be summarized under three recurring ideas: Natxiral
equality of rif^ts, a social contract, and representative government. With
the exception of the Common Sense, -which is a combined refutation of monarchy
and a plea for the separation of the New England Colonies, all three of these
ideas appear in each of the -wrritings noted. In no case, however, do these
ideas receive such a discursive trea-tment as they receive, for example, in
the -writing of Rousseau. Paine rather sets them do-wn as a fulcrvun by -which
to pry loose the aristocratic, monarchic tradition; and, if one may pursue
the figure, the lever is rather longer on the end of attack than on the end
of defense.
The thesis of the Dissertation on the First Principles of Government
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First, that hereditary government has not a right to exist; that it
cannot be established on any principle of right; and that it is a
violation of all principle. Secondly, that government by election and
representation has its origin in the natural and eternal rights of man.^
The Rights of Man has been described as a "coimterblast" against
Edmtind Burke’s Refl ections on the Revolution in France (1790). The ingredi-
ents composing this "blast" are the three ideas previously mentioned plus
a generous dash of sarcasm, and satire. Paine finds that Burke’s treatise,
"vritten as instruction to the French Nation ... is darkness attempting
to illuminate light." The argument follows the usual pattern. It is a
spicey and spirited attack on monarchy and aristocracy with an equally
spirited defense of the representative principle. The backbone of the argu-
ment^ is to be found in Paine’s contention that the rights of man have their
origin, not in society nor in any concession from the sovereign power, but
in nature. The?/ are the gift of the Creator, not the gift of the king, and
they originated with the divine creation of man at the beginning of the
world. The civil rights of man are based upon his natural rights and "every
civil right has for its foundation some natural right pre-existing in the
individual."^ Natural rights give v/ay to civil rights onl?/" because the state
of nature is an imperfect condition for the realization and preservation of
the rights of man. The civil state supplies this power of realization in the
case of such rights as security and protection. Other rights man retains in
the civil state in the same way in which he held them in the state of nature.
1. Paine, FPG, 272.
2. Ernest Barker, Art. 1, 530
3. Paine, RM, 281-82.
4. Ibid., 303-307.
5. Ibid., 306.
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The foundation of -the civil state is a social contract.^
Paine’s basic ideas are thus strikingly similar to those
but Rousseau’s treatment of them is much to be preferred for it
2
complete and more carefully reasoned.
of Rousseau
is more
THOREAU'S "CIVIL DISOBEDIMCE" (1849)
Another -writing -which might well be included in a list of the classics
on liberty is Henry D. Thoreau’s essay, "Ci-vll Disobedience," first published
llin 1849 under the title, "Resistance to Civil Government." This essay, like
Mill’s, is a defense of indi-vidual liberty, but, unlike Mill’s, it lacks the
I careful reasoning and the clear presentation of principles by -which indi-vidua.
liberty may be attained. Thoreau’s counsel is the more hasty one of dis-
obedience, or more accurately, non-cooperation -with a government whose laws
are \xn3ust, especially if those laws make the citizen a party to injustice
4
against another person. The indi-vidual’ s first duty is not to his country
1. The idea of contract receives fuller trea-bment in the other
-writings, e.g., DG,138 and FPG, 272-3, but the treatment of the idea is scant
in any event.
2. Paine, ho-wever, said that Rousseau’s -writings animate the mind -with
a love for liberty without describing how to attain it (RM,334). The
strength of Paine’s -view over Rousseau’s lies in the fuller development of
the constitutional and representative principles to be found in the former.
For the relation of Paine to Rousseau (and Voltaire) see Clark, Art. 1, -where
the folio-wing similarities are noteds (l) Both (Paine and Rousseau) start
from the conviction that ccntemporary civilization is indescribably bad; (2)
both exalt the simplicity of the state of nature against the complexity of
the ci-vilized state; (3) both resolve to test fact by right; (4) both (unlike
Burke) disregard the restraints of tradition; (5) both had faith in the
people.
3. Thoreau, MIS, ix.
4. Thoreau, CD, 146. Thoreau held that tariff laws, slavery laws,
and -the laws aiming at the prosecution of the Mexican War -were unjust (CD,
passim and Emerson, Art. 1, 9).
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"but to his conscience; he must he a man first and a subject after-wards.
Pursuance of this underlying principle causes the thought at times to verge
conspicuously on anarchy. The opening paragraph, for example, affirms the
^8 ;
belief that "that goveniment is best -which governs not at all," but the
paragraph implies also that men are not yet ready for this kind of govern-
ment, although Tid^en they are ready this is the kind of government they -vd.11
have. The authority -which the -writer grants government in the end is granted
grudginglys
The authority of government, even such as I am -walling to submit
to . • .is still an impure ones to be strictly just, it must have the
sanction and consent of -the governed. It can have no pure right over
my person and property but -vdiat I concede to it.^
As a plea for the autonomy of the individual and as a reminder that
la-wf must be consistent -with justice, the essay is not -without its signifi-
cance. Beyond this, ho-wever, its limitations exceed its merits. The icono-
clastic spirit of the -writing issues in contempt, not only for the injustices
of government but for government itself. The -writer feels that v/ith respect
to the goveniment of his day, a person "cannot -without disgrace be associated
-with it." This attitude to-ward government embodies the essential -weakness
of the position. The government, says Thoreau, "does not concern me much,
and I shall bestow the fe-west possible thoughts on it."^ A search for any
concessions -which -would justify government leaves the student -with the con-
•vlction that Thoreau succeeded too well in his aim. There is no notice of
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"be rid of; it is hardly worth trying to reform. He spunis the consideration
of ways for removing an unjust law with a flourish~which turns out to be
self-contradictor y when examined; • .1 know not of such ways. They take
too much time, and a man’s life will be gone.*'^ The method should be more
direct; The individual should refuse to cooperate mth the government by
refusing to pay his taxes -whenever the laws are judged unjust by the dictates
of the individual’s conscience.
Whatever may be said in behalf of conscientious objectors, and much
can be said in their favor, it must be acknowledged that when conscientious
objection ccmbines -vnth contempt for government and indifference to-ward the
rectification of law, it takes on a character inimical to social life itself.
Thoreau may have been ri^t in his opposition to slavery, the tariff, and
the Mexican W'ar but even viien one is right he does not help his position by
•wrong arguments. To assert a principle vMch, consistently carried out,
•would destroy the society to which the principle is addressed is undoubtedly
a -wrong argtmient.
MILL’S ESSAY ON LIBERTY (1859)
Unlike any of the -writings considered thus far, the classic essay of
John S-buart Mill, On Liberty
,
is a philosophical analysis of the problem of
individual liberty. The subject of his essay is "the nature and limits of
the po-vver -which can be legitimately exercised by society over the indi-vid-
2
ual." Two maxims constitute the solution at nhich Mill arrives.
1. Thoreau, CD, 146.
2. Mill, LIB, 1.
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The maxims are, first, that the individual is not accountable to
society for his actions, in so far as these concern the interests of no
person but himself. • • • Secondly, that for such actions as are pre-
judicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable and
may be subjected either to social or to le^al punishments, if society is
of the opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its protection ].
The introductory chapter of Mill’s essay deals mth the nature of
^liberty and defines the domain of human liberty as *'the in-ward domain of
consciousness." The chapter demands liberty of conscience, "in the most
comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of
opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical and speculative, scientific,
moral or theological*"^
The second chapter, "Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion," under-
takes a detailed examination of this branch of the general subject, giving
argvunents -vAiich do not differ greatly from those of Milton.
The third chapter, "Of Individuality as One of the Elements in TiTell-
Being," inquires whether the same reasons which establish freedom of opinion
do not also establish the freedom of men to act upon their opinions "so long
as it is at their own risk and peril." The principle laid down is: ". • .Ir
things -which do not primarily concena others, individuality should assert
itself*"^
The fourth chapter, "Of the Limits of the Authority of Society over
the Individual," offers the folio-wing principle as a solution: "To individ-
uality should belong the part of life in which it is chiefly the indi-vidual
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that is interested; to society, the part -which chiefly interests society*”^
It is -worth noting -that Mill takes full account of the objection that a
mstinction bet-ween that kind of conduct -w^^.ich concerns only the individual
and that -wliich concerns society cannot be made# In opposition to his prin-
ciple he points out, -with sufficient completeness almost to carry the reader’s!
con-vlction against him, that many allegedly individual acts have social con-
sequences, and even -when the indi-vidual harms only himself his example is bad
for society*^ Mill’s ans-wer to this obj'ection is tvro-fold: "Yfhenever, in
short, there is a definite damage, or a definite risk of damage, either to an
individual or "to the public, the case is taken out of the province of liberty,,
and placed in tliat of morality or la-w." But in the case of conduct
vhich neither violates any specific duty to the public, nor occasions
perceptible hurt to any assignable individual except himself; the incon-
venience is one vAiich society can afford to bear, for the sake of the
greater good of human freedom*^
5
A.S examples of conduct of the latter kind. Mill notes such religious prac-
tices as eating pork, or such behavior as drinking fermented liquors, or in-
dulging Sabbath amusements, agitation against some of -which is due to those !
’’intrusively pious members of society, the stricter Cal-vrinists and Methodist&"
In the same category of merely indi-vldual conduct he places, in the last
chapter, such practices as fornication and gambling, although not vdthout
noting that the existence of ba-wdy houses and gaming places presents a prob-
lem less clear and moit difficult* It is li-btle -wonder that Mill’s essay
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provoked the righteous indignation of the Puritan Sir James Stephen,
-vdiose
rebellious ansiver to Mill we are soon to consider.
If the individual has a right to be protected from the moral meddle-
someness of the group or from the tyranny of a prevailing but objectionable
social custom or opinion, the group of society, on the other hand, has a
right to demand certain things of the individual, but it must be admitted
that Mill’s treatment of this side of the problem is sketchy. He notes two
conditions vhich "society is justified in enforcing, at all costs, to those
endeavor to withhold fulfilment." These "two obligations are, first, that no
individual injure those interests of another individual "which, either by
express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as
rights," and, secondly, iiiat each individual bear "his share (to be fixed on
some equitable principle) of the labors and sacrifices incurred for defending
the society or its m©nbers from injury and molestation,"^ There are, in
addition, certain positive acts for the benefit of others which the individ-
I
2
ual may rightfully be compelled to perform.
The final chapter, "Applications," presents some illustrations or
"specimens of application" of the maxims viiich form the teaching of the essay,
It also presents an extension of a principle already laid down. The principli
established thus far is that society may rightfully interfere against an
individual only for the sake of protecting other individuals from injury.
But, Mill suids, althou^ this is the only reason which can justify such
interference, it does not follow, therefore, that this reason always does
justify such interference. He gives an example to show that if the general '
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•welfare necessarily involves an injury to the interest of an individual,
the individual has no "right" to protection. If tvio persons compete in an
examination for an appointment vhich both desire, the one who fails suffers
an injury to his interests but he has no claim, to protection.^
Among the problems treated in the last chapter is the problem of
I
government interference with trade and commerce, the wisdom of which is
denied, not because such interference is outside the province of government,
but because such interference does not accomplish the end aimed at. In any
event, this problem does not involve the question of individual liberty since
it falls within a jurisdiction in which society has the right to interfere.
Likev/ise, the question of -whether the government should intervene to do some-
thing for the benefit of individuals is not strictly a part of the question
of indi-vidual liberty but Mill treats it and the reasons he gives for oppos-
ing such intervention are instructive. He says, in substance, that the thing
to be done is likely to be better done by individuals than by the government,
that even if it were not better done by individuals it still should be done
3by them for the sake of their own mental education, and that adding unneces-
sarily to the power of the government is a great e-vil because it tends toward
bureaucracy and the absorption of the principal ability of the country into
the go-verning body, which is "fatal, sooner or later, to the mental activity
and progressiveness of the body itself."^ To find the -way bet-ween the evils
of bureaucracy and the ad-vantages of centralized power and intelligence "is
191 .
lU
1. Mill, LIB, 167.
2. Ibid., 193.
3. Ibid., 194.
4. Ibid., 195 ff.
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one of the most difficult and complicated questions in the art of govern-
19^.
ft 1
ment* Mill offers the follomng principle for guidance in this matters
"The greatest dissemination of power consistent mth efficiency, but the
greatest possible centralisation of information, and diffusion of it from
the center."^
Mill’s treatment of the problem of governmental interference is
patently Individualistic, belonging to the laissez-faire tradition# It
closes with the following passage:
The mischief begins wlien, instead of calling forth the activity and
powers of individuals and bodies, it (the government) substitutes its
own activity for theirs# # # # The worth of a State in the long run, is
the worth of the individuals composing it; and# # # a State "vdaich dwarfs
its men, in order that they may be more docile instruments in its hands
even for beneficial purposes, will find that with small men no great
thing can really be accomplished # # •'^
The same individualism which leads Mill to look with fear upon the powr of
centralized authority leads him to fear education by the state# "That the
whole or any large part of the education of the people should be in State
hands, I go as far as any one in deprecating#"^ The state may require that
children receive a minimum of education and it may require examinations to
ascertain whether this minimum has been achieved, but such examinations are
to be confined to the factual content of these topics# In view of the manner
in which totalitarian states in modem times dominate education for the
purpose of indoctrinating individuals with the purposes of the state. Mill’s
warning is not altogether untimely.
> 1# Mill, LIB, 201#
2# Loc# cit#
3# Ibid#, 204.
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IA final instance of the individualism of Mill’s view is to be found in
his treatment of -those forms of individual conduct -vhich may be classed as
self-indulgence, ©•g*# the use of intoxicants, gambling, and fornication.
Mill holds that these are matters in -which legislative interference is not
legitimate, although the indi-vidual -who does harm to others -while intoxicated
is rightfully liable to punishment. The problem created by the existence
of groups -which profit from these forms of indulgence, ho-wever, is a problem
the difficulty of -which Mill notes but for -which he offers no detailed solu-
tion, The principle underlying the attitude of society to-ward persons ad-
dicted -fco intoxicants and gambling is;
Their choice of pleasures, and their mode of expending their income,
after satisfying their legal and moral obligations to the State and to
indi-viduals, are their ovn concern, and must rest -with their o-wn judg-
ment • ^
This statement, like others -which are more parenthetical, sho-wrs the
point of departure of Brill's -whole philosophy of individual liberty. In one
parenthetical remark we are told that ", . , liberty consists in doing -what
one desires, . ," and in another that ", , ,all restraint, qu^S restraint,
is an e-vil, , We may summarize Mill’s view, therefore, by saying that
individual liberty is the absence of restraint in so far as such absence of
restraint is consistent -with no injury to the rights of other individuals
and -wdth no injury -bo society as a -whole.
^
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STEPHEN’S LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATEH^TY (1873)
One of the most notable and detailed answers to Mill’s essay comes
from the pen of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen (1829-94), who was a British





offers a point-by-point criticism of
Mill’s essay and presents as an alternative the thesis that force is not
only necessary but justifiable, if the end to viiich it is directed is true
or good, if the use of force is not too costly in proportion to the end
2 3
achieved. This principle is taken to justify religious and moral coercion
for society must be alert to "keep both young fools and old fools out of
hann’ s way# If freedom does not like it, let her go and sit on the heights#"'*
The attack on Mill is a curious medley of cogent reasoning, misrepresenta-
5
tion, and dogmatic utterance# Let us turn to some of the main points of
Stephen’s criticism.
One point made early in the attack is that morality and religion are
both coercive systems, and the coercion is for purposes which cannot be
included under Mill’s principle of "self-protection." Moreover, if Mill’s
1# Smellie, Art# 1, 385.
2# Stephen, LEF, 49.
3# Ibid#, 15-16 ff# and 142-56#
4# Ibid., 188.
5# For instances of dogmatism consider (a) the assertion that men
are to be forbidden to deny the truth of the doctrines of God and the future
life, (b) the contention that the belief that persecution is alien to Christi
anity is a belief vhich is popular "with the class vho feel more than they
think" ( 100-101 ), and (c) the outburst against fornication (126).
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principle were applied to religion and morals it would destroy both.
The only moral system which would comply with the principle stated
by Mr, Mill -would be one capable of being summed up as follo-ws; — ’Let
e-very man please himself -without hurting his neighbour; ’ and every
moral s;'/stem -which aimed at more than this • • • would be -wrong in
principle# This -would condemn every existing system of morals.
^
A similar argviment is used in the case of religion.^
One might ansvrer Stephen at this point by calling attention to the
fact -that Mill’s principle is not intended to apply to morals and religion
but to politics. That the principle, "Let every man please himself," is
destructive of morality is, of course, true, but it is irrelevant. Neither
is it to be supposed that Mill proposed this as an adequate moral principle—
as anyone who has read Mill’s Utilitarianism knows. As to -the coercive
character of of religion and morality, it may be said that coercion under the
stress of reasons which the individual is free to accept or reject is one
thing, -while coercion under the stress of punishment from the sovereign
power is qjite another. Nothing but confusion comes from implying that the
-tvro types of coercion are the same.
An argument in Stephen’s second chapter against Mill’s agrument in
fa-ror of freedom of thought is similarly beside the point. By recasting
Mill’s argument in a less cogent form Stephen finds it easy to ansvrer. He
correctly quotes Mill as holding that "if any opinion is compelled to silence,
that opinion may, for aught -we can certainly know, be true. To deny this is
to assume our o-wn infallibility."^ He notices Mill’s further proposition
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there is the greatest difference betiween presuming an opinion to be
true because, with every opportunity for contesting it, it has not
been refuted, and assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting
its refutation. Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our
opinion is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its
truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with
human faculties have any rational assurance of being right.
1
Stephen, however, affirms that these two propositions from Mill imply the
following ”No one can have a rational assurance of the truth of any opinion
viiatever, unless he is infallible, or unless all persons are absolutely free
2
to contradict it.” Stephen is sure that we have a rational knowledge of a
great many things (the existence of London Bridge, or the river Thames)
whether others are, or are not at liberty to contradict them. This is, how-
ever, a shoddy analysis. Mill’s contention that certain knowledge of the
falsity of an opposing opinion implies infallibility, is true. But Stephen’s
assertion that rational assurance of any opinion implies infallibility, is
a different assertion altogether; it is not implied by the former contention;
and it is false. Likewise, the free presentation of rational considerations
against an opinion is not the same thing as the right of "all persons (to be)
absolutely free to contradict . . ."
Stephen’s criticism of Mill’s remaining arguments in favor of freedom
of thought reveal the essential weakness of Stephen’s whole attack, namely,
his confidence in force and his lack of confidence in reason. He summarizes
Mill’s last two arguments by saying that they apply exclusively to "that
small class of persons whose opinions depend principally upon the conscious-
ness that they have reached them by intellectual processes correctly
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performed."^ Stephen finds this objectionable because ’’the incalculable
majority of mankind form their opinions in quite a different vray, and are
attached to them because they suit their temper, and meet their -wishes • •
Moreo-ver, freedom of thought destroys "zealous" belief. "If you -want zeal-
ous belief, set people to fight. . • . Unlimited freedom of opinion nay be a
»Z
very good thing, but it does not tend to zeal ..." It hardljr needs remark
ing that the substitution of zeal for reason in the settlement of social
questions is the surest way to cancel all possibility of an intelligent
settlement
.
As a descriptive statement of hov/ the multitude behaves Stephen’
s
assertion -would carry more -weight. But the assertion is not descriptive; it
is normative. "The minority," he tells us, "gives way not because it is
convinced that it is -wrong, but because it is convinced that it is a minor-
ity."^ He holds that "though compulsion and persuasion go hand in hand . . .
the lion’s share of the results obtained is due to compulsion . . ."^
Coercion for the purpose of establishing and maintaining morality, and coer-
cion for the purpose of establishing and maintaining religion are common and
legitimate forms of coercion as are coercion for the purpose of establishing
alterations in existing foms of government and coercion for the purpose of
0
altering social institutions. It is tirue that Stephen holds that coercion
is not justified unless its end is true or right, but does this mean that







the ends of coercion are to be formulated in the free court of rational dis-
cussion? ITot at all: "Each is a case of coercion, for the sake of what the
persons who exercise coercive pov^r regiard as the attainment of a s;ood object!
I
... Every one who has to do with lep;islation must find, that laws
' must be based upon principles, and that it is impossible to lay dovm any
principles of legislation at all luiless you are prepared to say, I am
right, and you are wrong, and your view shall give way to mine, quietly,
gradually, and peaceably; but one of us two must rule and the other
must obey, and I mean to rule.^
Admitting that "laws must be based upon principles," the main question
from the point of view of a philosophy of liberty is: What are those prin-
ciples? Mill faces that question; Stephen side-steps it. He gives us instea^^
a justification of the practice of coercion which contains no principle that
could be regarded as rational, just, or adequate as the foundation for a
philosophy of liberty. THien a minority comes to power and when they "have
made up their minds as to what is true, they will no more tolerate error
for the sake of abstract principles about freedom than any one of us tolerate^
»2
a nest of wasps in his garden."'^ Tdiether the minority happens to be right or
not is beside the point since reason has little or nothing to do with the
decisions about vhich they are so "zealous." Stephen says, "I should say
that doctrines come home to people in general ... in so far as they happen
to interest them and appear to illustrate and interpret their own experience.”
The analysis might be pursued further, but -vdiat has been said is
sufficient to reveal the principles at work. A moment’s reflection will
shov^ thab these principles are sufficient to justify the Spanish Inquisition
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or the b3nraimical dictatorship of a power-intoxicated minority, although
Stephen personally would have no part of either, l/fhat he would prefer to
endorse, however, and vhat his principles commit him to are unfortunately
very different thins^s. Had he had the advantap;e of the political experi-
ences of Europe in the third and foiirth decades of the twentieth century
to ^ide him rather than experience with British Imperialism in the last
decades of the nineteenth century he might have been more scj*upulous in the
formulation of his principles, for the events of those years of the twentieth
century in Germany, Italjr, and Russia are the logical extension of his
principles and we can now see that instead of preserving liberty those prin-
ciples have crucified her.
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